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This report attempts to clarify some of the persis-
tent misconceptions about gangs and to assess the 
successes and failures of approaches that have been 
employed to respond to gangs. We undertook an ex-
tensive review of the research literature on gangs be-
cause we believe that the costs of uninformed policy 
making—including thousands of lives lost to vio-
lence or imprisonment—are simply too high. 
Los Angeles is a case in point. Author and former Cal-
ifornia state senator Tom Hayden reports that thou-
sands of young people have been killed in Los Angeles 
gang conflicts despite decades of extremely aggressive 
gang enforcement. City and state officials have spent 
billions of dollars on policing and surveillance, on 
development of databases containing the names of 
tens of thousands of alleged gang members, and on 
long prison sentences for gang members. Spending 
on gang enforcement has far outpaced spending on 
prevention programs or on improved conditions in 
communities where gang violence takes a heavy toll. 
Los Angeles taxpayers have not seen a return on their 
massive investments over the past quarter century: 
law enforcement agencies report that there are now 
six times as many gangs and at least double the num-
ber of gang members in the region. In the undis-
puted gang capital of the U.S., more police, more 
prisons, and more punitive measures haven’t stopped 
the cycle of gang violence. Los Angeles is losing the 
war on gangs.
Absent better information, lawmakers in the nation’s 
capital and across the country risk blindly follow-
ing in Los Angeles’ troubled footsteps. Washington 
policy makers have tied gangs to terrorism and con-
nected their formation and growth to everything 
from lax border enforcement to the illicit drug trade. 
Federal proposals—such as S. 456, the “Gang Abate-
ment and Prevention Act of 2007”—promise more 
of the kinds of punitive approaches that have failed to 
curb the violence in Los Angeles. 
Gang Wars presents findings from an extensive review 
of the research literature on gangs and the effective-
ness of various policy responses to gang problems. 
Y      outh crime in the United States remains near the lowest levels seen in           the past three decades, yet public concern and media coverage of gang activ-
ity has skyrocketed since 2000. Fear has spread from neighborhoods with long-
standing gang problems to communities with historically low levels of crime, 
and some policy makers have declared the arrival of a national gang “crisis.” Yet 
many questions remain unanswered. How can communities and policy makers 
differentiate between perceived threats and actual challenges presented by gangs? 
Which communities are most affected by gangs, and what is the nature of that 
impact? How much of the crime that plagues poor urban neighborhoods is at-
tributable to gangs? And what approaches work to promote public safety? 
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The following conclusions may surprise those who 
follow the public discussion on gangs. 
Gangs, gang members,  
and gang activity
There are fewer gang members in the United States 
today than there were a decade ago, and there is no 
evidence that gang activity is growing. It is difficult 
to find a law enforcement account of gang activity 
that does not give the impression that the problem 
is getting worse by the day. Yet the most recent com-
prehensive law enforcement estimate indicates that 
youth gang membership fell from 850,000 in 1996 
to 760,000 in 2004 and that the proportion of juris-
dictions reporting gang problems has dropped sub-
stantially. The myth of a growing gang menace has 
been fueled by sensational media coverage and mis-
use of law enforcement gang statistics, which gang 
experts consider unreliable for the purpose of track-
ing local crime trends. 
There is no consistent relationship between law 
enforcement measures of gang activity and crime 
trends. One expert observes that gang membership 
estimates were near an all-time high at the end of the 
1990s, when youth violence fell to the lowest level in 
decades. An analysis of gang membership and crime 
data from North Carolina found that most jurisdic-
tions reporting growth in gang membership also 
reported falling crime rates. Dallas neighborhoods 
targeted for gang suppression activities reported both 
a drop in gang crime and an increase in violent crime 
during the intervention period.
Gang members account for a relatively small share 
of crime in most jurisdictions. There are a hand-
ful of jurisdictions such as Los Angeles and Chicago 
where gang members are believed to be responsible 
for a significant share of crime. But the available evi-
dence indicates that gang members play a relatively 
small role in the national crime problem despite their 
propensity toward criminal activity. National esti-
mates and local research findings suggest that gang 
members may be responsible for fewer than one in 10 
homicides; fewer than one in 16 violent offenses; and 
fewer than one in 20 serious (index1) crimes. Gangs 
themselves play an even smaller role, since much of 
the crime committed by gang members is self-di-
rected and not committed for the gang’s benefit.
1  One of the eight crimes listed on Part 1 of the Uniform Crime 
Reports: rape, robbery, murder, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny, theft of a motor vehicle, and arson.
Gangs do not dominate or drive the drug trade. 
National drug enforcement sources claim that gangs 
are “the primary retail distributors of drugs in the 
country.” But studies of several jurisdictions where 
gangs are active have concluded that gang members 
account for a relatively small share of drug sales and 
that gangs do not generally seek to control drug mar-
kets. Investigations conducted in Los Angeles and 
nearby cities found that gang members accounted for 
one in four drug sale arrests. The Los Angeles district 
attorney concluded that just one in seven gang mem-
bers sold drugs on a monthly basis. St. Louis research-
ers describe gang involvement in drug sales as “poorly 
organized, episodic, nonmonopolistic [and] not a ra-
tionale for the gang’s existence.” A member of one of 
San Diego’s best-organized gangs explains: “The gang 
don’t organize nothing. It’s like everybody is on they 
own. You are not trying to do nothing with nobody 
unless it’s with your friend. You don’t put your money 
with gangs.”
The public face of the gang problem is black and 
brown, but whites make up the largest group of 
adolescent gang members. Law enforcement sources 
report that over 90 percent of gang members are 
nonwhite, but youth survey data show that whites 
account for 40 percent of adolescent gang members. 
White gang youth closely resemble black and Latino 
counterparts on measures of delinquency and gang in-
volvement, yet they are virtually absent from most law 
enforcement and media accounts of the gang prob-
lem. The disparity raises troubling questions about 
how gang members are identified by police.
Most gang members join when they are young and 
quickly outgrow their gang affiliation without the 
help of law enforcement or gang intervention pro-
grams. A substantial minority of youth (7 percent of 
whites and 12 percent of blacks and Latinos) goes 
through a gang phase during adolescence, but most 
youth quit the gang within the first year. One mul-
tistate survey found that fully half of eighth-graders 
reporting gang involvement were former members. 
When former gang members cite reasons why they 
left the gang, they commonly mention high levels of 
violence and say that they just grew out of gang ac-
tivity; only rarely do they cite fear of arrest or crimi-
nal penalties.
Most youth who join gangs do so between the ages 
of 12 and 15, but the involvement of younger chil-
dren in gangs is not new. Noted expert Malcolm 
Klein observes: “Although some writers and officials 
decry the 8- and 10-year-old gang member, they 
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haven’t been in the business long enough to realize 
that we heard the same reports 20 and 40 years ago.” 
Leaving the gang early reduces the risk of negative 
life outcomes, but current policies make it more 
difficult for gang members to quit. Gang involve-
ment is associated with dropping out of school, teen 
parenthood, and unstable employment, but the risks 
are much smaller for those who leave the gang in 
a year or less. Yet little attention has been devoted 
to why and how youth leave gangs, and many gang 
control policies make the process of leaving more 
rather than less difficult by continuing to target for-
mer members after their gang affiliation has ended. 
Researchers note: “Police and school officials may 
not be aware of the decision of individuals to leave 
the gang or may not take such claims seriously, and 
records may not be purged of prior gang status.…
When representatives of official agencies (e.g., police, 
school) identify an individual as a gang member, they 
are sending a powerful signal to rival gang members 
as well as to people in the community about the gang 
involvement of that person.”
Gang enforcement
The record of law enforcement antigang efforts pro-
vides little reason for optimism. Media reports are full 
of stories about cities where crime goes up, a crack-
down is launched, and crime goes down. But a review 
of research on the implementation of gang enforce-
ment strategies—ranging from neighborhood-based 
suppression to the U.S. Justice Department Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s Com-
prehensive Gang Program Model—paints a very dif-
ferent picture. Findings from investigations of gang 
enforcement efforts in 17 jurisdictions over the past 
two decades yield few examples of success and many 
examples of failure. 
The problems highlighted in the research include:
•   Lack of correspondence between the problem, 
typically lethal and/or serious violence, and a law 
enforcement response that targets low-level, non-
violent misbehavior.
•   Resistance on the part of key agency personnel to 
collaboration or implementation of the strategy as 
designed.
•   Evidence that the intervention had no effect or a 
negative effect on crime and violence.
•   A tendency for any reductions in crime or violence 
to evaporate quickly, often before the end of the 
intervention period.
•   Poorly designed evaluations that make it impos-
sible to draw any conclusions about the effect of 
an intervention.
•   Failure of replication efforts to achieve results com-
parable to those of pilot programs.
•   Severe imbalances of power and resources between 
law enforcement and community partners that 
hamper the implementation of “balanced” gang 
control initiatives.
The literature survey also yielded the following find-
ings concerning typical gang enforcement initiatives:
Police gang units are often formed for the wrong 
reasons and perceived as isolated and ineffectual 
by law enforcement colleagues. A survey of 300 
large cities found that the formation of gang units 
was more closely associated with the availability of 
funding and the size of the Latino population than 
with the extent of local gang or crime problems. An 
in-depth study of four cities determined that gang 
units were formed in response to “political, public, 
and media pressure” and that “almost no one other 
than the gang unit officers themselves seemed to be-
lieve that gang unit suppression efforts were effec-
tive at reducing the communities’ gang problems.” 
Investigators found that gang officers were poorly 
trained and that their units became isolated from 
host agencies and community residents. The chief of 
one police department admitted that he had “little 
understanding of what the gang unit did or how it 
operated.” The authors observed that the isolation 
of gang units from host agencies and their tendency 
to form tight-knit subcultures—not entirely unlike 
those of gangs—may contribute to a disturbingly 
high incidence of corruption and other misconduct.
Heavy-handed suppression efforts can increase 
gang cohesion and police-community tensions, 
and they have a poor track record when it comes 
to reducing crime and violence. Suppression re-
mains an enormously popular response to gang activ-
ity despite concerns by gang experts that such tactics 
can strengthen gang cohesion and increase tension 
between law enforcement and community members. 
Results from Department of Justice–funded inter-
ventions in three major cities yield no evidence that 
a flood of federal dollars and arrests had a positive 
impact on target neighborhoods. St. Louis evaluators 
found that dozens of targeted arrests and hundreds of 
police stops failed to yield meaningful reductions in 
crime in the targeted neighborhoods, even during the 
period of intense police activity. Dallas residents saw 
the incidence of “gang-related” violence fall in target 
areas but had little to celebrate because the overall 
violent crime numbers rose during the intervention 
period. Detroit evaluators reported initial reductions 
in gun crimes within two targeted precincts, but the 
apparent gains were short-lived: by the end of the 
intervention period, the incidence of gun crime in 
target areas was at preintervention levels and trend-
ing upward.
“Balanced” gang control strategies have been 
plagued by replication problems and imbalances 
between law enforcement and community stake-
holders. Gang program models that seek to balance 
suppression activities with the provision of social 
services and supports have been piloted in Boston 
and Chicago with some success. But the results of 
attempts to replicate Operation Ceasefire and the 
Comprehensive Gang Program Model in other ju-
risdictions have been disappointing. Replications of 
the Ceasefire model in Los Angeles and Indianapolis 
produced no evidence that efforts to disseminate a 
deterrence message had changed the behavior of gang 
members. Meanwhile, replications of the Chicago 
model in five cities produced mixed results, with just 
two sites reporting reductions in participants’ vio-
lent behavior that approached statistical significance. 
Prevention and intervention appeared to lag far be-
hind suppression efforts in the many sites. The Los 
Angeles Ceasefire evaluators concluded: “We suspect 
that the carrot side of these interventions will always 
lag far behind the stick side in spite of the best inten-
tions that it not do so, unless some extraordinary ef-
forts are made” (emphasis added). A recent analysis 
concluded that two-thirds of resources expended on 
gang reduction in Los Angeles have gone to suppres-
sion activities.
African American and Latino communities bear 
the cost of failed gang enforcement initiatives. 
Young men of color are disproportionately identi-
fied as gang members and targeted for surveillance, 
arrest, and incarceration, while whites—who make 
up a significant share of gang members—rarely show 
up in accounts of gang enforcement efforts. The Los 
Angeles district attorney’s office found that close to 
half of black males between the ages of 21 and 24 
had been entered in the county’s gang database even 
though no one could credibly argue that all of these 
young men were current gang members. Commu-
nities of color suffer not only from the imposition 
of aggressive police tactics that can resemble martial 
law, but also from the failure of such tactics to pacify 
their neighborhoods. One researcher argues that in 
Chicago, for example, a cycle of police suppression 
and incarceration, and a legacy of segregation, have 
actually helped to sustain unacceptably high levels of 
gang violence. 
Positive public safety strategies
This report does not endorse any particular program 
or approach for reducing the damage done by gangs 
and gang members. Instead, it points toward effec-
tive actions we can take to reduce youth violence. The 
most effective route toward reducing the harm caused 
by gangs requires a more realistic grasp of the chal-
lenges that gangs pose. The objective should not be 
to eradicate gangs—an impossible task—but rather to 
promote community safety. As one community stake-
holder observes, “The problem is not to get kids out of 
gangs, but the behavior. If crime goes down, if young 
people are doing well, that’s successful.”
One city that never embraced the heavy-handed 
suppression tactics chosen elsewhere has experi-
enced far less gang violence. In New York City, a va-
riety of street work and gang intervention programs 
were fielded decades ago during a period when gang 
violence was on the rise. These strategies were sol-
idly grounded in principles of effective social work 
practices that fall outside the realm of law enforce-
ment, and they seem to have helped dissuade city 
policy makers and police officials from embracing 
most of the counterproductive gang suppression 
tactics adopted elsewhere. No seasoned New Yorker 
would deny the existence of street gangs. But gang-
related offenses represent just a tiny blip on the New 
York crime screen. Gang experts conclude that the 
city’s serious problem with street gang violence had 
largely faded away by the end of the 1980s. Youth 
violence remains a problem in some New York City 
neighborhoods, but with crime falling to historic 
lows, the city’s approach to gangs and youth crime 
seems to be remarkably effective. 
There is no “magic bullet” to end gang crime, but 
both the lessons from the past and results from re-
search on more recent innovations in juvenile jus-
tice policy point toward more effective public safety 
strategies:
•  Expand the use of evidenced-based practice to 
reduce youth crime. Evidenced-based practices are 
those interventions that are scientifically proven to 
reduce juvenile recidivism and promote positive out-
comes for young people. Rather than devoting more 
resources to gang suppression and law enforcement 
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tactics, researchers recommend targeting funding to 
support research-based programs operated by agen-
cies in the health and human services sector. As Peter 
Greenwood, former director of the RAND Corpora-
tion’s Criminal Justice Program and an evaluator of 
Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, notes, “Delays 
in adopting proven programs will only cause ad-
ditional victimization of citizens and unnecessarily 
compromise the future of additional youth.”
•  Promote jobs, education, and healthy com-
munities, and lower barriers to the reintegration 
into society of former gang members. Many gang 
researchers observe that employment and family for-
mation help draw youth away from gangs. White 
youth have greater access to jobs and education, 
which may explain why there are many white gang 
members but little discussion of a chronic white gang 
problem. Creating positive opportunities through 
which gang members can leave their past behind is 
the best chance for improving public safety. This re-
quires both investing resources and reforming poli-
cies and practices that now deny current and former 
gang members access to these opportunities.
•  Redirect resources from failed gang enforcement 
efforts to proven public safety strategies. Gang in-
junctions, gang sweeps, and ominous-sounding en-
forcement initiatives reinforce negative images of 
whole communities and run counter to the positive 
youth development agenda that has been proven to 
work. Rather than promoting antigang rhetoric and 
programs, policy makers should expand evidence-
based approaches to help former gang members and 
all youth acquire the skills and opportunities they need 
to contribute to healthy and vibrant communities.
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Perhaps the least settled issue in gang re-
search is the age-old question: “What is a gang?” 
It seems that the majority of academic authorities 
can agree on only one point in this regard: that there 
is no agreement—neither among the criminologists 
who study gangs nor among the cops who police 
them. The picture becomes no clearer when we nar-
row the issue by asking, “What is a youth gang?” or 
“What is a street gang?” 
In an essay on gang research published in Crime and 
Justice, John Hagedorn says that the definitional 
debate about gangs has been “long and rancorous” 
(Hagedorn 1998). He proposes that, in thinking 
about what gangs are, a good place to start is with the 
godfather of gang research, Frederic Thrasher, who 
pointed out that “ganging” is a normal peer activity 
for adolescents within a continuum of behaviors that 
range “from conventional to wild.” 
In American Street Gangs, a popular college textbook, 
Tim Delaney poses a set of questions drawn from 
current media depictions to illustrate the problem of 
defining gangs:
In fact, there is no single definition, although 
every definition includes some mention of the 
word, group. For example, is a group of young 
people hanging out together a gang? What if 
this group is hanging outside a convenience 
store talking loud and acting proud? What if 
this group creates a name for itself, starts iden-
tifying members with specific clothing, and 
uses secret hand signals and handshakes and 
intimidating nicknames such as “killer” and 
“assassin”? But the group just described could 
actually be a sports team! Add to this descrip-
tion the commission of a number of deviant 
acts and fraternities and sororities would also fit 
this profile. (Delaney 2005)
For many influential experts (such as Malcolm Klein 
and Irving Spergel), criminal activity is intrinsic to 
the definition—but equally influential experts (such 
as James Short) think otherwise. In his Crime and 
Justice essay, Hagedorn says he prefers Joan Moore’s 
definition: 
Gangs are unsupervised peer groups who are 
socialized by the streets rather than by conven-
tional institutions. They define themselves as 
a gang or “set” or some such term, and have 
the capacity to reproduce themselves, usually 
within a neighborhood.
More recently, Hagedorn—who believes that gangs 
are reproducing themselves across a world that is in-
creasingly urbanized—has adopted a more global, 
“postindustrial” characterization of what gangs are:
Gangs are organizations of the street composed 
of either 1. the socially excluded or 2. alienated, 
demoralized, or bigoted elements of a domi-
nant racial, ethnic, or religious group.
While most gangs begin as unsupervised ado-
lescent peer groups and remain so, some in-
stitutionalize in barrios, favelas, ghettoes, and 
prisons. Often these institutionalized gangs 
become business enterprises within the infor-
mal economy and a few are linked to interna-
tional criminal cartels. Others institutionalize 
as violent supporters of dominant groups and 
may devolve from political or conventional or-
ganizations. Most gangs are characterized by a 
racialized or ethno-religious identity as well as 
being influenced by global culture. Gangs have 
variable ties to conventional institutions and, 
in given conditions, assume social, economic, 
political, cultural, religious, or military roles. 
(Hagedorn website) 
At the opposite end of the continuum, legal defini-
tions intended to prohibit gang activity focus almost 
entirely on intentional criminal activity and are typi-
cally spare in defining distinct elements of association. 
California Penal Code §186.22 (e)(f ) defines a “crim-
inal street gang” as “any ongoing organization, asso-
ciation, or group of three or more persons, whether 
formal or informal, having as one of its primary ac-
A Gang, by Any Other Name…
PROlOGUE
10	 Gang	Wars:	The	Failure	of	Enforcement	Tactics	and	the	Need	for	Effective	Public	Safety	Strategies
tivities the commission of one or more of the criminal 
acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, 
of subdivision (e), having a common name or com-
mon identifying sign or symbol, and whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity.”1
After many years of fielding squadrons of special-
ized “gang” units to combat criminal gangs and 
compiling lists of hundreds of thousands of people 
in an effort to identify and target gang members and 
their associates for harsh treatment in the criminal 
justice system, American law enforcement agencies 
have not been able to agree upon a common defi-
nition. Perhaps the least of the problems posed by 
this failure is that accurate tracking of gang-related 
crime statistics is difficult, if not impossible.2
Given the lack of consensus about how and when 
groups of people do or do not constitute a gang, 
classification of gangs by type is understandably a 
fuzzy area. Delaney says that while there are many 
types of gangs, his textbook (2005) is focused on 
“street gangs,” and he includes only brief discus-
sions of some “non-street gangs”: motorcycle gangs, 
organized crime, the Ku Klux Klan, skinheads, and 
prison gangs. 
Malcolm Klein similarly asserts that prison gangs, 
skinheads, “stoners,” and motorcycle gangs are not 
street gangs (Klein 1995). Klein says that skinhead 
groups do not qualify as street gangs because they 
are usually inside, and when they go out they are 
“looking for a target, not just lounging around.” And 
bikers are usually focused on their motorcycles, out 
cruising or selling drugs. He says both types of gangs 
are narrowly focused in their criminality, “always 
planning something”—while street gangs are more 
aimless and casual about the trouble they get into. He 
1  Subdivision (e) enumerates the following offenses: assault with 
a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great 
bodily injury; robbery; unlawful homicide or manslaughter; the 
sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for 
sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances; shooting at 
an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle; discharging 
or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle; 
arson; the intimidation of witnesses and victims; grand theft; 
grand theft of any firearm, vehicle, trailer, or vessel; burglary; 
rape; looting; money laundering; kidnapping; mayhem; 
aggravated mayhem; torture; felony extortion; felony vandalism; 
carjacking; the sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm; possession 
of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed 
upon the person; threats to commit crimes resulting in death or 
great bodily injury; and theft and unlawful taking or driving of 
a vehicle.
2  Wes McBride, the dean of U.S. gang investigators, warned the 
authors not to believe gang statistics from any source: “They are 
all wrong.”
doesn’t explain why “heavy metal–influenced ston-
ers,” “punks,” “satanic cults,” and “terrorist gangs” 
don’t qualify. And he dismisses “low riders” and kids 
who hang out on street corners without comment. 
Brenda Coughlin and Sudhir Venkatesh say that 
while the popular image of gangs is synonymous 
with African American and Latino youth in poor 
urban neighborhoods, this may be “an artifact of 
definitional boundaries” (Coughlin and Venkatesh 
2003). They maintain that evidence of ethnic diver-
sity among street gangs, as well as the existence of 
delinquent white groups not conventionally consid-
ered to be gangs (“fraternities, motorcycle and ‘biker’ 
outfits, militias, skinheads, or the Ku Klux Klan”), 
need more research attention. 
Studies based on self-reports as well as localized eth-
nographic research have documented that white and 
black gangs are both present in urban areas, and that 
white gangs are also involved in serious violence. Yet 
people of color predominate in law enforcement esti-
mates of gang membership, and most of those arrested 
for gang offenses are African American and Latino. 
“Street gangs” versus whatever
There does not seem to be a consensus on how 
to distinguish between “drug gangs” and “street 
gangs.” The literature suggests an increasing over-
lap of these categories. Malcolm Klein differenti-
ates drug gangs on the basis of characteristics that 
he says street gangs largely lack: “clear, hierarchical 
leadership; strong group cohesiveness; a code of loy-
alty and secrecy”; and a narrow focus on drug deal-
ing to the exclusion of other crimes. Most experts 
agree that drug trafficking is a secondary interest for 
street gang members, yet they also agree that sig-
nificant numbers of street gang members are very 
much involved in drug sales, and that drug profits 
often play a vital role in keeping street gangs in op-
eration. Felix Padilla has described the evolution of 
a violent Puerto Rican street gang in Chicago into 
an organized drug trafficking and distribution en-
terprise (Padilla 1992). 
Tim Delaney says that the “drug gang” concept is 
relatively new, formulated to account for the increas-
ing number of gangs involved in the sale of drugs. 
He says that we should not be surprised to find that 
“street gangs” are actively involved in drug traffick-
ing since it constitutes “the number-one criminal 
enterprise in the world,” and the growing popularity 
of “crack” cocaine produced new opportunities for 
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urban youth to make money around the same time 
that legitimate job opportunities were disappearing 
in their neighborhoods. 
John Hagedorn says that gang participation in a 
growing global underground economy is the central 
mechanism whereby gangs “institutionalize on the 
streets” (Hagedorn 2005). The economic restructur-
ing that has curtailed access to jobs for unskilled ur-
ban men means that gangs become an increasingly 
important source of employment, retaining mem-
bership of many individuals into adulthood. He sees 
drug-dealing gangs as “the main street-level employer 
of youth in the poorest areas of cities forsaken by in-
dustrial jobs.”
A typology of youth violence
Mercer Sullivan finds the definitional ambiguities in 
gang research a distraction from more vital inquiries: 
Youth violence takes many organizational 
forms. Lumping these together as “gang” phe-
nomena carries distracting baggage. The pe-
rennial fascination with gangs is partly, overly 
romantic. It can, and sometimes does, cloud 
our view of what we should be placing front 
and center, the problem of youth violence. 
(Sullivan 2005) 
Sullivan proposes using more neutral analytic terms 
to make important distinctions among group criminal 
activities that may—or may not—be related to gang 
membership: action-sets, cliques, and named gangs: 
An action-set is simply an aggregation of indi-
viduals cooperating together in a coordinated 
line of activity. They need not continue their 
coordinated activity over any specified period 
of time or share any explicit recognition among 
themselves or in the view of others that they are 
associated on any permanent basis.
A clique is an aggregation of individuals with 
some form of diffuse and enduring bonds of 
solidarity, at least for the near term. They en-
gage in a variety of activities together on some 
kind of regular basis. They need not have a 
name or leader or share ritual symbols of group 
membership.
A named gang has the properties of a clique, along 
with a name and explicit criteria of membership 
recognized by members and others. Gangs are 
far more likely than cliques to have designated 
leadership, formalized rules and codes of con-
duct, and ritualized symbols of membership, but 
they do not have to have all or any particular 
combination of these. 
Sullivan points up an “odd and oddly little-noticed 
contradiction” resulting from a lack of careful dis-
tinction between youth gangs and group criminal ac-
tivities—that membership in youth gangs was widely 
reported to have climbed to unprecedented high lev-
els by the later half of the 1990s, yet youth violence 
decreased sharply during the same period:
If gang membership becomes far more preva-
lent and gang membership is strongly related to 
youth violence, how can youth violence decline 
while gang membership remains at historically 
high levels? Given the choice, who would not 
prefer more gangs and less youth violence to the 
opposite combination?
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Residents of New York City have enjoyed more than a 
decade and a half of exceptional crime rate reductions, 
breaking historic records for declines in lethal vio-
lence, as well as record declines across the entire range 
of index crimes1 that are roughly double the rates of 
decline for the nation as a whole (zimring 2007). In 
March 2007 New York City’s police commissioner, 
Ray Kelly, announced that over the fi rst three months 
of the year the murder rate had fallen to a low not seen 
since the early 1960s, when the fi rst reliable homicide 
statistics were recorded (Moore 2007).
In areas of the country where an increased number of 
homicides were reported, street gangs were frequently 
identifi ed by law enforcement authorities as a causal 
factor. Th e media eagerly picked up the theme in 
some cities (including some where homicides contin-
ued to trend down), with lurid depictions of heavily 
tattooed gang-bangers and claims that violent gangs 
were spreading from coast to coast.
Gang crime is spreading “like a cancer,” according 
to Federal Bureau of Investigation director Robert S. 
Mueller III. Th e FBI boasts of its national antigang 
strategy, involving local police in a network of 131 
FBI-led task force operations across the country, cou-
pled with a national “gang targeting enforcement and 
coordination center,” a national “gang intelligence 
center,” and a national task force based in Washing-
1  Th e Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports 
are based on a national set of crime statistics that focus on 
“index crimes”—murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson—
collected by the FBI from law enforcement agencies across the 
United States. 
ton, D.C., that is focused on Mara Salvatrucha, or 
MS-13,2 working to merge some 100,000 criminal 
records from Central America with the FBI’s crimi-
nal history database (FBI 2007).
While overall crime rates in Los Angeles have been 
declining for the past half-decade, gang crime is re-
ported to be rising. Citing a 15.7 percent increase 
in gang crime over 2006, Los Angeles police chief 
William Bratton declared a crackdown on gangs in 
January 2007. By the end of March more than 800 
people had been arrested by gang enforcement offi  -
cers. Almost half were said to be members of 11 gangs 
Bratton designated as “the worst” in Los Angeles. 
Many arrests were for very minor charges—curfew 
violation, drug possession, vandalism, noncompli-
ance with probation conditions.
Public defenders in Los Angeles said that court dockets 
were fl ooded with cases where prosecutors were over-
charging—fi ling felony charges and seeking gang en-
hancements to invoke harsh prison sentences in cases 
involving minor nonviolent incidents that could have 
been charged as misdemeanors (McGreevy 2007a). 
Charging that the Los Angeles Police Department is 
“outnumbered” by gang members, Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa sought funding to hire 780 new police 
offi  cers over the next fi scal year, a move he said was 
essential for eff orts to control gang violence (Mc-
Greevy 2007b). 
Meanwhile, in America’s other “gang capital,” where 
2  Mara Salvatrucha was formed in Los Angeles in the 1980s by 
immigrant Salvadoran youth whose families fl ed a civil war and 
U.S. military intervention in their homeland. 
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the police department reports that nearly half of all 
murders arise from gang activity, a 278-page report 
published by the Chicago Crime Commission con-
tended that gangs posed an increasing threat in Chi-
cago’s suburbs (Chicago Police Department 2005; 
Chicago Crime Commission 2006).
No media coverage of national crime trends has failed 
to note that New York City stands out from the pack 
in terms of its exceptional crime decline. High rates 
of chronic gang-rated violence in Los Angeles and 
Chicago are also noted by the media, yet an impor-
tant contrast that lies within the exceptional New 
York crime experience has escaped media notice. 
Gang crime makes for occasional—sometimes sen-
sational—news headlines in New York, and no sea-
soned New Yorker would deny the existence of street 
gangs. Yet gang-related offenses represent just a tiny 
blip on the New York crime screen, and even conser-
vative gang expert Walter Miller concluded that the 
serious problem with street gang violence experienced 
some 45 years ago in New York City had, by and large, 
faded away by the end of the 1980s (Miller 1990).
The next section of this report briefly recounts a 50-
year history of gangs and antigang interventions in 
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The accounts 
reveal a sharp contrast between the experience in 
New York, where the primary strategies were in-
formed by social theory and grounded in traditional 
social work practice, and in the other cities, where 
police suppression held the upper hand. 
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Successive and pronounced cycles of gang violence 
have been documented in New York City, reaching 
back well over a century. Social historian Eric Sch-
neider has chronicled the trajectory of the serious 
and widespread gang problem that plagued the city 
from the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, during 
the transformation of the city’s economy from war 
production and manufacturing to financial and legal 
services, insurance, real estate development, and civil 
service jobs (Schneider 1999). 
African American and Puerto Rican families migrat-
ing into the city faced a highly racialized labor market 
that systematically excluded them from well-paying 
job categories and racial segregation that shunted 
them into older housing stock located in the poor-
est neighborhoods. Adolescent peer groups formed 
within crowded city schools competed outside of 
school with hostile ethnic groups for recreational 
space along neighborhood borderlines. 
As neighborhood rivalries spread, the schools them-
selves became contested territory between compet-
ing groups of cynical youngsters of color who were 
well aware of the class, racial, and ethnic barriers that 
stood between them and opportunities for good jobs 
in the future. Dropping out of school only stiffened 
the barriers they faced, trapping them within the 
city’s secondary labor market, where discrimination 
and exploitation rendered employment an episodic 
experience at best.
War veterans returning to the city introduced emerg-
ing street-corner-fighting groups of disaffected 
youths to more violent tactics and more sophisticated 
weaponry. The rate of youths killing youths increased 
markedly as a result. In 1947 the recognition that 
gang violence was a serious problem led to establish-
ment of the New York City Youth Board. 
Youth Board funding became available to support 
gang intervention projects operated by private social 
welfare agencies. The Youth Board placed street-level 
gang workers (termed “detached workers” because 
they worked entirely outside of traditional social ser-
vice program offices) in central Harlem, in the Tomp-
kins Park area in Brooklyn, and in the South Bronx 
neighborhood of Morrisania to intervene whenever 
violence flared between neighborhood youth gangs.
Schneider recounts how street workers sought to es-
tablish relationships with youths they perceived to 
be gang leaders and tried to deflect gang members 
from fighting. They organized athletic programs at 
neighborhood recreation centers, offering advice 
supplemented with field trips to amusement parks, 
beaches, and camp sites. They provided resources for 
organizing neighborhood social events, block parties, 
and “hall dances.” Their most highly valued service 
by far was intended to draw individual gang mem-
bers away from gang activities by locating job op-
portunities for them. 
By 1955 the Youth Board was deploying 40 street gang 
workers in troubled neighborhoods across the city. 
Ten years later the number had swelled to 150. While 
gang members were initially suspicious of street work-
ers, they were also status-conscious—well aware that 
an officially assigned street worker enhanced a gang’s 
prestige by underscoring its reputation as a dangerous 
group. Mediation sessions engineered by street work-
ers between hostile gangs dampened violent confron-
tations, but they also provided a level of recognition 
approaching celebrity for certain gang leaders. 
Even the modest resources street workers provided 
in their efforts to channel gang members’ energies 
toward more positive social activities could bolster 
gang cohesion. Yet the city’s dedicated commitment 
to street work as the primary strategy to combat vio-
lence among street gang members fostered a far more 
constructive, less counterproductive response to gang 
violence than the harsh law enforcement tactics em-
ployed by police to suppress gangs in other cities.
Soon after the establishment of the Youth Board, crit-
icism from police and politicians forced it to require 
that street workers inform the police of impending 
Gangs in New York City
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gang fights, and about caches of weapons. Street 
workers were thereby compelled toward a limited 
degree of cooperation with the police. Street workers 
complained that the policy of cooperation compro-
mised their credibility on the street, while police of-
ficers remained suspicious about the role of the street 
workers. Yet, once channels of communication about 
potential gang violence were established, they facili-
tated development of more strategic, better-targeted 
police patrol tactics designed to quell violence before 
it started. Schneider credits the citywide decline in 
large-scale gang “rumbles” during this period to co-
operation between the Youth Board and the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD).
Cooperation between these two diverse city agencies 
failed to dispel the obvious tension between pro-
ponents of harsh police tactics and those commit-
ted to innovative social work approaches to address 
the gang problem. Pandering politicians continued 
to call for “nightstick justice” against gangs. Use of 
mediation between warring gangs was frequently 
condemned—despite its obvious effectiveness in 
achieving truces, at least in the short term—by those 
whose crime-control tastes preferred the spicy flavor 
of police crackdowns. 
Yet establishment of a city-funded system of street 
work and gang intervention programs, solidly 
grounded in principles of effective social work prac-
tice and institutionalized entirely outside of the law 
enforcement domain, helped to constrain New York’s 
policy makers and police officials from embracing 
most of the counterproductive gang suppression tac-
tics adopted elsewhere. Kim McGill, founder of the 
South Bronx–based Youth Force Project who now di-
rects the California Youth Justice Coalition, believes 
that Youth Board policies and practices in the 1950s 
established norms that continue to influence and 
modulate New York City’s approach to the problem 
of street gangs today.
Street work was augmented by more conventional 
forms of social work and gang intervention pro-
grams provided by neighborhood service organiza-
tions, churches, settlement houses, and recreation 
centers. The effectiveness of agency-based programs 
was limited by issues of control, as competing gangs 
contested for ownership of the “turf” represented by 
a particular recreation center, or resisted direction 
from professional social service staff. 
More successful interventions drew from a social work 
model pioneered decades earlier by Clifford Shaw, a 
sociologist who established the Chicago Area Project 
(CAP) in the 1930s. CAP used local residents as fam-
ily counselors and organizers in their own neighbor-
hoods to engage the energies of youth and adults in 
projects designed to improve and strengthen social 
control in the community. 
Clashes during the mid-1950s between Mayrose (a 
street gang made up of white youths of varied eth-
nicity), Dragons (a Puerto Rican gang), and Sports-
men (African American adolescents living in housing 
projects) escalated into a violent and deadly gang war 
in lower Manhattan. An assortment of settlement 
houses, civic groups, and churches became linked 
together in a CAP-style gang intervention network 
under sponsorship of the Lower Eastside Neighbor-
hood Association (LENA). 
Gang truces were negotiated by LENA, while Youth 
Board street workers plied their services to defuse 
street violence, and social workers at the Henry 
Street Settlement House set up prevention programs 
targeting “predelinquent” children to divert them 
from joining gangs. Gang conflict did not disappear, 
but Schneider says that cycles of violent attacks and 
retaliation were somewhat disrupted. 
Tasting a modest degree of success, LENA sought 
funding from the Ford Foundation to build on these 
efforts. An ambitious planning project begun in 1967 
with visionary guidance from faculty members Rich-
ard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin at the Columbia Uni-
versity School of Social Work was expanded after the 
1960 election when a newly established President’s 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency joined forces 
with Ford staff. LENA’s mission was broadened into 
a comprehensive agenda of youth development and 
community organizing. 
Mobilization for Youth (MFY) was launched in 1962 
with a rich mix of federal and city funding that en-
larged the substantial stream of Ford grant dollars. 
Five settlement houses located in the target area 
coordinated an expanded cadre of street workers 
who mounted intervention efforts with more than a 
dozen neighborhood street gangs. A raft of job train-
ing, job placement, subsidized employment, and 
social service programs were established to prevent 
gangs from forming by providing new channels of 
opportunity for neighborhood residents. A team of 
activist lawyers was assembled to protect and expand 
residents’ legal rights, advocating for social benefits 
and economic entitlements. 
Drawing on the CAP model, MFY launched an am-
bitious organizing drive designed to mobilize neigh-
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borhood residents for action against entrenched 
community problems: substandard housing, poorly 
performing schools, deficient public services. Em-
brace of confrontational tactics that characterized 
the 1960s—noisy picketing and “sit-ins” at the of-
fices of government bureaucracies and the homes 
of bureaucrats, militant rent strikes and school 
boycotts, forceful agitation against police brutal-
ity—rapidly thrust the MFY community organizing 
tactics beyond CAP’s relatively sedate political style 
toward radical activism. 
Predictably, given the agency’s generous public 
funding base, MFY’s managers soon found them-
selves engulfed in a media-fueled political firestorm, 
almost completely alienated from the government 
agencies that provided that funding. MFY’s po-
litical opponents charged loudly that agency staff 
included communists, that MFY organizers were 
responsible for the 1964 uprising in Harlem, and 
that vast sums of public money were being mis-
spent (Moynihan 1969).
By the time investigators determined that these al-
legations had no basis in reality, MFY’s director had 
resigned and the agency had retrenched, retooling 
itself to concentrate primarily on delivery of direct 
services to neighborhood residents. Community or-
ganizing was restricted to campaigns that were less 
likely to disrupt provision of government antipoverty 
grants. The reorganization served to boost the agency 
as a prototype model for the community action pro-
grams set up across the nation under President Lyn-
don Johnson’s War on Poverty.
By 1966 the problem of serious gang violence had 
largely been abated in New York City. The NYPD 
youth division reported that the number of street 
gangs had declined. MFY replaced street-work pro-
grams with “adolescent service centers” set up to 
dispense conventional job and educational counsel-
ing services. In Schneider’s assessment, New York 
City’s gang intervention strategy had proved to be 
an overall success, with LENA and MFY mounting 
the most effective tools for keeping gang violence 
to a minimum and diverting youths away from 
gang membership. 
Mayor John Lindsay applied lessons learned from the 
community action experience in his citywide effort to 
avoid the urban conflagrations erupting in other cit-
ies across the nation during this period. The Lindsay 
administration set up the Urban Action Task Force, 
empowered to step up delivery of city services and 
channel resources to community leaders in African 
American and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, connect-
ing them directly to city hall. 
The Youth Board recruited neighborhood trouble-
makers to serve as youth leaders, organizing sum-
mer recreation and employment programs in these 
communities. Neighborhood youth councils hired 
the “worst kids” to staff these programs, while city 
hall bent civil service rules in order to offer them the 
possibility of upward mobility into permanent jobs 
in the city bureaucracy. Schneider describes how for-
mer gang members helped to quell a 1967 uprising 
in East Harlem, after which the local youth council 
was used to channel welfare assistance and jobs to 
community residents, cementing the direct politi-
cal ties between the mayor’s office and East Harlem’s 
youth leaders.
By no means, however, does Schneider credit the 
Lindsay administration’s political embrace of commu-
nity action or the gang intervention programs with 
solving the structural problems that had given rise to 
the city’s serious postwar gang problem, or with pro-
viding effective crime control in the long term:
Gang intervention in all its forms attempted 
to disrupt the operations of the gang, espe-
cially gang fighting, and press youths into 
making conventional adjustments to work-
ing-class life. Because these programs define 
gangs as the problem, rather than as a symp-
tom of other problems, they were unprepared 
to confront the fundamental issues that had 
led adolescents to form gangs in the first place. 
These were the limits of liberal social reform. 
The result was that gang intervention, where 
it successfully disrupted gangs, inadvertently 
substituted individual deviance in the form 
of drug use for the collective resistance of the 
gang. By the mid-1960s, authorities decided 
that gangs were no longer the problem. They 
had been displaced by the rapid spread of her-
oin among New York’s adolescents.
Of course, heroin did not actually displace gangs in 
New York City, any more than gang intervention 
programs erased their existence. But bolstered by 
other contributing factors—radical movements and 
community politics that siphoned off the most tal-
ented gang leaders, the Vietnam War and a wartime 
economic boom—the city’s sustained investment 
in street work and gang intervention programs had 
worked to reduce the level of gang violence below 
a threshold level, or “tipping point,” where cycles of 
gang attacks and retribution become acute and con-
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tinuous. And the spread of heroin that followed the 
decline in gang violence supplanted the ethos of gang 
warfare with an emerging drug culture:
The relationship between drug use and the de-
cline of the gangs was synergistic: the collapse of 
the gangs furthered drug use and the rising tide 
of drug use eroded the remaining gangs’ abilities 
to preserve their members and themselves…. 
Public policy and gang interventions pushed the 
number of gangs below the threshold level in the 
early 60s, but it was heroin that kept them there, 
as one epidemic gave way to another. 
Schneider points out that the phenomenon of youth 
gangs never entirely died out in the city. Cycles of 
gang activity have continued to the present time, 
with periodic episodes of gang violence flashing 
above the tipping point in one distinct area of the 
city after another. 
The 1970s saw a revival of gang activity in the South 
Bronx, where the ravages of intractable poverty, her-
oin addiction, and an epidemic of arson had cut wide 
swathes of devastation in the bleak urban landscape. 
Youth gangs carried on the customary battles over 
turf, of course, but they also organized against the 
drug trade, mounting aggressive campaigns to drive 
heroin dealers and junkies out of their neighbor-
hoods. 
Periodic gang revivals also sparked renewed ethnic vi-
olence, as Euro-American gangs, particularly those in 
Italian American enclaves in the North Bronx and in 
the Brooklyn neighborhoods of Howard Beach and 
Bensonhurst, were primed to terrorize any African 
Americans and Latinos with the temerity to venture 
into their neighborhoods. Conflict between China-
town youth gangs mirrored long-standing ethnic, 
political, and commercial rivalries that had been ex-
acerbated by an influx of immigrants from different 
regions of China. 
Since the waning of the sustained gang violence that 
plagued the city for two decades after World War II, 
episodic revivals of gang activity have never rivaled 
the extent or intensity of the postwar gang crisis. 
Those who expected that the problem of youth vio-
lence would subside as street gangs lost their wide-
spread appeal, however, were sorely disappointed 
when deadly gun violence reached epidemic propor-
tions among New York City youths in the later half 
of the 1980s. 
The sharp upsurge in the rate of gun homicides was 
not, for the most part, perceived to be gang-related. 
Jeffrey Fagan has described how the escalation of gun 
violence across the city was fueled by development 
of a pervasive “ecology of danger” within which the 
widespread availability of guns helped to spark conta-
gious behavioral norms and “scripts” that reinforced 
their use, with extraordinarily lethal consequences 
(Fagan and Wilkinson 1998).
New York’s leading urban anthropologist, Mercer 
Sullivan, closely examined the nature of youth vio-
lence in New York during the last decade of the 20th 
century, when “supergangs” from Los Angeles and 
Chicago were reported to be proliferating across the 
nation (2005). He conducted a systematic search for 
stories published in city newspapers between 1990 
and 2000 that included the term “youth gang,” pin-
pointing 1997 as the year when “nationally famous 
gangs finally came to New York City, at least in 
name.” Newspaper references to Bloods, Crips, Latin 
Kings, and Ñetas surged that year, raising fears about 
an impending gang-related crime wave. Yet police re-
ports from the same period indicate that serious vio-
lent crime was on the decline in the city well before, 
and long after, media reports of the emergence of a 
new generation of violent gangs. Something was go-
ing on, but clearly it did not produce a crime wave.
Sullivan had amassed a wealth of interview and ob-
servational data during ethnographic field research he 
conducted in three city neighborhoods between 1995 
and 1999 to examine the social ecology of youth 
violence and document changing patterns in vio-
lent behavior over the period. The research was spe-
cifically designed to trace perceptions of local youth 
gang activity among parents, teachers, police officers, 
and youths themselves. The patterns of violence he 
documented help to explain why the apparent pro-
liferation of notorious national youth gangs was not 
associated with an increase in serious youth crime.
Sullivan’s data contained signs of the gang emergence 
phenomenon, but he also found evidence that media 
reports of sensational gang conflict were primarily a 
relabeling of existing local rivalries. Group violence, 
when it erupted, stemmed primarily from conflict 
(“beefs”) between informal cliques of youths who 
lived on particular city blocks and shared a strong 
sense of identification and loyalty. Sullivan reports 
that youths in such local groups were familiar with 
the phenomenon of youth gangs, but they tended to 
distinguish these from their block-group loyalties: 
In the early period of fieldwork, 1995–1996, 
beefs between these groups were described 
in terms of these place-based identifications, 
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as, for example, “between Redwood and the 
Desert.” By the end of the fieldwork, follow-
ing the spike in newspaper gang reports of 
1997 . . . these conflicts had been redefined. We 
heard at one point that Redwood and Castle 
had joined together to fight the Bloods from 
the Desert who were trying to “take over the 
neighborhood.” 
But the “beef” between the Bloods and the block 
groups was an ephemeral event that was quickly 
disrupted with targeted police action—and it took 
place during a period of general decline in violence 
in this area. 
Some indications of localized violence in one particu-
lar area of the city coincided with the 1997 spike in 
media coverage about gangs, yet the scale of the prob-
lem fell far short of the gang-related mayhem expected 
by those who were reading the media accounts:
Our data suggest mutually reinforcing effects 
of media panic and street rumor, on one hand, 
and some real changes in the amount and or-
ganization of youth violence on the other.
At the beginning of the fieldwork period, we 
documented high levels of fighting among stu-
dents from the middle school we were studying. 
Many of these fights involved multiple partici-
pants, but they were not organized as named 
gangs. Some groups involved in fights could be 
associated with a particular block or housing 
project, but other fights involved essentially ad 
hoc groupings, time-limited action-sets rather 
than cliques, much less named gangs.
Beginning in 1996 and rapidly increasing in 
1997, named gang affiliations swept through 
the area. Local youth began choosing to iden-
tify as either Bloods or Crips, mostly Bloods. 
These identifications, however, were ambigu-
ous and highly contested. There was no single 
group leader or structure within either category, 
and there were many subsets of these catego-
ries. Rumors ran rife and mutated constantly. 
A favorite topic of conversation was the differ-
ence between “real Bloods” and “fake Bloods.” 
Most individuals carrying the insignia of Blood 
membership were said to be “fake Bloods.”
Many stories were told of the rituals suppos-
edly associated with Blood membership. To 
be inducted into the Bloods, various accounts 
claimed that a person had to do something 
such as randomly slash the face of a total 
stranger with a razor. In other versions, the 
slashing victim had to be a family member, or 
one’s own mother. The crescendo of this hyste-
ria peaked on Halloween 1997. As the day ap-
proached, rumors circulated throughout New 
York City that Halloween would be a day of 
mass Blood initiation. The chancellor of the 
New York City schools issued a public state-
ment that schools would remain open despite 
widespread calls from parents and others that 
they be closed. The Soulville middle school 
we were studying remained open, but only a 
handful of students showed up.
The mass slashings never occurred. . . . Some 
entity or loosely related group of entities 
called Bloods did appear in New York, but 
the panic came and went as violent crime 
citywide continued to decline.
Sullivan wonders whether law enforcement estimates 
of increasing gang prevalence reported in the Na-
tional Youth Gang Survey conducted during the pe-
riod may have largely resulted from a wave of moral 
panic over gangs. 
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While New York City has experienced only sporadic 
gang problems since the mid-1960s, Chicago’s insti-
tutionalized neighborhood gangs have remained an 
entrenched problem since the 1950s. John Hage-
dorn has traced the roots of violence among Chica-
go’s institutionalized “supergangs” all the way back 
to post–World War I race riots, when white work-
ers and the Ku Klux Klan expelled African Americans 
from industrial jobs they had obtained while whites 
were fighting overseas (Hagedorn undated). During 
the Depression, as jobs in every sector became scarce 
and Mexicans were subjected to mass deportation, 
youth violence increased as small “corner groups” of 
black and brown youths clashed against white ethnic 
gangs in defense of their neighborhoods.
As immigrant ethnic groups and racial minorities 
competed for jobs, hegemony over the city’s po-
litical machinery shifted among various ethnic ele-
ments, with the Irish ultimately sustaining control of 
the uppermost levels of power. Both licit and illicit 
opportunity structures were solidly blocked against 
most African Americans and Mexicans, as white 
ethic groups held sway in both the labor market and 
the underground economy. Contained by racism and 
racial segregation, African Americans remained stuck 
at the very bottom of the ranks. When deindustri-
alization gutted the city’s supply of manufacturing 
jobs, they remained trapped in unemployment and 
poverty. Ranked in terms of black/white dissimilarity 
in housing patterns, Chicago continues to score as 
the most racially segregated city in the nation (Frey 
and Myers 2002).
In Stateville, his groundbreaking study of prison cul-
ture, James Jacobs examined how police repression 
and mass imprisonment of Chicago’s “supergangs” 
helped to transform both Illinois prisons and the gangs 
themselves (Jacobs 1977). In the 1960s federal social 
policy turned to a focus on juvenile delinquency, and 
federal dollars began to flow into grassroots organi-
zations in high-crime urban neighborhoods. Around 
the same time, Chicago street gang leaders began to 
gravitate toward grassroots political action. 
On the South Side, community organizers and 
church leaders cultivated relationships with charis-
matic gang members and fostered their development 
as legitimate grassroots leaders. Both Blackstone 
Rangers (the street gang that evolved into the Black 
P. Stone Nation and ultimately became known as 
the El Rukns) and Devil’s Disciples were drawn into 
The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), Saul Alinsky’s 
dynamic grassroots organization. TWO garnered 
substantial financial support from both private foun-
dations and the federal Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO) to create youth employment programs 
while thumbing its nose at city hall and drawing in-
tense opposition from the Chicago police.
Similar developments ensued on the West Side, 
where the Lawndale-based Conservative Vice Lords, 
advised by a Peace Corps veteran, founded Opera-
tion Bootstrap. They allied with Jesse Jackson and 
soon attracted funding for a host of social action 
programs. But at the same time that the Lindsay 
administration in New York was embracing com-
munity action programs such as these, and delib-
erately enlisting gang leaders from among the city’s 
“worst kids” to serve as staff for recreation and jobs 
programs, Mayor Richard J. Daley’s response was 
quite different.
Lacking John Lindsay’s progressive vision of “urban 
action” against poverty, Daley feared that the gangs’ 
increasing role in building grassroots power, and 
the liberal allies they were attracting, would upset 
his political machine. As TWO was launching its 
OEO-funded youth programs, the Daley admin-
istration was beefing up the police department’s 
gang intelligence unit and initiating a crackdown 
of intense police harassment, arresting Woodlawn 
youths for petty crimes and curfew violations and 
conducting warrantless intrusions of TWO offices 
(Jacobs 1977). 
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In 1968 both the Blackstone Rangers and the Vice 
Lords gave Daley his due by working hard to upset 
his political machine at the polls. Daley promptly 
increased the gang intelligence unit from 38 to 200 
officers. Illinois prisons were soon flooded with gang 
members sent en masse by the Chicago courts. Gang 
leaders swept into prison as “political prisoners” with 
a vivid sense of their organizational power. Once 
they were there, they set vigorous recruitment drives 
in motion. By 1972 at least half of Illinois prisoners 
were said to be affiliated with gangs. As the gangs 
took over the prison market for contraband and 
solidified their control of prison programs, gang af-
filiation provided members with both economic and 
social benefits. 
The massive infusion of gang members came at a 
time when liberal prison reformers were working to 
loosen the hold of the traditional prison manage-
ment regime in the state’s maximum-security insti-
tutions in order to improve prison conditions. As 
old-time prison guards chafed under a new system of 
authority geared toward a “human relations” model 
of management, the Black P. Stone Nation, Vice 
Lords, Disciples, and Latin Kings came to dominate, 
control, and transform the prison’s social system. 
Gang members came to prison with a spirit of rebel-
lion against authority gained on the streets of Chi-
cago during the 1960s and a sense of racial and social 
solidarity stemming from a mix of street gang tradi-
tions and radical black nationalism. They quickly cast 
aside the traditional “inmate code”—with its hierar-
chy based on offense type and a “do your own time” 
ethos—replacing it with strong communal values of 
solidarity between gang brothers and loyalty to gang 
leadership. Prisoners learned how to “do gang time.”
Prison guards saw themselves undermined by the 
“pro-inmate” reforms imposed by the new manage-
ment in power above them and challenged by the 
belligerent rebels they faced on the tiers. The level of 
intergang violence increased. As guards became more 
and more demoralized, prisoners increasingly resisted 
their control, mounting periodic food strikes, physi-
cal attacks on guards, and bouts of taking hostages. 
In 1973 a prison guard was murdered. 
Prison managers responded to strikes and violence 
with lockdowns. They constructed a special housing 
unit where supermaximum conditions prevailed. 
Between 1970 and 1975 Stateville appeared to tee-
ter on the verge of chaos, but a full-scale prison up-
rising never materialized. Jacobs reports that prison 
managers, guards, and prisoners alike attributed the 
gang leaders, who feared an Attica-style response 
from the state, with credit for restraining violence 
within bounds.  
Daley’s repression of Chicago’s politicized gangs only 
increased their membership and strengthened their 
cohesion. The policy of prison containment made 
recruitment easier in a setting where rejecting gang 
membership meant endangering one’s property and 
personal safety. The crucible of prison tested gang 
loyalties and forged strong bonds to gang leadership. 
As prisoners were released to the streets of Chicago, 
the gang allegiances they gained in prison shaped 
their reentry experiences.
The experience of surviving mass imprisonment 
toughened the hide of Chicago gang members and 
consolidated their organizational structure, making 
them more durable and contributing to their insti-
tutionalization. Hagedorn explains the concept of 
institutionalized gangs as follows:
There have been many attempts to categorize 
gangs, but in the context of this study, US 
gangs can be differentiated between intersti-
tial and institutionalized gangs. The US fa-
ther of gang research, Frederic Thrasher, used 
interstitial to describe early Chicago gangs. 
It literally means “in between” or the transi-
tions of youth, as from one neighborhood to 
a better one and/or from childhood to young 
adult. Most US gangs were, and continue to 
be, transitional interstitial groups, rising with 
one set of peers and declining as its peer group 
matures.
But in some cities, particularly Chicago and 
Los Angeles, gangs institutionalized, or per-
sisted over generations. To say that a gang 
has institutionalized signifies that it persists 
despite leadership changes (e.g. killed, incar-
cerated, or matured out), has an organization 
complex enough to sustain multiple roles 
of members (including children), adapts to 
changing environments without dissolving 
(e.g. police repression), fulfils some commu-
nity needs (economic, security, services), and 
organizes a distinct outlook of its members 
(sometimes called a gang subculture). (Hage-
dorn undated)
When Chicago gang members began to look to the 
civil rights movement and community action pro-
grams as vehicles out of poverty and segregation, 
Mayor Daley’s incarceration campaign smashed 
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their hopes and dreams. But Hagedorn maintains 
that the lengthy prison terms received by gang lead-
ers could not break their ties to street chapters. By 
the time they returned to the streets, the decline in 
Chicago’s industrial jobs left them no options aside 
from what remained in the underground economy. 
They crowded into Chicago’s hypersegregated high-
rise housing projects with drugs and guns the only 
tools at hand.
Federal funds for construction of public housing 
had become available during the 1960s, but Mayor 
Daley’s deep commitment to racial containment did 
not allow for dispersal of housing sites outside of 
Chicago ghettos (Hagedorn and Rauch 2004). The 
Robert Taylor Homes epitomized the Daley-era ap-
proach, with 28 towering blocks of high-rise projects 
warehousing 27,000 Chicagoans, virtually cutting 
them off from access to better schools and work op-
portunities in white neighborhoods.
As the drug economy heated up in the 1980s, the 
flow of city services and public housing resources 
began to recede from Chicago projects like Robert 
Taylor. New York’s epidemic of lethal youth gun vio-
lence in the late 1980s appeared to fade in the face 
of concentrated drug enforcement operations by the 
police. During the same period Chicago police ad-
dressed increased levels of violence with a crackdown 
on the institutionalized gangs that John Hagedorn 
says may only have increased the level of violence. 
Police repression only fragmented gang leadership, 
causing intragang violence.
Gang fragmentation and violence were further ex-
acerbated in Chicago during the mid-1990s when 
the public housing authority shifted millions of 
dollars from needed maintenance and renovation 
of the city’s high-rise projects to finance a drug en-
forcement campaign involving massive gang sweeps. 
When that strategy proved largely fruitless, the city 
began to demolish the projects, forcing more than 
a hundred thousand tenants to move. Instead of 
building new housing for them, the housing author-
ity gave displaced tenants rent vouchers. Scattered 
relocation to other segregated, high-crime areas of 
the city dislocated people from long-established so-
cial networks and increased friction and violence 
among Chicago gangs.
New York faced similar economic pressures from 
deindustrialization through the same period. Poor 
neighborhoods suffered huge declines in housing 
stock as landlords abandoned buildings to deteriora-
tion and arson. But even while the youth homicide 
epidemic raged, city government committed billions 
to new affordable housing initiatives, refurbishing 
abandoned buildings, constructing new housing on 
vacant land, and sparking an urban revival in burned-
out neighborhoods like the South Bronx. Residents 
experienced far less displacement and were able to 
benefit from the improvements in their neighbor-
hoods. 
While Chicago neighborhoods like Lawndale and 
Englewood declined during the 1990s, the South 
Bronx began to climb out of the economic and social 
blight that prevailed in the previous decade, lessen-
ing the level of youth violence and helping to speed 
the unprecedented drop in New York City’s violent 
crime rate that has continued to the present time.
Hagedorn maintains that the displacement of tens 
of thousands of African American families, some-
times fracturing renegade splinter groups off institu-
tionalized gangs, has played a role in the persistence 
of high levels of violence due to gang wars and drug 
market disputes. While New York’s homicide rate 
plummeted, Hagedorn points out, Chicago’s de-
clined only slightly (Hagedorn undated). 
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Los Angeles has experienced a long-term 
pandemic of youth gang homicide and violence 
(California Attorney General’s Office 2004). A quar-
ter-century-long “war on gangs” has cost taxpayers 
billions of dollars, yet—according to a new report by 
the Advancement Project—there now are six times as 
many gangs and at least double the number of gang 
members in the Los Angeles region (Advancement 
Project 2007). 
New York’s sporadic cycles of gang violence have 
never paralleled the deadly carnage experienced in 
Los Angeles. In Street Wars, his insightful study of 
gangs, Tom Hayden writes that some 10,000 of Los 
Angeles’ young people have been killed in gang con-
flicts over the past two decades (Hayden 2005). The 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) reported 
11,402 gang-related crimes in 2005 (Advancement 
Project 2006). That same year, the New York Police 
Department reported just 520 (New York City May-
or’s Office of Operations 2005). FBI crime reports 
indicate that New York’s homicide rate that year was 
about half of Los Angeles’, while the rate of reported 
gang crime in Los Angeles was 49 times the rate re-
ported in New York City. 
What can account for such startling contrasts? Is New 
York City in denial about the nature and size of its 
street gang problem? Or is the city still benefiting from 
policies set more than 30 years ago that approached 
the problem of street gangs in ways that avoided the 
excesses of police suppression that have characterized 
the policing of gangs in Los Angeles? Do Hayden, the 
Advancement Project, and the LAPD exaggerate the 
seriousness and scale of Los Angeles’ gang problem? 
Or has police suppression helped to turn the Los An-
geles gang problem into a gang pandemic? A short 
review of gang suppression efforts in Los Angeles is of-
fered here in order to provide a historical context that 
may shed some light on these puzzling questions. 
During World War II, groups of Mexican immigrant 
“pachucos” in stylized “zoot suits” and wide-brimmed 
hats drew hostile police actions when sailors home 
on leave surged repeatedly into East Los Angeles to 
attack them. While a handful of sailors were arrested 
for fighting, hundreds of the Latino youths they at-
tacked were arrested for disturbing the peace. 
Hayden recounts that the early African American 
gangs in Los Angeles—the Slausons and the Gladia-
tors—were formed in the Watts ghetto projects after 
World War II in response to white youth violence 
during integration of the public schools. Blacks were 
beaten and burned in effigy by white public school 
cliques. African Americans living in Watts faced pub-
lic signs in nearby Compton, then a white working-
class enclave, that warned that “Negroes” had to be 
out of town by sundown. The white Spook Hunters 
gang enforced boundary transgressions; when backup 
was needed it was supplied by the LAPD.
In an interview, a veteran of the 1965 Watts uprising 
told Hayden about growing up as a Baby Slauson: 
“We resisted the term ‘gang.’ We saw the police as a 
gang, we saw ourselves as a club formed because of 
discrimination. You couldn’t get into the Boy Scouts, 
you couldn’t go to the public swimming pools, you 
couldn’t go into Inglewood. Southgate was off limits.”
During the same years that the Youth Board’s street-
work efforts in New York City were showing success 
in assuaging the epidemic of gang violence there, 
legendary LAPD chief William Parker—who main-
tained a segregated police force until 1960—resisted 
the notion of using social work approaches to quell 
gang violence (Davis 2006). In his view, gang mem-
bers were incorrigibles, deserving nothing more than 
a locked-down prison regime. He characterized the 
city’s barrio residents as just one step removed from 
“the wild tribes of Mexico.” During the civil rights 
era, black gangs and black nationalist groups fused 
in Parker’s mind into a single menace of communist-
inspired black power. 
As though to confirm Chief Parker’s paranoia, hostili-
ties between South Central gangs seemed to evaporate 
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in August 1965 as members joined Watts residents 
in battle against the LAPD and the National Guard 
during five days of sustained civil disturbance. The 
cessation of most gang hostilities continued more 
or less for the next half decade, as many prominent 
gang leaders took up roles in liberation movement 
organizations. But after the Los Angeles chapter of 
the Black Panther Party was dismantled by the com-
bined efforts of the FBI and the LAPD, old gang 
hostilities reemerged.
Latino gangs in East Los Angeles were a focus of 
gang suppression policing in the 1970s. In The City 
of Quartz, his far-reaching study of the impact of 
globalization on the political economy and com-
munity culture in Los Angeles, Mike Davis writes 
that it was a “major community counter-offensive” 
led by priests, parents, and veteran gang members 
that brought the number of gang homicides down 
from 34 in 1978 to none at all in 1988. Meanwhile, 
an epidemic of “gangbanging” spread rapidly in 
South Los Angeles, coinciding with the rapid rise 
of the crack cocaine market. Davis says that as bad 
as it was, the outbreak of youth violence never came 
close to resembling the phantasmagoric images por-
trayed by law enforcement with inflated statistics 
and supercharged rhetoric. 
Davis characterizes the media-fueled hysteria over 
gangs in Los Angeles during the period as “a terrain 
of pseudo-knowledge and fantasy projection.” Hys-
terical rhetoric soon led to a hyperrepressive reaction 
by police. Davis has described a massive Operation 
HAMMER gang sweep in Los Angeles during the 
late 1980s: 
A thousand extra-duty patrolmen, backed up 
by elite tactical squads and a special anti-gang 
taskforce, bring down the first act of “Opera-
tion HAMMER” upon ten square miles of 
Southcentral Los Angeles between Exposition 
Park and North Long Beach, arresting more 
Black youth than at any time since the Watts 
rebellion of 1965. Like a Vietnam-era search-
and-destroy mission—and many senior police 
are proud Vietnam veterans—Chief [Darrell] 
Gates saturates the street with his “Blue Ma-
chine,” jacking up thousands of local teenagers 
at random like so many surprised peasants. Kids 
are humiliatingly forced to “kiss the sidewalk” 
or spreadeagle against police cruisers while of-
ficers check their names against computerized 
files of gang members. There are 1,453 arrests; 
the kids are processed in mobile booking cen-
ters, mostly for trivial offenses like delinquent 
parking tickets or curfew violations. Hundreds 
more, uncharged, have their names and ad-
dresses entered into the electronic gang roster 
for future surveillance.
In 1987 the Gang Related Active Trafficker Suppres-
sion program (GRATS) mounted nine sweeps over 
a period of two months, netting more than 1,500 
arrests. Yet the violence continued, so Chief Gates—
fearing a threat by county supervisors to call out the 
National Guard—threw the sweep machine into 
high gear, initiating HAMMER-style supersweeps. 
During an August 1988 raid by HAMMER troops 
on a group of Dalton Avenue apartment buildings, 
rampaging cops smashed apartment walls with 
sledgehammers and spray-painted “LAPD Rules” 
on those left intact. They wreaked such extensive 
damage to property and possessions that the Red 
Cross offered residents disaster relief and temporary 
shelter. The raid yielded no arrests of gang members 
and no weapons. Residents were later awarded $3 
million by the courts to compensate them for the 
damages inflicted during the Dalton Avenue police 
riot. By 1990 HAMMER had pounded more than 
50,000 arrestees (Davis 2006).
In Street Wars, Hayden related how mounting La-
tino gang violence in the Pico barrio on the west side 
of Los Angeles during the early 1990s was quelled 
by a series of gang truces. Gang warfare in Santa 
Monica, West Los Angeles, Culver City, and Ven-
ice had become a bloody slaughter, conducted with 
pipe bombs and drive-by shootings. Street gangs 
were loosely connected through the prison pipeline 
to Mexican Mafia (La Eme) shot-callers, who called 
a cease-fire on drive-bys in September 1993—but, 
according to Hayden, many cease-fire agreements 
had already been hammered out at the street level 
between gang leaders, who met regularly in an effort 
to calm the warfare.
La Eme had been formed in the California prison 
system during the 1950s for the purpose of protect-
ing Latino prisoners from hostile acts by African 
Americans and racist whites. As in Illinois, the prison 
experience galvanized La Eme with a businesslike 
structure of rules, enforced with muscular leader-
ship. The shot-callers convened the September 1993 
mass meeting of more than 1,000 gang members in 
Elysian Park to deliver the message that the violence 
between Mexicans had to cease. 
After the gangs were convened, the home of a ma-
jor La Eme organizer was raided by the LAPD. The 
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organizer turned informant and helped to make the 
first federal RICO1 case against a gang in Los An-
geles, which—in 1997—resulted in life sentences 
for 10 La Eme leaders. But the truce process sus-
tained relative peace in West Los Angeles into 1998 
(Hayden 2005).
The first civil gang injunction was sought against the 
Playboy Gangster Crips in 1987 by then–city attor-
ney James Hahn. He requested a restraining order 
spanning 26 square blocks south of Beverly Hills 
with 24 specific prohibitions, including “congregat-
ing in groups of two or more” and “remaining in 
public streets for more than five minutes at any time 
of day or night.” The injunction would have banned 
the wearing of gang colors, imposed a curfew on ju-
veniles, and required that gang members would be 
subject to arrest for simply passing through the area 
without an authorization document signed by a “law-
ful property holder or employer.” Hahn was forced to 
modify his application after opposition erupted from 
the American Civil Liberties Union—but his gang-
busting ambitions were truly fulfilled the following 
year, when a RICO-style bill he authored in collabo-
ration with Ira Reiner, Los Angeles district attorney, 
was enacted in Sacramento. The Street Terrorism En-
forcement and Prevention Act (STEP) made partici-
pation in gang activity a felony (Davis 2006). 
The STEP act (California Penal Code 186.20) de-
fines a gang as an ongoing organization, association, 
or group of three or more persons, whether formal or 
informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more specified crimes,2 hav-
ing a common name or common identifying sign 
or symbol, and whose members individually or col-
lectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity.
The law provides that anyone who actively partici-
pates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that 
its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern 
of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, 
furthers, or assists any felonious criminal conduct by 
members of that gang is guilty of a criminal offense. 
If a person is convicted of a felony committed “for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent 
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct 
1  The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
Act of 1970 provides long prison sentences for those convicted 
of certain crimes (e.g., gambling, murder, kidnapping, arson, 
robbery, bribery, extortion) performed as part of an ongoing 
criminal organization.
2  See prologue footnote 1 for a list of the crimes.
by gang members,” the person will receive a sentence 
enhancement on top of the prescribed prison sen-
tence (for low-level felonies, an extra two to four 
years; for more serious felonies, five years; for violent 
felonies, ten years) (Bjerregaard 2003).
The use of civil gang injunctions (CGIs) accelerated 
in the mid-1990s. Cheryl Maxson reports that at 
least 22 gang injunctions had been issued in the city 
of Los Angeles by July 2004. The scope of these gang 
suppression tools can be drawn very broadly: 
The number of gang members can range from a 
handful to the hundreds, and the initial string 
of names often is followed by “and any other 
members.” The targeted area can be a housing 
complex, several square blocks, or an entire 
city, but most often CGIs are spatially based, 
neighborhood-level interventions intended to 
disrupt the gang’s routine activities. Prohibited 
behaviors include illegal activities such as tres-
pass, vandalism, drug selling, and public urina-
tion, as well as otherwise legal activities, such as 
wearing gang colors, displaying hand signs, and 
carrying a pager or signaling passing cars, be-
haviors associated with drug selling. Nighttime 
curfews are often imposed. Most disturbing to 
legal scholars and advocates is the commonly 
applied prohibition against any two or more 
named gang members associating with one an-
other. (Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane 2005)
A gang database was first compiled in Los Angeles 
by the Los Angeles County sheriff the same year that 
James Hahn sought his injunction against the Play-
boy Gangster Crips. The Los Angeles database was 
taken statewide a decade later when the California 
Department of Justice created CalGang, which tracks 
some 200 datapoints of personal information and 
gang-related information. By 2003, Loren Siegel re-
ported, 47 percent of African American men in Los 
Angeles County between the ages of 21 and 24 had 
been logged into the Los Angeles County gang data-
base, and more than a quarter-million Californians 
had been entered into the CalGang database by law 
enforcement personnel across the state (Siegel 2003).
A person can be entered in the CalGang database if 
a law enforcement officer determines that the person 
meets at least two of ten criteria (Advancement Proj-
ect 2006):
  1. Admits gang membership or association.
  2.  Is observed to associate on a regular basis with 
known gang members.
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  3. Has tattoos indicating gang membership.
  4.  Wears gang clothing, symbols, etc., to identify 
with a specific gang.
  5.  Is in a photograph with known gang members 
and/or using gang-related hand signs.
  6.  Is named on a gang document, hit list, or gang-
related graffiti.
  7.  Is identified as a gang member by a reliable 
source.
  8.  Is arrested in the company of identified gang 
members or associates.
  9.  Corresponds with known gang members or 
writes and/or receives correspondence about 
gang activities.
10.  Writes about gangs (graffiti) on walls, books, 
paper, etc.
Civil injunctions and other public order measures, 
such as curfews for urban youth, have been embraced 
by many as progressive alternatives to draconian 
incapacitation mandated by antigang sentencing 
enhancements such as are embodied in STEP (Har-
court 2001). Yet introduction of these “alternatives” 
has not served as a substitute for police repression 
and imprisonment of street gangs in Los Angeles. 
Rather, the array of antigang measures have com-
bined to compound the impact of Los Angeles’ pe-
rennial crackdowns on gangs. 
The intensity of the LAPD’s war on street gangs and 
its propensity for corruption were laid bare when in-
vestigations of police misconduct exposed the opera-
tions of the CRASH (Community Resources Against 
Street Hoodlums) program. According to Tom 
Hayden, CRASH had evolved from TRASH—Los 
Angeles’ first antigang police unit—established un-
der a federal grant in 1977. T stood for total, and the 
goal was total suppression of gangs.
In 1998 a CRASH officer working out of the Ram-
part police precinct house, Rafael Perez, was charged 
with theft of eight pounds of cocaine from a police 
locker. Facing a long prison term, Perez broke the 
code of silence and revealed the inner workings of 
the antigang squad. 
Operating jointly with federal agents in the FBI 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, CRASH officers in the Rampart district 
conducted gang sweeps in 1997 and 1998 that re-
sulted in Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) deportation of 160 people. Some INS officials 
in Los Angeles were appalled at the tactics being 
used. INS documents handed over to a Los Angeles 
Times reporter revealed complaints by INS officers 
that CRASH was waging war against “a whole race of 
people.” Perez testified that potential witnesses to po-
lice misconduct were being handed over to the INS 
for deportation. 
Perez talked of framing cases against some 100 people, 
and implicated scores of other officers. Perez admit-
ted that he and his partner had shot one Pico-Union 
gang member in the head and then planted drugs and 
guns near his fallen body. The brain-damaged vic-
tim, released from prison after Perez’s testimony, had 
been sentenced to 23 years in prison for his “crime.” 
Tainted cases were dismissed against 99 other defen-
dants. A Los Angeles Times article published in 2000 
characterized the Rampart CRASH unit as hosting 
a secret fraternity of more than 30 officers and ser-
geants with “an organized criminal subculture.” Of-
ficers were awarded plaques that celebrated incidents 
in which they had wounded or killed people (Glover 
and Lait 2000). 
The harsh gang suppression tactics that have been 
employed for decades by law enforcement agencies 
in Los Angeles have never suffered from a lack of 
criticism from academic experts, civil libertarians, 
and criminal justice reform advocates and activists. 
California’s Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) has been 
waging a grassroots campaign against Los Angeles’ 
current war on gangs. YJC activists charge that by 
criminalizing gang membership and gang activity, 
California’s antigang laws result in discrimination on 
the basis of race, class, and age. They argue that “peo-
ple should be held accountable for their actions not 
for their dress, affiliations or where they live or hang 
out” (California Youth Justice Coalition 2006).
YJC activists condemn the excessive sentences meted 
out under the penalty enhancement provisions of 
California’s STEP law, especially as they interact with 
other “get-tough” measures enacted by California 
voters, such as the “Three Strikes” law and Propo-
sition 21, which made any felony committed “on 
behalf of a gang” a strike and provides prosecutors 
with legal authority to file charges against youths as 
young as 14 years old directly in adult court, without 
a fitness hearing before a judge. YJC activists charge 
that once youths are labeled with “gang affiliation,” 
they receive more severe treatment at every stage of 
the adjudication process. They may be denied release 
on bond; their defenses may be discounted and their 
testimony disbelieved by judges and jurors. 
Activists charge that instead of targeting individuals 
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for their criminal activity, gang injunctions sweep 
entire communities into a net of police surveillance. 
Moreover, they argue, injunctions, for the most part, 
are imposed not on the largest gangs or the most no-
torious gang neighborhoods but rather in areas that 
are near to white neighborhoods or those most at-
tractive for gentrification. At a city council hearing 
on these injunctions held in May 2006, community 
residents from areas under injunction complained of 
severe curtailment of basic freedom and of routine 
police harassment.
In April 2007 Los Angeles city attorney Rocky Del-
gadillo responded to community pressure by an-
nouncing new guidelines that mandate significant 
changes in civil injunction procedures (Los Angeles 
City Attorney’s Office 2007). No longer will police 
officers determine who will be served with an injunc-
tion. They will have to present the city attorney’s of-
fice with evidence that proves, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that a person is an active gang member before 
adding that person to an injunction list. Those added 
to a list will be served with legal notice and will be 
able to petition for removal from an injunction list 
by explaining that they are no longer active—or never 
were active—in a gang. Moreover, all cases will auto-
matically be reviewed every three years, and people 
will be removed from the list unless there is evidence 
that they have maintained active gang membership.
The revised guidelines mark a major victory for YJC 
activists in Los Angeles, but they pledge continued 
pressure to extend the injunction reforms to Los An-
geles County, and to end use of gang database sys-
tems that remain devoid of meaningful due process. 
They continue to seek guarantees that people who 
are added to CalGang will receive official notification 
and be given clear rights to appeal their inclusion in 
the database.
The history of failed gang strategies compiled by the 
Advancement Project for the Los Angeles city council 
in 2006 notes that Proposition 13 (the landmark tax 
reform measure enacted by California voters in 1978) 
resulted in virtual elimination of all of the city’s pre-
vention and early intervention programs. Around the 
same time, the city began to construct its monolithic 
gang suppression machinery (Advancement Project 
2006). In contrast, New York City has made consider-
able efforts to maintain an adequate level of city fund-
ing for youth services, recreation, and employment 
programs (Advancement Project 2007).
To this day, suppression has remained the primary 
strategy to address Los Angeles’ serious, chronic 
problem of gang violence. The Advancement Proj-
ect research team reports that more than two-thirds 
of the money available for gang reduction efforts is 
directed to suppression efforts by the LAPD and the 
city attorney’s office, with the largest portion invested 
in police “gang impact teams.” 
Los Angeles is well into the third decade of its failed 
“war on gangs.” Despite massive, militarized police 
actions, strict civil injunctions, draconian sentenc-
ing enhancements, and a gang database that appears 
to criminalize upwards of half of its young African 
American male residents, gang violence is worsening, 
according to media reports. With a reported 720 ac-
tive gangs and 39,488 gang members, Los Angeles 
retains the dubious honor of being the gang capital 
of the world. 
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Gang policy is often made in moments of perceived 
crisis, when law enforcement agencies and elected of-
ficials feel intense pressure to “do something” about 
gangs immediately—a poor atmosphere for consider-
ing questions that will determine the success or failure 
of a gang control strategy. 
Sober policy making is made even more difficult by 
the larger-than-life quality that attaches to any con-
versation about gangs. Gangs thrive on publicity of 
all kinds. Their members often go to great pains to 
make themselves visible and to exaggerate the threat 
they pose to society. They are often aided and abet-
ted by politicians and the media, who also thrive on 
the sensational reaction that gangs—with their men-
acing tattoos, graffiti, colors, and hand signs—elicit 
from the public.
Gang researchers are not immune to America’s long 
romance with gangs, but for the most part their 
work provides a helpful antidote to the overblown 
rhetoric of gang members and those who would 
make the eradication of gangs a national priority. 
Their work can help us answer critical questions that 
should—but usually don’t—guide policy making: 
Who are gang members? Why do they join gangs, 
and—equally important—why do they leave? What 
do gangs do? What is the relationship between gang 
activity and crime? What do we want to accomplish 
through our gang control efforts, and how do we ex-
pect it to happen? Should we focus on gangs at all?
The following chapters seek to shed light on these 
questions and debunk some of the most tenacious 
myths about what gangs are and how gang problems 
can best be addressed.
PART II     What Research Tells Us
      here is a wealth of research on the origins of gangs and the activities and char-
acteristics of their members, as well as a smaller but useful body of literature that 
seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of various gang control strategies and tactics. 
Unfortunately, public officials rarely draw on this resource, opting instead to 
make policy by anecdote. 
T
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It is difficult to find a law enforcement account of 
gang activity that does not give the impression that 
the problem is getting worse by the day. A review 
of the most recent National Gang Threat Assessment 
from the National Alliance of Gang Investigators As-
sociations (NAGIA) suggests that gangs pose a rapidly 
growing threat to public safety (2005). Nationally, 
NAGIA claims that gangs are associating with orga-
nized crime; gang members are becoming more so-
phisticated in their use of computers and technology; 
Hispanic gang membership is on the rise; California-
style gang culture is migrating and spreading gangs’ 
reach; women are taking more active roles in gangs; 
“Indian Country” sources are reporting escalating 
gang activity; and motorcycle gangs are expanding 
their territory. 
The report paints an even bleaker picture of regional 
developments. Nearly half of the key regional find-
ings—11 of 23—contain a variant of the words 
increase or grow. All of the following are reputed 
to be on the rise in one or more regions: neighbor-
hood/homegrown and hybrid gangs; gangs in His-
panic immigrant communities; gang violence and 
drug trafficking on Indian reservations; graffiti and 
tagging; gang activity around schools and college 
campuses; cooperation between gangs to facilitate 
crime and drug trafficking; sophistication in the 
planning and execution of gang crime; identity 
and credit card theft perpetrated by gang members; 
and use of firearms by gang members. There is, by 
contrast, no mention of reductions in any form of 
gang activity.
Yet the most comprehensive survey of law enforce-
ment data on gang activity shows no significant 
changes in estimated gang membership or the 
prevalence of gang activity—both of which are 
down significantly since the late 1990s. Further, 
law enforcement depictions of the gang population 
are sharply at odds with youth survey data when it 
comes to the geography of gang activity as well as 
the race and gender of gang members.
Data on the prevalence of gang 
problems and gang membership
The National Youth Gang Survey
The primary source of law enforcement reports on the 
prevalence of gang problems is the National Youth 
Gang Survey (NYGS). The survey is distributed 
annually to all law enforcement agencies that serve 
suburban counties and cities with 50,000 or more 
residents, along with a random sample of police de-
partments that serve small cities and rural counties. 
Each agency is asked to describe the nature of the 
local youth gang problem and estimate the number 
and demographic characteristics of gangs and gang 
members in its jurisdiction. Respondents are told to 
exclude from their reports motorcycle gangs, prison 
gangs, hate groups, and gangs composed entirely of 
adults. Response rates have ranged from 84 to 92 per-
cent since 1996 (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006).
The National Youth Gang Center (NYGC) uses 
NYGS data to examine the prevalence of gang 
problems by type of jurisdiction and to estimate 
the number of gangs and gang members in the 
United States. The strength of gang prevalence and 
population estimates is limited by the quality of law 
enforcement data. Local estimates of gang member-
ship can fluctuate from year to year based on shift-
ing definitions of gang activity and changes in the 
capacity to track it. NYGC senior research associate 
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Arlen Egley explains that signifi cant year-to-year 
variation in the number of gang members reported 
by a given jurisdiction often refl ects a “change in 
approach” rather than a change in the gangs them-
selves (personal communication).
Law enforcement estimates of local gang membership can 
ﬂ uctuate from year to year based on changes in police 
practices. 
Th e number of active gang members reported by the 
Detroit Police Department nearly doubled between 
1996 and 1997, rising from 2,000 to 3,500 before 
plunging to 800 the following year (Bynum and 
Varano 2003). Yet gun crimes—which were consid-
ered by Detroit researchers to be indicative of gang 
activity—moved in the opposite direction, falling be-
tween 1996 and 1997 and rising the following year. 
Elsewhere, the fl uctuations can be tied directly to 
training and funding for gang enforcement eff orts. In-
dianapolis Police Department estimates of local gang 
activity jumped from 80 gangs and 1,746 members in 
1995 to 198 gangs and 2,422 members in 1997 after 
the city was selected to participate in a federal gang 
initiative (McGarrell and Chermak 2003).
Sharp year-to-year changes in local gang popula-
tion estimates are excellent fodder for sensational 
media reports but say little about the severity of 
a local gang problem. Deborah Lamm Weisel 
and Tara O’Connor Shelley warn that “while it is 
tempting to use law enforcement data about gangs 
and gang-related off enses to make comparisons 
between—or even within—jurisdictions, gang-
related data are exceptionally unreliable for this 
purpose” (2004). Th e national estimates of gang 
prevalence published by NYGC are less volatile be-
cause they combine results from hundreds of juris-
dictions. Nonetheless, trends in estimated city and 
county gang membership reversed directions three 
times between 1996 and 2002 (Egley, Howell, and 
Major 2006). 
Despite these fl aws, NYGS data do provide a gen-
eral picture of the scope and direction of the gang 
problem as it is perceived by law enforcement. 
Th e most recent NYGC report indicates that the 
United States had roughly 24,000 youth gangs and 
760,000 gang members in 2004 (Egley and Ritz 
2006). Th e numbers are daunting, immediately 
conjuring images of a marauding army of gun-tot-
ing criminals half the size of the active U.S. mili-
tary. But NYGC data indicate that the size and 
reach of gangs have actually declined over the past 
decade. Th e estimated gang population is down 
from roughly 850,000 in 1996, and the propor-
tion of jurisdictions reporting gang problems has 
fallen sharply. 
Th e number of jurisdictions reporting gang problems fell 
sharply at the end of the 1990s.
Th e largest reductions have occurred in rural coun-
ties, where the proportion of law enforcement re-
spondents reporting gang problems has fallen by 
nearly half since the late 1990s. One in eight rural 
law enforcement agencies (12.3 percent) reported 
gang problems between 2002 and 2004, while a 
quarter (24.3 percent) reported problems between 
1996 and 1998. 
Smaller cities and suburban counties have also wit-
nessed signifi cant drops in the reported prevalence 
of gang problems since the late 1990s. Over a third 
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(36.5 percent) of cities with 2,500 to 50,000 resi-
dents reported gang problems in the late 1990s. A 
little more than a quarter of small cities (28.4 per-
cent) reported such problems between 2002 and 
2004. Gangs were active in a majority of suburban 
counties (56 percent) during the late 1990s, but that 
proportion fell to 40 percent in the most recent sur-
vey period. 
Larger cities experienced a reduction in reported 
gang activity, according to law enforcement respon-
dents, although the drop was less dramatic. Four in 
five cities with 50,000 or more residents (79.8 per-
cent) reported gang problems between 2002 and 
2004, down from the 85.6 percent that reported 
such problems just six years earlier. The largest de-
cline in the number of jurisdictions reporting gang 
problems occurred at the end of the 1990s. The pic-
ture has remained stable since the end of the 1990s, 
with small and large cities reporting a small increase 
in the prevalence of gang problems while rural and 
suburban counties reported a slight decrease. None 
of the recent shifts are large or consistent enough to 
establish a clear trend, according to NYGC staff (Eg-
ley, personal communication).
Youth surveys
The second source of information on the prevalence 
of gang activity and the characteristics of gang mem-
bers is a group of youth surveys conducted over the 
past 15 years. Surveys can provide greater consistency 
than estimates generated by law enforcement agen-
cies employing varied definitions and data collection 
methods. And they can track behavior that does not 
come to the attention of law enforcement. 
Yet surveys are limited by how representative the 
sample is of the general population. Most surveys of 
youth gang activity target specific locations or seg-
ments of the youth population, making it difficult 
to derive general conclusions about the larger youth 
gang population. The results of youth surveys—like 
law enforcement surveys—also depend on the per-
ceptions of survey subjects and their willingness to 
answer questions honestly.
Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson summarize the 
results of nearly 20 youth surveys conducted in over 
30 cities and four countries in Street Gang Patterns 
and Policies (2006). Rates of current self-reported 
gang membership in U.S. surveys range from a high 
of more than 20 percent among a sample of high 
school students and dropouts in Chicago, Los An-
geles, and San Diego (citing Fagan 1990) to a low 
of 2 percent for a nationally representative sample 
of youth who participated in the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) (citing Snyder and 
Sickmund 1999).1 Reported lifetime prevalence of 
gang membership ranged from a high of 31 percent 
among high-risk Rochester, New York, youth (citing 
Thornberry et al. 2003) to a low of 5 percent among 
NLSY respondents.
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which 
was sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, is the only source of survey data on youth gang 
membership in the United States that is based on a 
nationally representative household sample. The sur-
vey identified a group of nearly 9,000 youth using 
cross-sectional and supplemental samples to ensure 
adequate representation across both geography and 
race/ethnicity. Youth between the ages of 12 and 16 
were interviewed on a wide range of subjects and 
reinterviewed annually over a four-year period. The 
large size and national scope of the sample, together 
with its rigorous methodology, make NLSY the most 
reliable source of information on the prevalence of 
gang involvement.
The application of NLSY prevalence rates to 2000 
U.S. Census counts produces a total estimated 12- 
to 16-year-old gang population of roughly 440,000.2 
The figure is roughly half the size of the NYGC es-
timate, but this result is not entirely unexpected. 
The 440,000 estimate includes only gang members 
between the ages of 12 and 16, while NYGC staff 
estimate that adults make up two-thirds of gang 
members known to law enforcement (Egley, How-
ell, and Major 2006). The NYGC estimate and the 
projection from NLSY prevalence rates appear to fall 
within the same ballpark, assuming that some of the 
440,000 self-reported gang members are never iden-
tified by law enforcement and that there are another 
500,000 or so gang members over the age of 16 who 
are not captured by the NLSY survey.
1   Surveys differ in the way they formulate questions and report 
results on the prevalence of current gang membership. For 
purposes of this report, youth reporting gang membership 
within the past year are grouped with “current” gang members. 
2   The 440,000 figure is a midpoint between an estimate of 
gang membership generated by using the overall 2 percent 
prevalence rate (415,000) and an estimate generated by 
applying race- and gender-specific prevalence rates to 
components of the youth population (470,000). The difference 
is likely a result of imprecision in the prevalence rates, which 
have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole percent, 
as well as the lack of reported prevalence rates for Asians and 
Native Americans.
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Squaring the data: law enforcement 
versus youth surveys
Urban and rural youth were equally likely to report cur-
rent and lifetime gang membership.
Th e law enforcement and youth survey results part 
company when it comes to the composition of the 
youth gang population. NYGC data indicate that gangs 
are primarily an urban phenomenon: four in fi ve large-
city law enforcement agencies report a gang problem 
compared to fewer than one in seven rural agencies. 
Even in the late 1990s, no more than a quarter of rural 
law enforcement respondents reported gang problems. 
But urban and rural youth were equally likely to report 
current and lifetime gang membership—2 percent 
and 5 percent, respectively—according to NLSY data 
(Snyder and Sickmund 2006).
Girls account for a quarter to a third of adolescent gang 
members, according to youth surveys.
Th e NYGC and NLSY data also point toward very 
diff erent gender breakdowns. NYGC reports that 
women and girls made up just 6 percent of gang 
members known to law enforcement in 2000 (Klein 
and Maxson 2006). Yet NLSY prevalence rates—3 
percent for boys and 1 percent for girls—indicate 
that girls should account for roughly a quarter of the 
adolescent gang population. Th e three-to-one ratio 
of male-to-female gang participation found in the 
national youth survey is supported by the results of 
other youth surveys, which found ratios ranging from 
three to one to nearly one to one (Klein and Maxson 
2006). A research team led by Finn-Aage Esbensen 
reports an even lower two-to-one ratio of male-to-fe-
male gang participation based on a survey of nearly 
6,000 eighth-grade public school students (Esbensen 
and Winfree 2001).
Th e gang prevalence rates generated by the NLSY 
survey can be used to estimate the gender breakdown 
of youth gang membership in the United States. Th e 
GREAT survey was not designed to select a represen-
tative sample of youth, but extrapolating from the 
GREAT data nonetheless provides an interesting con-
trast to law enforcement accounts of gang membership, 
as shown on the following chart.3 
Th e most striking diff erence between gang popula-
tion estimates generated by law enforcement and by 
youth surveys may be their racial and ethnic com-
position. Law enforcement reports indicate that the 
overwhelming majority of gang members are Latino 
or African American. 
African Americans and Latinos were roughly 15 times 
more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be identifi ed by 
the police as gang members.
Latinos accounted for nearly half (49 percent) of 
the estimated youth gang population in 2004, ac-
cording to NYGS data, even though they make up 
just 17 percent of 12- to 24-year-olds in the United 
States (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006; 2000 U.S. 
Census). Blacks accounted for more than a third 
of known gang members (37 percent)—more than 
twice their 15 percent share of the adolescent/young 
adult population. Non-Hispanic whites, by contrast, 
accounted for 63 percent of adolescents/young adults 
but just 8 percent of gang members identifi ed by law 
enforcement. In other words, African Americans and 
Latinos were roughly 15 times more likely than non-
3  Th e estimated gender breakdowns presented here diff er from 
those reported by Esbensen and Winfree (2001) for gang 
members in their sample because their base population diff ers 
from the youth population in the United States. 
Figure 4.4. Race/ethnicity of law enforcement-
identifi ed youth gang members and 
total youth/young adult population
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Figure 4.3. Gender of estimated U.S. youth gang population
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Figure 4.5. Gang membership rates by race/ethnicity
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Hispanic whites to be identifi ed by the police as gang 
members.
Youth survey data also show diff erences in the 
prevalence of gang involvement among whites and 
nonwhites, but the gap is much smaller. Ratios of 
black-to-white gang membership rates range from 
a high of nearly fi ve to one among high-risk sev-
enth-graders in Pittsburgh to just under two to one 
among middle school students in St. Louis (Klein 
and Maxson 2006 citing Lahey et al. 1999; Curry, 
Decker, and Egley 2002). Th e weakness of most of 
these surveys, for the purpose of examining the racial 
and ethnic composition of youth gangs nationwide, 
is that they typically sample urban areas that diff er 
from the suburban and rural areas where the major-
ity of Americans (especially whites) lives. 
Two surveys provide a more comprehensive national 
snapshot of youth gang involvement by race and 
ethnicity. NLSY data show that 6 percent of black 
males, 5 percent of Latino males, and 2 percent of 
white males between the ages of 12 and 16 reported 
belonging to a gang in the past 12 months; 2 per-
cent of black and Latina females and 1 percent of 
white females also reported current gang member-
ship (Snyder and Sickmund 1999). Th e racial and 
ethnic diff erences in self-reported gang membership 
remain substantial but fall far short of those reported 
by law enforcement. 
Esbensen and Th omas Winfree reported very simi-
lar results from the GREAT evaluation (2001). Th e 
GREAT sample was not nationally representative, 
but it did include 11 geographically and racially di-
verse communities ranging from large cities like Phil-
adelphia and Phoenix to small cities and rural areas 
such as Pocatello, Idaho, and Will County, Illinois. 
One in 20 white youths (5.1 percent) reported current 
gang membership, as did one in 10 black youths (10.1 
percent) and just over one in 10 Latino youths (11.6 
percent). Th e prevalence of gang membership is higher 
in the GREAT survey than in the NLSY survey, an 
outcome that may refl ect the selection of communities 
that were actively seeking to address gang problems. 
But the ratios of nonwhite-to-white gang participation 
are remarkably similar to those generated by NLSY re-
searchers: a little more than two to one for Latinos and 
between two and three to one for blacks.
Whites account for more than 40 percent of adolescent 
gang members, according to youth survey data.
Th e NLSY and GREAT surveys both indicate a 
breakdown of gang membership very diff erent from 
that reported in law enforcement surveys. When the 
NLSY prevalence rates are applied to the 12- to 16-
year-old U.S. population, they produce an estimated 
gang population that is roughly a quarter black, a 
quarter Latino, and more than 40 percent white.4 Th e 
GREAT survey was not designed to select a repre-
4  Th e NLSY results published by Snyder and Sickmund provide 
gang prevalence for white, black, and Latino youth but not for 
other racial groups such as Asians or Native Americans (2006). 
Esbensen and Winfree found prevalence rates for other racial 
groups that were nearly identical to gang membership rates 
among Latinos (2001). For the purpose of extrapolating the 
racial and ethnic breakdown of the adolescent gang population 
from NLSY data, we have substituted prevalence rates for Latinos 
for the missing prevalence rates for “others.” Th is assumption 
may not be correct, but it is based on the best available data. 
Further, even if the assumption were incorrect, the eff ect of the 
error would be minimal since other racial groups account for a 
small proportion of the total adolescent population.
Figure 4.6 Race/ethnicity of estimated U.S. youth gang population
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sentative sample of youth, so the resulting data can-
not be used to generate a statistically valid population 
estimate. But it is worth noting that the application 
of GREAT prevalence rates to the U.S. youth popu-
lation produces a racial/ethnic breakdown of gang 
membership that is nearly identical to the breakdown 
indicated by the NLSY data, as shown in Figure 4.6. 5 
The surveys provide strong evidence that whites make 
up the largest racial/ethnic group of gang youth rather 
than the small fraction reported by law enforcement.
The disparities between youth surveys and law en-
forcement accounts of gang membership do not nec-
essarily prove that either source is inaccurate. Law 
enforcement and youth surveys use different meth-
ods to gather information on distinct (if overlapping) 
populations. Self-reports of gang involvement by 
youth will not necessarily match the perceptions of 
police who deal with a larger and older group that has 
come into contact with law enforcement because of 
real or perceived criminal conduct. Nevertheless, there 
must be some explanation for why youth and young 
adults identified as gang members by law enforcement 
look so different from youth who identify themselves 
as gang members. 
There are three likely explanations. First, youth who 
self-identify as gang members may be “fronting,” or 
involved in groups that call themselves gangs but do 
not engage in serious delinquency. These youth might 
never come to the attention of law enforcement, or 
their claims to gang identity might be ignored, be-
cause they are not “real” gang members. 
Second, the composition of the youth gang popula-
tion may change drastically between the adolescent 
years that are captured in youth surveys and the 
young adult years when law enforcement contact is 
more frequent. For example, if attrition rates were 
higher for white than nonwhite gang youth at the 
end of adolescence, the youth gang population could 
become less white. 
Third, the disparity could be a result of biases in the 
way gang members are identified or the way data are 
collected that cause law enforcement officials to un-
derestimate the gang involvement of white, female, 
and rural youth/young adults and overestimate the 
gang involvement of nonwhite, male, and urban 
youth/young adults. 
The published results of the major national youth 
5  The estimated racial/ethnic breakdowns presented here differ 
from those reported by Esbensen and Winfree (2001) for gang 
members in their sample because their base population differs 
from the youth population in the United States. 
surveys that address the question of gang involve-
ment—NLSY and GREAT—do not permit com-
parisons of urban and rural gang youth. They do, 
however, provide enough information to begin ex-
ploring similarities and differences in gang activity 
across race and gender lines.
Do youth surveys mix “bad apples” with 
oranges who only pretend to be bad?
The finding that whites accounted for a significant 
proportion of self-reported youth gang members 
came as a surprise to many gang researchers when 
it was first reported in 1998 by Esbensen and Win-
free (Esbensen, personal communication). Many re-
searchers expressed skepticism that white youth who 
reported gang involvement were “real” gang mem-
bers, arguing in effect that the survey findings con-
fused true “bad apples” with youth pretending to be 
bad. Similar objections have been raised to the con-
clusion—supported by many youth surveys—that 
females make up a larger share of the gang popula-
tion than law enforcement reports indicate.
Gang researchers have generally found that most 
female gang members are involved in largely male 
gangs rather than all-female gangs. This makes it un-
likely that difference in gang characteristics can ac-
count for the gender disparity in law enforcement 
and youth survey accounts of gang membership. 
There is convincing evidence, however, that female 
gang members are more delinquent than nonmem-
bers of either gender, but less delinquent than male 
gang counterparts (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006). 
Female gang members could therefore be less likely 
to attract law enforcement attention and to find their 
way into gang databases. 
White gang members report committing delinquent acts 
at the same rate as black and Latino peers.
On the other hand, the GREAT survey data show 
that the self-reported gang membership of white 
youth was as “real” as that of nonwhite peers across 
various measures of delinquency and intensity of 
gang participation. The researchers found that the 
only statistically significant difference in rates of of-
fending between white, African American, and His-
panic gang members was a lower propensity among 
African Americans to use drugs. There were no statis-
tically significant differences in self-reported rates of 
property offending, person offending, or participa-
tion in drug sales.
The researchers also examined the relationship be-
tween the intensity of gang affiliation and other 
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characteristics associated with gang involvement. 
Th ey experimented with more and less restrictive 
defi nitions of self-reported gang membership to 
see whether the demographic and other variables 
changed with the defi nition. Th e defi nitions in-
cluded (1) past gang membership; (2) current gang 
membership; (3) current membership in a gang that 
participates in delinquent acts; (4) current member-
ship in a delinquent gang with some level of organi-
zation (e.g., initiation rites, colors, leaders); and (5) 
describing oneself as a current “core” member of an 
organized delinquent gang (Esbensen et al. 2001).
Th e increasingly restrictive defi nitions of gang mem-
bership correlated to increasing rates of self-reported 
delinquency. Th e big jump in delinquency occurred 
at the point of current gang membership, which was 
associated with two times more delinquent acts than 
past gang membership (3.52 versus 1.67). Th ere were 
also substantial diff erences between the delinquency 
rates of organized delinquent gang members (an av-
erage of 3.92 delinquent acts) and core gang m em-
bers (4.41 delinquent acts). Th e diff erences between 
core and noncore members of organized delinquent 
gangs were particularly notable for person off enses 
(3.13 versus 3.69) and drug sales (3.89 versus 4.79). 
Th e data show a nonsignifi cant relationship between 
gang defi nition and the racial/ethnic breakdown 
of gang membership, but in the opposite of the ex-
pected direction. White gang youth were more likely 
than black or Latino gang youth to report being core 
members of an organized delinquent gang. A third of 
current white gang members (33 percent) fi t the most 
restrictive defi nition of gang membership, compared 
to a quarter of Latino gang youth (24 percent) and 
one in fi ve black gang youth (19 percent). Esbensen 
notes that white gang members tended to have higher 
scores on various risk scales than nonwhite gang mem-
bers, which might explain the intensity of their gang 
involvement (personal communication).
Th e fact that a youth engages in delinquent behavior 
does not necessarily mean the behavior will come to 
the attention of law enforcement. Delinquency often 
goes unreported, so it is possible that self-reported 
gang members could engage in delinquent conduct 
while remaining below the law enforcement radar. 
But research by David Curry provides further evi-
dence that self-reported gang membership is a valid 
predictor of future contact with law enforcement 
(2000). Curry collected self-report and arrest data 
for a sample of 429 Chicago youth to test the rela-
tionships between self-reported gang membership, 
self-reported delinquency, and subsequent offi  cially 
recorded delinquency. He found that, after control-
ling for race and prior arrests, the odds of future arrest 
were doubled for self-reported gang members. 
Together these research fi ndings make a persuasive 
case that the gang involvement of white self-reported 
gang members is no less “real” than the involvement 
of black and Latino peers. Th e disparity between law 
enforcement and youth survey reports may be ex-
plained in part by diff erences between the character 
and intensity of male and female gang involvement. 
But another explanation is required for the racial dif-
ferences.
Do rural, female, and white gang members 
quit gangs before their urban, male, and 
nonwhite peers?
Young adults account for two-thirds of gang members 
identifi ed by law enforcement, while the youth cohort 
accounts for just a third. If the demographic profi le of 
young adult gang members diff ered signifi cantly from 
that of youth members, it might help to explain the 
gap between law enforcement and self-report data 
on the demographics of gang membership. 
Researchers have consistently found that gang 
members join during early adolescence, and that the 
prevalence of current gang membership begins to fall 
after age 14 or 15. David Huizinga reports that the 
overwhelming majority of self-reported gang mem-
bers in a Denver sample of at-risk youth joined the 
gang between the ages of 12 and 15 (personal com-
munication). NLSY data show that the proportion 
of youth reporting ever having been a gang member 
rose from 3 to 6 percent between the ages of 12 and 
15 before fl attening out at age 16 (Snyder and Sick-
mund 1999). Six of seven youth surveys summa-
rized by Klein and Maxson show that the prevalence 
Figure 4.7. Percentage of self-reported gang 
members who met most restrictive criteria 
(core member of organized, delinquent gang)
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of current gang membership peaks at age 14 or 15 
(2006).6 These findings indicate that any differences 
in the gender, race, and geographic profile of youth 
and young adult gang members are likely to result 
from attrition rather than recruitment of young 
adults into gangs. There is strong evidence that fe-
males “age out” of gang activity more quickly than 
males. NYGC staff reference several studies that 
show that a majority of female gang members leave 
within a year (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006).
Whites appeared no more likely than blacks and Latinos 
to leave gangs at an early age. 
Comparisons of gang attrition rates for white and 
nonwhite youth produce mixed results. The GREAT 
data do not support the notion that white youth 
leave gangs more quickly than black and Latino 
counterparts—at least not prior to the eighth grade. 
Whites who were gang members at some time in 
their lives reported current involvement at roughly 
the same rate (50 percent) as black and Latino youth 
(53 percent and 47 percent, respectively) (Esbensen 
et al. 2001).
Nor do the NLSY data for youth ages 12 to 16 pro-
vide evidence that white youth leave gangs more 
quickly than nonwhite youth. The survey found that, 
among youth who reported ever having participated 
in a gang, half of white youth and less than half of 
nonwhite youth identified themselves as current gang 
members. Neither survey provides evidence of higher 
turnover among white gang youth in early and mid 
adolescence. 
Hints that white youth age out of gangs more 
quickly than blacks and Latinos begin to appear 
at the end of adolescence. Non-Hispanic whites 
were 3.5 times more likely to report having been 
a gang member by the age of 17 (7 percent) than 
to report current gang membership between the 
ages of 12 and 16 (2 percent). The ratios of cur-
rent-to-ever gang membership were slightly smaller 
for blacks and Latinos (4 percent current and 12 
percent ever), which could indicate lower turnover 
rates among nonwhites. But these differences are 
too small to draw any firm conclusions from them 
about the relationship between race and the persis-
tence of gang involvement.
6  The GREAT survey findings are excluded because the 
entire sample was made up of eighth-grade students and 
age differences in the group could be a result of factors that 
correlate to gang membership (e.g., excellent or poor high 
school performance causing a youth to be advanced or held 
back a grade).
No comparable survey data exist for young adults, so 
it is impossible to determine whether, and to what 
degree, differences in gang attrition rates change the 
face of gang membership in the young adult years. 
John Hagedorn and other gang ethnographers have 
argued that the loss of jobs and social capital brought 
about by deindustrialization has kept young inner-
city men involved in gangs into their adult years 
(Hagedorn 2005). It is certainly plausible that white 
gang youth who have better employment and educa-
tional opportunities available to them are more likely 
to give up gang life than African American and La-
tino youth with few prospects. 
Yet even if the life courses of white and nonwhite gang 
members diverged sharply during the young adult 
years, it is not clear that such a divergence could fully 
explain the racial/ethnic disparity between youth 
survey and law enforcement depictions of the youth 
gang population. Law enforcement reports identify 
many more black and Latino gang members—and 
many fewer white gang members—than the survey 
data suggest should be out there. We can test this 
proposition by comparing NYGC gang population 
estimates to projections based on NLSY gang preva-
lence rates and 2000 U.S. Census data. 
The white gang undercount
NYGC staff report that there were roughly 770,000 
youth gang members in 2000, including around 
250,000 African Americans, 370,000 Latinos, 
90,000 whites, and 60,000 members of other racial 
groups. The application of NLSY prevalence rates 
to race and gender components of the 2000 youth 
population produces an estimate of 470,000 12- to 
16-year-old gang members, including 130,000 Af-
rican Americans, 110,000 Latinos, 200,000 whites, 
and 30,000 members of other racial groups. These 
competing estimates are not easy to reconcile. 
Even if every white gang member quit by the age of 17, 
the white gang population would be two times the law 
enforcement estimate.
The first issue is the apparent undercount of white 
gang members, a problem that persists even if we 
accept the unproven hypothesis that whites age out 
of gangs faster than nonwhite peers. If we assume 
that every single white gang member left the gang by 
the age of 17, there would still have been 200,000 
white youth gang members in 2000—nearly twice 
the law enforcement estimate. It is, of course, quite 
unlikely that white youth quit gangs en masse on 
their 17th birthdays. If just a third of 16-year-old 
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white gang members stuck around until the age 
of 24, the total white gang population would be 
300,000—more than three times the law enforce-
ment estimate. 
Th e fact that many white youth gang members go 
undetected—or at least unrecognized—by law en-
forcement should not come as a surprise. Juvenile 
misbehavior may not be reported to police, and law 
enforcement agencies tend to focus their eff orts on 
crimes committed by adults and older youth. It is 
plausible that most white gang youth are never iden-
tifi ed as such by police because their behavior is not 
considered serious or persistent enough to attract 
notice or merit a gang enforcement response. But 
if we accept this explanation for the apparent white 
undercount, why should it not also apply to black 
and Latino gang youth, who are no more delinquent 
or deeply involved in gangs than white gang youth? 
The nonwhite gang overcount
Th is point leads us to the second issue: an apparent 
overcount of black and Latino gang members. Based 
on NLSY prevalence rates, in 2000 there should 
have been 130,000 black gang members between 
the ages of 12 and 16—just about half the total law 
enforcement estimate of 250,000. If we assume that 
youth gang members fall in the 12- to 24-year-old 
age group,7 then black young adults would have to 
remain involved in gangs at two-thirds the rate of 
12- to 16-year-olds in order to meet law enforcement 
estimates.8 Th ere is no evidence that African Ameri-
cans are joining gangs in large numbers after the age 
of 16, so the numbers would work only if a large ma-
jority of black 16-year-old gang members remained 
active well into young adulthood. 
Th is scenario further depends on law enforcement 
correctly identifying every single black youth gang 
member in the United States. We know that juvenile 
7  Th is assumption may prove incorrect; however, the evidence 
from survey research eff orts that followed Denver and 
Rochester youth into adulthood indicate that youth and 
young adults account for the overwhelming majority of gang 
activity (Huizinga and Th ornberry, personal communication). 
Th ere is general agreement among gang researchers that gang 
membership is more likely to persist into adulthood today than 
a generation ago. But we have found no evidence that older 
adults (age 25 and up) constitute a signifi cant share of gang 
members.
8  NLSY results suggest that 4 percent of the 3.2 million black 12- 
to 16-year-olds were current gang members (6 percent of males 
and 2 percent of females), generating an estimated youth gang 
population of 130,000. In order to reach the law enforcement 
estimate of 250,000 black gang members within the 12- to 
24-year-old cohort, the rate of gang membership among the 4.6 
million black 17- to 24-year-olds would have to be 2.6 percent.
misbehavior often goes unreported and undetected 
by law enforcement. We also know from the GREAT 
survey that many black youth have joined and left 
gangs by the time they reach the eighth grade. If we 
assume, as we did for white gang youth, that most 
12- to 16-year-old black gang members stay below 
the law enforcement radar (at least until they get 
older), then the prevalence of gang membership 
among 17- to 24-year-olds would have to equal the 
prevalence among 12- to 16-year-olds to meet the 
law enforcement estimate.9
Finally, the gang population extrapolated from 
NLSY prevalence rates is nearly a quarter female, 
while law enforcement estimates put the female 
proportion of gang members at just 6 percent. 
9  If half of black gang youth (ages 12 to 16) were not detected by 
law enforcement, the 12- to 16-year-old cohort would account 
for just over a quarter (65,000) of the law enforcement estimate 
(250,000), and the prevalence rate among 17- to 24-year-olds 
would have to rise to 4 percent. 
Figure 4.8. Scenario No. 1: law enforcement ID 100% of gang 
males; 100% of blacks/latinos and 0% of whites remain active 
from ages 17 to 24
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
 White Black Latino
 (Youth (Law (Youth (Law (Youth (Law
 survey) enforcement) survey) enforcement) survey) enforcement)
1	to	2	
(projected)
12	to	1
All	Ages
E
st
im
at
ed
 G
an
g 
P
op
ul
at
io
n
Figure 4.9. Scenario No. 2: law enforcement ID 50% of 12- to 16-
year-old gang males and 100% of 17- to 24-year-olds; 100% of 
blacks/latinos and 33% of whites remain active from ages 17 to 24
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
 White Black Latino
 (Youth (Law (Youth (Law (Youth (Law
 survey) enforcement) survey) enforcement) survey) enforcement)
1	to	2	
(projected)
12	to	1
All	Ages
E
st
im
at
ed
 G
an
g 
P
op
ul
at
io
n
2	 Gang	Wars:	The	Failure	of	Enforcement	Tactics	and	the	Need	for	Effective	Public	Safety	Strategies
In order to meet a law enforcement estimate of 
roughly 225,000 black male gang members (based 
on a population of 250,000 gang members that is 
94 percent male), the gang prevalence rates for 17- 
to 24-year-old black males would have to go even 
higher. The numbers work only if black young adult 
males participated in gangs at a slightly greater rate 
than adolescents and all black male gang members 
were detected by law enforcement; or if young black 
men participated in gangs at much higher rates than 
black male youth and not all gang members were 
detected by law enforcement.10 
The disparity between estimates based on law en-
forcement and those based on youth surveys is 
much greater for Latinos. NLSY prevalence rates 
indicate that there should have been 110,000 La-
tino gang members between the ages of 12 and 16, 
less than a third of the total law enforcement esti-
mate of 370,000 youth gang members. The only 
way the number of 12- to 24-year-old Latino gang 
members could meet the law enforcement estimate 
is if Latinos participated in gangs at higher rates be-
tween the ages of 17 and 24 than between the ages 
of 12 and 16.11 
This calculation assumes that all Latino youth and 
young adult gang members are identified by law 
enforcement. It also ignores the difference in the 
gender breakdown of law enforcement and youth 
survey gang population estimates. If half of youth 
gang members and all adult gang members were de-
tected by law enforcement, the overall prevalence 
of gang membership would have to rise from 3.5 
percent among youth to 5.5 percent among young 
adults. In order to generate a high enough estimate 
of Latino males, the gang prevalence rate among 
10  NLSY prevalence rates suggest that in 2000 there were nearly 
100,000 black male gang members between the ages of 12 
and 16, while law enforcement sources estimate a total black 
male gang population of approximately 225,000. If all black 
male gang youth were detected by law enforcement, the 
gang prevalence rate among 17- to 24-year-old black males 
would have to be 5.5 percent (just below the 6 percent black 
adolescent male rate) in order to generate 125,000 additional 
gang members. The prevalence rate would have to rise to 
7.6 percent if all of the young adult gang members, but 
just half of the youth gang members, were identified by law 
enforcement.
11  NLSY prevalence rates suggest that 3.5 percent of the  
3.2 million Latino/Latina 12- to 16-year-olds (5 percent 
of males and 2 percent of females) were current gang 
members, generating an estimated youth gang population 
of 115,000. In order to reach the law enforcement estimate 
of 370,000 Latino/Latina gang members within the 12- to 
24-year-old cohort, the rate of gang membership among the 
5.7 million Latino/Latina 17- to 24-year-olds would have to 
be 4.5 percent. 
young adults would have to be nearly double the 
rate for adolescents.12 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the difficulty of match-
ing youth survey data to law enforcement estimates, 
even if one makes very broad assumptions about the 
divergence between paths of white and nonwhite 
gang members after the age of 16.
The current exercise is speculative. The available data 
do not allow us to definitively rule out the possi-
bility that white gang membership is the exclusive 
province of youth, while black and Latino gang in-
volvement continues unabated (or grows) well into 
adulthood. We have assumed that the 12- to 24-
year-old cohort accounts for substantially all of the 
youth gang population. But we cannot completely 
discount the possibility that adults in their late 20s, 
30s, or even 40s account for a significant proportion 
of “youth gang” members. 
The relevance of work and family opportunities to 
the process of desistance from participation in gangs 
is well documented, and ethnographers have linked 
the disappearance of blue-collar jobs in urban mi-
nority neighborhoods to the extension of gang ac-
tivity into young adulthood. Even without strong 
quantitative evidence, we can be fairly certain that 
the paths of white gang members diverge signifi-
cantly from those of black and Latino gang members 
as they enter the adult years. Differences in attrition 
rates probably explain part of the disparity between 
youth survey and law enforcement depictions of 
youth gang populations.
Yet in order for differences in attrition rates to ex-
plain much of the disparity, the divergence in the life 
paths of white and nonwhite gang members would 
have to be so radical that it would pose its own set 
of troubling questions. Are the opportunities avail-
able to white gang youth as they enter adulthood so 
much better that they pull all of the white youth—
but none of the minority youth—away from gangs? 
Are the responses of law enforcement and other 
social institutions to minority gang youth so much 
12  NLSY prevalence rates suggest that in 2000 there were a little 
more than 80,000 Latino male gang members between the 
ages of 12 and 16, while law enforcement sources estimate a 
total Latino male gang population of around 350,000. If all 
Latino male gang youth were detected by law enforcement, the 
gang prevalence rate among 17- to 24-year-old Latino males 
would have to be 8.9 percent (well above the 5 percent Latino 
adolescent male rate) in order to generate 270,000 additional 
gang members. The prevalence rate would have to rise to 10.5 
percent if all of the young adult gang members, but just half of 
the youth gang members, were identified by law enforcement.
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more counterproductive that they severely delay, or 
completely arrest, the natural process of desistance 
from gang activity?
Do law enforcement agencies find the  
type of gang members they look for?
The mental gymnastics required to square law en-
forcement gang estimates with youth survey data are 
convoluted, forcing us to carefully consider the pos-
sibility that the law enforcement estimates are sim-
ply wrong. There are much simpler explanations for 
why law enforcement would tend to underestimate 
white gang populations and overestimate nonwhite 
gang populations.
First, suburban, small-town, and rural law enforce-
ment agencies may be less capable of detecting and 
tracking gang activity than urban police agencies. 
Small-town officers may not recognize gang activity, 
and small-town police departments may find it more 
difficult to establish and maintain gang databases. 
These factors could contribute to the undercount of 
white gang members, who are more likely to live in 
majority white suburbs and towns than are nonwhite 
gang members.
Second, the practices employed by urban law en-
forcement agencies to identify and track gang mem-
bers may contribute to the nonwhite overcount. 
Gang databases are notoriously unreliable because 
there are often too few controls on who is put in 
them and also because too little effort goes into re-
moving from the database people who are no longer 
active gang members. 
NYGC staff cite the second problem as one reason 
for the apparent aging of the youth gang popula-
tion (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006). Jurisdic-
tions that began tracking gang members at a given 
point keep people in their files long after they have 
ceased “banging,” creating the false impression 
that the membership is steadily aging and growing. 
Egley also observes that law enforcement agencies 
have an institutional bias toward identifying older 
individuals as the source of gang problems: “The 
longer they have the problem …the more police 
start focusing on the older members, thinking that 
it’s going to solve the gang problem” (personal 
communication).
Third, there is ample evidence that police misiden-
tify minority youth as gang members based on their 
race and ethnicity, style of dress, and association with 
gang peers. Loren Siegel notes that, according to a 
report prepared by the Los Angeles district attorney’s 
office, “46.8 percent of the African American men 
between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four in 
L.A. County have been entered into the police gang-
tracking database” (2003). Siegel also cites a 1993 
New York Times report that “two of three young black 
men in Denver were on a gang suspect list.” As an 
NAACP official put it at the time: “They ought to 
call it a blacklist. . . . It’s not a crackdown on gangs; 
it’s a crackdown on blacks.”
Esbensen argues that minority youth are dispropor-
tionately identified as gang members because that 
is who law enforcement officers have been trained 
to see: 
You find what you’re looking for. The train-
ing manuals for police departments; law en-
forcement experts that lecture to community 
groups and go to police officer trainings—
they all perpetuate the myth that gang mem-
bers are racial and ethnic minorities. Cops are 
trained to look and that’s what they find. The 
same applies to boys and girls. The Orange 
County Sheriff’s Department training manual 
says the best indicator of gang membership is 
self-affiliation except with girls because they’re 
lying. The media reiterates the myths. (Per-
sonal communication)
Several years ago, a group of U.S. and European 
gang researchers launched the Eurogang Project, an 
effort to develop a common research framework—
described by James Short and Lorine Hughes as 
“the most ambitious street gang research effort ever 
undertaken” (2006). In Europe, as in the United 
States, Esbensen reports, law enforcement offi-
cials consistently overestimated the role of minor-
ity youth and underestimated the role of majority 
youth in gang activity:
The Eurogang group has been meeting since 
1998 to try and get cross-national multi-site/
method studies going. We have developed 
common measures and strategies and . . . there 
has been incredible consistency in the results. 
In the Netherlands, for example, law enforce-
ment claimed that the gang members were pre-
dominantly from Morocco and Antilles, but we 
found that over half were native-born Dutch. 
We found that the U.S. is not an anomaly. Ev-
erywhere we found a higher prevalence of gang 
involvement than law enforcement reported. 
We got a lot more females and majority group 
members. The results are incredibly robust. 
(Personal communication)
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The failure of law enforcement to recognize white 
gang activity should not come as a complete sur-
prise. There may be very good reasons for small-
town and suburban police to avoid labeling youth as 
gang members. The overwhelming majority of gang 
members are not sociopaths but troubled youth. A 
police officer who looks at a delinquent 14-year-old 
and sees a future criminal has every reason to put 
him in a gang database. But an officer who sees a 
future solid citizen or the son of a family friend may 
conclude that “boys will be boys” no matter what 
gang signs the kids think they’re throwing. 
Perhaps suburban and rural law enforcement agen-
cies have ignored the threat posed by white gangs. Or 
perhaps the phenomenon of ganging has been misun-
derstood—and its contribution to the crime problem 
exaggerated—by urban law enforcement agencies 
that treat every troubled youth wearing gang colors 
like an enemy of the state. The following chapters 
attempt to address this question by examining the 
process of joining and leaving gangs as well as the 
gang contribution to the overall crime problem.
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During the next 12 months, hundreds of thousands 
of adolescent boys and girls will join gangs or form 
new ones. That’s the bad news. The good news: 
nearly all will tire of the violence or outgrow their 
gang fascination, and most will do so in a year or less. 
Contrary to popular myth, the vast majority will not 
face the threat of violence from their gang brethren 
when they leave, although they may continue to be 
targeted by rivals. And many will meet hostile treat-
ment from social institutions that refuse to accept 
their status as former gang members. 
Joining
Prevalence of gang membership
Most youth do not join gangs, but the appeal of ganging 
crosses demographic and geographic lines.
Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson emphasize that 
gang members do not make up a majority of youth, 
even among high-risk groups in urban settings: 
“Perhaps the strongest message in this research is 
that even with unrestricted definitions in high-risk 
populations, most youth—7 or 8 out of 10—do not 
join gangs throughout adolescence” (2006). On the 
other hand, gangs claim a sizable minority of youth, 
and the appeal of ganging crosses demographic and 
geographic lines. 
Nationwide, 7 percent of whites and 12 percent of blacks 
and Latinos report current or past gang membership by 
the age of 17 (Snyder and Sickmund 2006). Urban and 
rural adolescents were equally likely to report current 
or past gang membership, and white youth participated 
in gangs at high enough rates to make them the largest 
group of adolescent gang members. Gang involvement 
is greater among high-risk youth and in communities 
where gang activity is prevalent. For example, nearly a 
third of boys and girls who participated in the Roch-
ester Youth Survey joined gangs at some point during 
their adolescence (Thornberry 2001a).
Most gang members join between the ages of 12 and 15.
The public is scandalized each time it is reported 
that gangs are recruiting children. Yet ganging has 
always been an adolescent pursuit—a developmen-
tal phase through which many youth pass on their 
way to adulthood. The overwhelming majority of 
gang members join between the ages of 12 and 15, 
according to Terence Thornberry (personal commu-
nication). Klein notes:
For many decades, the initial entry into gangs 
has been at around 11 years of age (initial, not 
typical), and so there is little room for change 
downward. Although some writers and officials 
decry the 8- and 10-year-old gang member, 
they haven’t been in the business long enough 
to realize that we heard the same reports twenty 
and forty years ago. (1995)
Risk factors
A number of risk factors are associated with gang 
membership, but no single factor or set of factors 
can successfully predict which youth will become 
gang members. The variables that correlated most 
strongly with gang membership among participants 
in the Rochester Youth Survey included negative 
life events, positive values about drugs, and asso-
ciation with delinquent peers (Thornberry 2001b).1 
The most powerful protective factors were educa-
tion-related and included commitment to school, 
attachment to teachers, and parents’ expectations 
for school. 
Researchers working on the Seattle Social Devel-
opment Project found similar results (Thornberry 
2001b). Availability of drugs, externalizing be-
haviors, learning disabilities, having “bad” peers, 
hyperactivity, and low school commitment were 
1  Delinquent behavior also correlates strongly to gang 
membership; this relationship is discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter.
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associated with gang membership. 2 Social compe-
tence, conventional beliefs, and attachment to con-
ventional peers significantly reduced the likelihood 
of gang involvement. 
Thornberry notes that gang membership is strongly 
associated with problems across multiple domains. 
The Rochester Youth Survey research team found 
that “a majority (61 percent) of the boys and 40 
percent of the girls who scored above the median 
in seven risk factor domains were gang members” 
(cited in Wyrick and Howell 2004). The variables 
that predicted gang membership among Rochester 
and Seattle youth survey participants were concen-
trated in the peer, school, and personal domains. But 
the role of community factors (such as availability of 
drugs and neighborhood integration) and family fac-
tors (such as supervision, parental attachment to the 
child, proviolent attitudes, and family instability) was 
also significant. To put it another way, gang members 
are youth for whom everything is going wrong.
Thornberry’s findings fit the experience of Jesuit 
priest Father Greg Boyle, who founded Homeboy 
Industries, a program that provides employment op-
portunities to current and former gang members who 
want to leave the gang life. Father Boyle observes 
that what sets gang members apart from other youth 
is their misery (Boyle 2005). According to Boyle, 
such youth do not need to be recruited—much less 
forced—to join a gang. They are the kids who hang 
around older gang members hoping to be noticed 
and invited into the circle.
Esbensen, Winfree, He, and Taylor also examined 
correlates of gang membership using a set of demo-
graphic, social learning, and self-control variables, 
along with the five definitions of gang membership 
described in chapter 4 (2001). The researchers found 
that race and family structure were statistically sig-
nificant predictors of gang membership, but that 
these factors did not predict the intensity of gang 
involvement. There were no statistically significant 
relationships between measures of self-control (im-
pulsivity, parental monitoring, and risk-seeking) and 
gang involvement under any of the five definitions of 
gang membership. 
Youth who reported having delinquent peers were 
more likely to report gang membership under each 
definition. By contrast, having prosocial peers ap-
peared to have no effect on the likelihood of gang 
involvement among GREAT survey participants. 
2  Race and gender also correlate to gang membership, as 
discussed in chapter 4. 
The other variables that successfully predicted gang 
membership under all five definitions were tolerance 
of fighting and a weak sense of guilt. The results sug-
gest that what distinguishes the most deeply involved 
gang members from peers is a worldview in which 
fighting is a normal part of life and the rules of main-
stream society do not fully apply. 
leaving
It is commonly believed that gang membership is 
a one-way street leading inevitably to death or jail. 
This myth is perpetuated not only by the media but 
also by gang members who exaggerate the stakes of 
membership in order to underscore the importance 
and permanence of their collective bond: 
During the course of the interviews, many gang 
members expressed the belief that it is impos-
sible to leave the gang. A number of subjects 
told us that the only way to exit the gang was 
to be killed. Such beliefs have their foundation 
in the role of threats of violence for maintain-
ing gang solidarity and membership in the face 
of threatened and informal sanctions. (Decker 
and Van Winkle 1996)
Nothing could be further from the truth. Decker and 
Van Winkle continue, “Despite such statements, the 
majority of active gang members (63 percent) told us 
they knew at least one person who had left their own 
gang” (emphasis added). Data from national and local 
youth surveys indicate that the typical gang member 
is active for a year or less. Esbensen and his colleagues 
identified as many former gang members as current 
gang members in a multisite sample of more than 
5,000 eighth-graders (Esbensen et al. 2001). The 
Rochester Youth Survey research team, which tracked 
1,000 high-risk youth into adulthood, found that a 
large majority of members quit after a brief stay in 
the gang: 
Gang membership turned out to be a rather 
fleeting experience for most of these youth. 
Half of the male gang members reported being 
in a gang for 1 year or less, and only 7 percent 
reported being a gang member for all 4 years. 
Two-thirds (66 percent) of the females were 
in a gang for 1 year or less and none reported 
being a member for all 4 years. (Thornberry, 
Huizinga, and Loeber 2004)
Huizinga reports similar results from the Denver 
Youth Survey sample of over 1,500 at-risk youth 
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(personal communication). Th ree in fi ve males (60 
percent) and nearly four in fi ve females (78 percent) 
quit after one or two years. One in six remained in-
volved for three to four years (15 percent of males 
and 18 percent of females). A quarter of males and 
just 4 percent of females stayed with the gang for fi ve 
or more years. By way of comparison, the turnover 
rate among new gang members exceeded the 47 per-
cent turnover rate for workers in the hospitality and 
leisure industry (U.S. Department of Labor 2006).
Leaving a gang is associated with a sharp reduction 
in delinquent activity. Th ornberry and his colleagues 
observed that, among youth who were involved dur-
ing a single year, overall delinquency fell by half after 
they left the gang (Th ornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber 
2004). Th e Rochester research team also found that 
gang youth report higher rates of off enses against 
persons only during years of active gang involvement 
(Th ornberry 2001a). 
Delinquency rates also fell sharply among Seattle 
youth who quit gangs for all off ense types except 
drug sales (cited in Th ornberry 2001a). Denver youth 
gang members committed the overwhelming major-
ity of their delinquent acts (80 percent or more) dur-
ing periods of gang involvement, even though most 
were active for a year or less (Th ornberry, Huizinga, 
and Loeber 2004).
Why youth quit gangs
It is surprising that more attention has not been de-
voted to the question of why and how youth leave 
gangs. Th e salutary eff ect of desistance from gang 
membership is reason enough to pursue a research 
and policy agenda that aims to accelerate turnover 
among gang members. Yet the gang literature is 
practically devoid of research on desistance. Th e pri-
mary source of information on leaving the gang is 
a set of interviews conducted by Scott Decker and 
Barry Van Winkle in the early 1990s with 99 cur-
rent and 24 former St. Louis gang members (1996). 
Results that are based on such a narrow sample can-
not claim to be authoritative, but they do provide a 
helpful point of departure for thinking about desis-
tance from gang activity.
A single factor dominated the responses of former 
gang members who were asked why they gave up the 
gang life: “All twenty-one individuals who answered 
this question told us, fl at out, that their experience 
with violence had been the primary motivation for 
leaving the gang.” Th is fi nding is at fi rst surprising 
since researchers have long noted that violence can 
strengthen cohesion among gang members. 
Decker and Van Winkle resolve the apparent con-
tradiction by making a distinction between violence 
that brings gang members together and violence that 
splinters individuals from the group. Th ey argue 
that “internal” violence (initiation rites, for exam-
ple) and “mythic” violence (tales of battles between 
gangs) intensify gang bonds, but the impact of real 
violence—whether the gang members experience it 
directly, or indirectly by way of friends and family—
is quite diff erent. Th e following was a fairly typical 
response to the question “Why did you decide to 
leave the gang?”:
Well after I got shot, I got shot in my leg. You 
know how your life just fl ash? It like did that 
so I stopped selling dope, got a job, stayed in 
school, just stopped hanging around cause one 
day I know some other gang member catch me 
and probably kill me.
Interviews with gang members who participated in 
the Denver Youth Survey provide another glimpse of 
leaving a gang. Huizinga reports that 30 to 40 per-
Figure 5.1. Offenses committed by youth during 
years of gang involvement and noninvolvement
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cent of former gang members identified maturation 
as their main motive for leaving the gang (personal 
communication). These individuals described hav-
ing “grown up,” “grown out of it,” taken on “new 
responsibilities,” or simply “got[ten] too old” for the 
gang life. The maturation process was often linked to 
having children. Safety concerns accounted for the 
second-largest set of responses, and moves to new 
neighborhoods or out of the city also played a role 
in some cases.
The St. Louis and Denver interviews of former gang 
members share one critical feature: mention of mo-
tives related to law enforcement or the criminal 
justice system (fear of arrest or incarceration, for 
example) was almost entirely absent. Decker and 
Van Winkle make no reference to deterrence-related 
motives in their description of desistance from gang 
membership. Huizinga observes that such motives 
were mentioned by about 10 percent of those in-
terviewed, often in conjunction with other motives 
(personal communication). 
These findings point to a mismatch between tradi-
tional gang control policies, which seek to deter gang 
activity through the use of criminal justice sanctions, 
and the reality of gang membership. The research 
team that worked on the Denver Youth Survey 
found little evidence that arrest or incarceration can 
deter delinquency or gang membership (Huizinga, 
personal communication). Huizinga describes the 
group’s findings:
For gang members, it is the same as for other 
youth: very little effect, especially for incar-
ceration. They don’t see [the criminal justice 
system] as weak or a paper tiger…but there is 
a litany, especially from gang members, that 
being arrested and incarcerated is just to be ex-
pected—a rite of passage. In our qualitative re-
search we asked what they learned. The answer 
was to run next time, to be more careful. They 
figured out one more thing to do to avoid ap-
prehension. Some say they learned things, es-
pecially while incarcerated, and made contacts. 
(Personal communication)
Ironically, active gang members interviewed by 
Decker and Van Winkle were likely to endorse tradi-
tional gang control tactics as effective means to deter 
gang membership (1996). The gang members’ top 
suggestions were to “(1) talk to individuals about the 
hazards of life in the gang, [and] (2) provide stricter 
punishments or discipline for those considering join-
ing the gang.” 8 Ball, a 15-year-old Hoover Gang-
ster Crip, suggests that other youth could be “scared 
straight” despite the fact that the tactic had failed 
with him:
8 Ball: You have to talk to them so you have 
to catch them at an early age and show them. 
Bring in some guy that got shot up in a gang, 
“Look what happened to me, a broken jaw or 
broken bones and stuff.” You got to talk to 
them. There was a movie called Scared Straight 
and I looked at that and it kind of changed my 
mind about everything.
Interviewer: But you are still in the gang.
8 Ball: Yeah because I didn’t trip off that because 
I was young then. I keep telling myself that I’m 
going to stop, that’s what I be saying. I’m going 
to try to stop, but that’s hard to do. You got your 
reputation.
When it came to eliminating the gangs, “the modal 
response was that violence would be the most ef-
fective means.” One gang member asserted that au-
thorities would have to “smoke us all,” while another 
suggested the only solution would be to “put them in 
one place and blow them up.” Conflict with authori-
ties clearly fit easily within the apocalyptic worldview 
of active gang members, while the mundane reality 
of maturation did not. 
How youth quit gangs
Current gang members interviewed by Decker and 
Van Winkle maintained that gang members must be 
“beaten out” or “shoot a close relative, usually a par-
ent.” But the researchers found “little evidence that 
leaving the gang requires group consent.” Former 
gang members “scoffed at these notions, particularly 
the obligation to shoot a parent as a condition of 
leaving a gang.” 
Two-thirds of former members (13 of 19) indicated 
that they “just quit” the gang, while the next-largest 
group said that they had moved to another state (4 of 
19). Just two former gang members reported having 
been formally “beaten out” of the gang. The following 
was a fairly typical exchange between an interviewer 
and a former gang member:
Interviewer: How did you get out?
Ex007: You just stop claiming.
Interviewer: That’s all?
Ex007: See, that’s stupid shit. Them young peo-
ple. They fickle-minded, they don’t know shit. I 
ain’t got to kill shit [to get out of the gang].
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Huizinga reports somewhat different results from in-
terviews with former gang members in Denver (per-
sonal correspondence). Some interviewees described 
opting to be “beat out” of the gang, often for the sake 
of children whom they “don’t want to end up like 
[themselves].” The process of being beat out did not 
appear to deter most youth from leaving the gang, 
since a large majority of Denver members quit before 
the age of 18.
The principal barrier to leaving a gang is not fear of 
punishment by the gang but the difficulty many gang 
members face when they try to make new lives for 
themselves. Decker and Lauritsen observe that leaving 
the gang may require “rejecting one’s friends and peers” 
(1996). Yet mainstream social institutions are reluctant 
to embrace former gang members. Thus former gang 
members experience the worst of both worlds: “After 
all, what incentive is there to leave the gang when it is 
the source of their friends and when past criminal ac-
tivities committed as gang members cause many groups 
to treat them as if they remained in the gang?” 
Identification of gang members is seen as an essen-
tial tool in gang intervention efforts. But the gang 
label can make it more difficult for youth to leave the 
gang. Former gang members may be targeted by law 
enforcement long after their active participation in 
the gang has ended. Gang education efforts may dis-
suade employers from offering jobs to former gang 
members or youth who merely look like gang mem-
bers. The refusal of major social institutions to rec-
ognize a former gang member’s new status can even 
filter down to rival gangs:
Police and school officials may not be aware 
of the decision of individuals to leave the gang 
or may not take such claims seriously, and 
records may not be purged of prior gang sta-
tus. In such cases, the institution continues to 
treat the individuals as a gang member. When 
representatives of official agencies (e.g. police, 
school) identify an individual as a gang mem-
ber, they are sending a powerful signal to rival 
gang members as well as to people in the com-
munity about the gang involvement of that 
person. Such a symbol may have consequences 
for how that individual is treated. 
Consequences of gang membership
The negative consequences of past gang involvement 
persisted well into adulthood for participants in the 
Rochester Youth Survey (Thornberry, personal com-
munication). At the age of 30, former gang members 
were much more likely to report being unemployed, 
receiving welfare, committing crime, or carrying a 
gun than peers who had never joined a gang. 
Thornberry reports that the risk of negative out-
comes varied significantly depending on the dura-
tion of gang involvement. Males who spent a year 
or less in a gang were no more likely than nonmem-
bers to be unemployed or receiving welfare by the 
time they reached 30. “Transient” gang males were 
more likely than nongang peers to report higher rates 
of delinquency and gun carrying at the age of 30, 
but they were less delinquent than “stable” gang 
peers. The Rochester Youth Survey’s pool of female 
gang members was too small to distinguish between 
the long-term consequences of transient and stable 
gang involvement.
Gang involvement clearly disrupts the lives of youth 
during a critical developmental period when they 
should be receiving an education, learning life skills, 
and taking on adult responsibilities. Thornberry’s 
findings indicate that much of the damage might 
be avoided if policy makers could figure out how to 
quickly and successfully move youth out of gangs. 
Decker concurs that we should set a high priority on 
“[getting] them out as quickly as we can” (personal 
communication).
Gang control policies that fix the gang label on 
youth do just the opposite: they keep former gang 
members from acquiring the social capital they 
need in order to survive in mainstream society. And 
they deter youth from leaving the gang by ensuring 
that they will be treated as pariahs no matter what 
they do. The scarcity of research on this topic pro-
vides further evidence that policy makers have little 
interest in reclaiming gang youth, despite claims to 
the contrary.
Researchers who have spent their careers following the 
lives of gang youth argue strongly for both the elimina-
tion of policies that target gang members and the adop-
tion of prevention approaches that have been proven 
effective with delinquent youth. Decker and Van 
Winkle conclude that public safety initiatives should 
“respond to the crimes of gang members, especially 
their violence, not to the group nature of the affilia-
tions these individuals maintain” (1996). Esbensen, 
Winfree, He, and Taylor (2001) echo the call for a 
focus on behavior rather than gang membership:
Given the permeability of gang membership, 
policies linking legal action to an individual’s 
perceived status may erroneously criminal-
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ize that individual. As such, we suggest that 
legislation targeting gang status should be 
discouraged in favor of legislation focused on 
actual behavior. 
Thornberry points out that there is a strong body of 
evidence on “what works” to keep youth on track, 
and that these approaches should be the focus of 
policy and research efforts:
In contrast to the gang prevention literature, 
in the general literature on preventing delin-
quency and serious delinquency, there are 
model programs that have been shown to re-
duce delinquency and violence. Rather than 
deal directly with the gangs, use gang mem-
bership as a marker to get kids into high-im-
pact treatment programs. Second, figure out 
which of those programs can be tailored and 
focused to problems of gang members. (Per-
sonal communication)
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Mayors and U.S. Attorneys are on the front lines in 
our communities and know better than anyone that 
gangs have become an increasingly deadly threat to 
the safety and security of our Nation’s citizens. 
—U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO GONzALEz, 
MARCH 31, 2006 
For the most part, gang members do very little—
sleep, get up late, hang around, brag a lot, eat again, 
drink, hang around some more. It’s a boring life; the 
only thing that is equally boring is being a researcher 
watching gang members. 
—MALCOLM W. KLEIN, 1995
Gangs can be understood in many ways. John Hage-
dorn (2005) and Sudhir Venkatesh (2003) describe 
gangs as replacements for mainstream institutions 
(the state, the family) that find themselves in cri-
sis. Others such as Luis Barrios (2003) and David 
Brotherton (2003) argue that gangs take on aspects 
of social movements. Finally, many have observed 
that gangs proliferate and operate within the realm 
of youth culture, citing among other examples the 
role of the film Colors in the dissemination of Los 
Angeles gang culture (Klein 1995). 
But the dominant public discourse treats gangs as 
a particularly virulent subset of the crime problem. 
James Short and Lorine Hughes argue that this ten-
dency has affected gang studies, which largely “regard 
gangs as a fractal of crime” (2006, emphasis in origi-
nal). The tendency to equate gangs with the most 
spectacular forms of crime has also generated a set of 
public myths about the relationship between gangs 
and crime. These myths hold that:
•   Most or all gang members are hardened criminals.
•   Gang members spend most of their time plan-
ning or committing crimes.
•   Gang members are responsible for the bulk of 
violent crime.
•   Gangs largely organize and direct the criminal 
activity of their members.
There may be a handful of gangs and gang mem-
bers who meet this description. Researchers who 
study gangs generally find, however, that most “gang 
crime” is not well planned or centrally directed, but 
is instead committed by individual members or small 
groups on an ad hoc basis. 
Ethnographic and survey research have fairly consis-
tently shown that:
•  The seriousness and extent of criminal involve-
ment varies greatly among gang members. 
•  Gang members who engage in crime nonetheless 
spend most of their time in noncriminal pursuits. 
•  Gang members account for a small share of all 
crime (including violent crime), even within 
communities and neighborhoods where there are 
gang problems.
•  Much of the crime committed by gang members 
is self-initiated and is meant to serve personal 
rather than gang interests. 
What is a gang crime?
Law enforcement officials generally employ one of 
two definitions of gang crime for the purposes of 
tracking and measuring the problem. The first counts 
all crimes committed by individuals who are believed 
to be gang members as gang-related, regardless of the 
nature of the offense or the circumstances surround-
ing it. The second and more restrictive definition in-
cludes only gang-motivated crimes that are believed 
to have been committed for the benefit of the gang 
or as part of a gang function. 
Many crimes committed by gang members 
are unrelated to gang activity.
Cheryl Maxson and Malcolm Klein examined police 
data in South Central Los Angeles and found that use of 
a motive-based definition generated half as many gang 
homicides as a member-based definition (2001). In 
other words, half of the homicides committed by 
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gang members were not committed for the gang or 
as part of gang activity. 
Gang-motivated crimes can be further divided 
into two categories: self-directed crimes that are 
initiated and organized by individuals or small 
groups of rank-and-file gang members, and 
gang-directed crimes commissioned or orches-
trated by gang leaders or the gang as a whole. 
Finally, gang-motivated crimes can be understood 
in terms of instrumental actions that are intended 
to advance the material interests of the gang or its 
leaders, and expressive actions that show gang pride 
and demonstrate that the group is more fearless than 
its rivals by defending turf, avenging past injuries, 
and so on.
Consider the following four cases:
1.   A gang member gets in a fight with another man 
who makes a pass at his girlfriend at a party.
2.   A gang member assaults a young man affiliated 
with a rival gang who has ventured onto territory 
claimed by the subject’s gang.
3.   A gang member is asked by older gang members 
to go on a “mission” into enemy territory to find 
and attack rival gang members. 
4.   A gang member is asked by gang leaders to punish 
a witness who testified against another member.
All four cases would fall under the member-based 
definition of gang crime, but the first would not meet 
the motive-based definition because the fight had 
nothing to do with the gang. The third and fourth 
cases could be considered gang-directed incidents, 
but not the second, which was initiated spontane-
ously by the individual in question. 
The fourth case could represent an instrumental ef-
fort to advance gang members’ material interests by 
deterring witnesses from testifying against the gang. 
The third case, by contrast, depicts what is probably 
an expressive use of gang violence that is more likely 
to harm than to help gang members’ material interests 
by generating further violence and drawing unwanted 
attention from law enforcement.
Tales of sophisticated criminal conspiracies and calcu-
lated use of violence dominate the public discussion of 
gang crime. But gang-directed, instrumental activities 
are the exception, not the rule. Descriptions of gang 
activity drawn from ethnography and survey research 
provide little support for the view that gangs are a form 
of organized crime. 
As a general rule, gang members do not spend 
hours carefully planning out robberies and bur-
glaries with their fellows. They do not turn drug 
revenues over to the gang to finance its activities, 
but instead spend their money on clothes and fast 
food, as many other teenagers do. And most do 
not wait for permission from higher-ups to attack 
members of a rival group. Many gang youth engage 
in violence, but it is overwhelmingly expressive in 
nature and often initiated by rank-and-file mem-
bers—at times against the wishes of gang leaders 
who seek to keep a lid on conflicts. Drug sales are 
also common among gang members, but the ac-
tivity generally ranges from a completely disorga-
nized pursuit of individuals to loosely organized 
cooperative endeavors. 
The disorganized character of most gang crime does 
not reduce its significance. Nor can we ignore the 
moments when the wrong set of circumstances gen-
erates the kind of gang threat that we most fear. Short 
(2006) recounts the efforts of Richard Brymmer to 
locate the large youth gangs that had been described 
to him by police and neighborhood residents. After 
encountering only small groupings of eight to ten 
youth (palomillas) for two years, Brymmer witnessed 
the sudden transformation of the palomillas into a 
“wall of young males” in response to a threat from a 
rival gang. The transformation of the palomillas into 
a gang was a rare occurrence, but one with poten-
tially lethal consequences.
But the disorganized character of gang crime does 
raise the question of whether a gang is best under-
stood as an organization with defined leadership, 
goals, and means to achieve those goals, or as an ac-
tivity that orients youth toward crime and conflict 
with other gang members. Understanding the disor-
ganized character of gang crime also makes it pos-
sible to consider the degree to which getting rid of 
gang leaders, or even the gang itself, is likely to affect 
the incidence of crime and violence. 
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Measuring gang crime  
and delinquency
There are three methods for measuring gang crime 
and delinquency: 
•   self-reports of delinquent activity by youth who 
identify themselves as gang members;
•   self-reports of victimization by people who believe 
that their attacker was a gang member; and 
•   police reports of crimes committed by known or 
suspected gang members (typically generated at 
arrest). 
Each type of data has methodological weaknesses. 
Youth self-reports may inflate or minimize delin-
quent behaviors if the respondents seek to exag-
gerate or conceal their involvement in them. Most 
surveys of youth gang activity target specific loca-
tions or segments of the youth population, making 
it difficult to derive general conclusions about the 
larger youth gang population. Finally, many of the 
relevant surveys include only youth under the age of 
18 and ignore a young adult gang population that 
is of great interest to law enforcement, although the 
Denver and Rochester youth surveys have contin-
ued to collect information from participants into 
their adult years. 
The respondents in the National Crime Victimiza-
tion Survey (NCVS) report victimization by people 
whom they believe to be gang members, a belief that 
could be inaccurate or influenced by outside fac-
tors such as media reports of gang activity. Further, 
NCVS data are reported only at the national level 
and cannot be used to track regional or local trends.
Researchers have found that law enforcement gang 
membership and crime statistics are not a reliable basis 
for tracking trends or comparing jurisdictions.
Law enforcement gang crime numbers include only 
crimes that are reported to police and identified by 
the police as gang-related or gang-motivated. There 
is no agreed-upon definition of a gang or a gang 
crime, much less a uniform system for tracking and 
reporting it. Finally, the capacity and criteria for 
measuring gang crime vary greatly between law en-
forcement agencies and can shift from year to year 
as priorities change. A number of gang researchers 
have collaborated with police to improve data col-
lection or used police records to conduct their own 
analyses of crime data, but these efforts are few and 
far between. 
Deborah Lamm Weisel and Tara O’Connor Shelley 
warn that “while it is tempting to use law enforce-
ment data about gangs and gang-related offenses to 
make comparisons between—or even within—juris-
dictions, gang-related data are exceptionally unreli-
able for this purpose” (2004). Law enforcement data 
provide no more than a blurry snapshot of the scale 
of gang crime in a particular jurisdiction in a partic-
ular year. Nonetheless, law enforcement gang crime 
reports are frequently cited because they are often the 
only figures that can be compared to overall crime 
reports at the local level.
With the exception of law enforcement agencies that 
employ the less common motive-based definition, 
all three measures track crimes committed by gang 
members that may or may not be gang-motivated. 
The use of a broad membership-based definition 
overstates the contribution of gangs to the crime 
problem, since some members would engage in 
criminal activity whether or not they were affiliated 
with a gang. 
how much crime and delinquency do 
gangs and gang members generate?
To repeat, most gang members’ behavior is not 
criminal, and most gang members’ crimes are not 
violent. And of course, most violent people are not 
gang members, so it’s not very useful to define gangs 
in terms of violent crime alone. 
—MALCOLM W. KLEIN, 1995
Juvenile delinquency
Data from youth surveys indicate that gang mem-
bers commit delinquent acts at much higher rates 
than nongang peers and account for a significant 
share of juvenile crime. The research teams that con-
ducted the multiyear Denver Youth Survey and the 
Rochester Youth Survey found that gang members 
were responsible for a disproportionate share of self-
reported delinquency (Thornberry, Huizinga, and 
Loeber 2004). 
Youth who reported gang membership prior to the 
end of high school made up 30 percent of the Roch-
ester youth sample but accounted for over half of ar-
rests (54 percent), close to two-thirds of delinquent 
acts (63 percent), and 82 percent of serious delin-
quent acts. The divide between gang and nongang 
youth was even greater in Denver, where gang mem-
bers account for a smaller share of the sample (18 
percent of boys and 9 percent of girls) but roughly 
the same proportion of serious delinquency (80 per-
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cent of serious and violent crime). 
Gang members are responsible for a disproportionate 
share of delinquency, but most delinquent acts are com-
mitted by youth who are not gang members.
It would be incorrect to conclude from these fi ndings, 
however, that gang members commit the majority of 
crimes in the United States. Th e Denver and Rochester 
teams conducted their surveys in high-risk neighbor-
hoods and oversampled youth considered to be “at high 
risk for serious delinquency” in order to strengthen the 
statistical power of their fi ndings on delinquency. Th e 
prevalence of gang membership in the Denver sample 
was roughly 50 percent higher than the rates generated 
by the nationally representative National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) sample (11 percent of males 
and 6 percent of females), while rates of gang member-
ship in Rochester were nearly four times the national 
rate (8 percent overall) (Snyder and Sickmund 2006).
Th e number of gang members in a more nationally 
representative sample of youth would be too small 
to drive the overall incidence of crime. For exam-
ple, gang youth who participated in the Rochester 
Youth Survey reported three times more arrests, fi ve 
times more drug sales, 11 times more serious delin-
quent acts, and four times more overall delinquency 
than nongang peers. Th ese results are largely con-
sistent with fi ndings from Esbensen and Winfree’s 
research on a broader sample of 5,935 eighth-grade 
students (2001). Gang members who participated 
in the latter survey reported committing four to 
fi ve times more property crimes—and three to fi ve 
times more person crimes—than nongang peers.1 
1  Th e pattern was somewhat diff erent for drug sales. Esbensen 
and Winfree reported gang to nongang off ending ratios of 
Th e Rochester Youth Survey results are also roughly 
consistent with fi ndings from interviews conducted 
with a snowball sample of high school students and 
dropouts in San Diego, Los Angeles, and Chicago 
in the late 1980s by Jeff rey Fagan (cited in Th orn-
berry 2001a).2 Gang members made up 23 percent 
of the three-city sample but accounted for two-thirds 
of self-reported assaults and robberies, nearly seven 
times the rate for nongang peers.
A very rough estimate of the gang share of juvenile 
delinquency can be obtained by applying the gang-to-
nongang off ending ratios generated from the Rochester 
Youth Survey to NLSY gang prevalence data (8 percent 
of youth). Th e resulting picture is quite diff erent: the 
proportion of delinquency attributable to gang mem-
bers drops from 63 percent to 26 percent overall, from 
82 percent to 48 percent for serious delinquency, from 
70 percent to 32 percent for drug sales, and from 54 
percent to 19 percent for arrests. Further, these pro-
portions include crimes committed by gang youth 
before and after periods of gang membership. Th e 
Denver Youth Survey research team found that gang 
youth reported the bulk of their delinquent activity 
during periods of active gang membership, including 
85 percent of serious violent off enses, 86 percent of 
serious property off enses, and 80 percent of drug sale 
off enses (Th ornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber 2004). 
But the fact that 15 to 20 percent of delinquent acts 
attributed to “gang members” were committed during 
nongang years indicates that the contribution of active
gang members to overall delinquency may be closer to 
20 percent. Th e observation that young people who are 
not gang members commit most juvenile crimes does 
not diminish the seriousness of the problems posed by 
juvenile gang members. It does, however, remind us 
that “gang crime” occurs in a larger context of juvenile 
delinquency that crosses gender, race, and class as well 
as gang lines.
Youth typically begin to exhibit somewhat higher levels 
of delinquency before joining gangs, but their delinquent 
behavior peaks during periods of gang involvement.
Several research studies have sought to determine 
whether gang youth are more delinquent than non-
gang peers because gangs attract delinquent youth, 
between 9 and 12 to one—much larger than the fi ve-to-one 
ratio reported by Th ornberry. One possible explanation is that 
the oversampling of at-risk youth in the Rochester project 
produced higher rates of drug sales among nongang youth. 
2  A snowball sample is a nonrandom group of research subjects 
assembled through a referral process. Snowball samples are often 
used to reach population groups such as high school dropouts 
who may otherwise be diffi  cult to locate. 
Figure 6.2. Gang member share of youth delinquency
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or because the social dynamic of the gang facilitates 
delinquency among its members. Th e Denver and 
Rochester Youth Surveys, the Seattle Social Devel-
opment Project, and a fourth longitudinal study 
of youth in Montreal all found that higher rates of 
self-reported delinquency preceded gang member-
ship (Th ornberry 2001a). Th ese fi ndings suggest that 
seriously delinquent youth select themselves, or are 
selected by peers, for gang membership. 
But the group eff ect of gang membership appears 
to exceed the impact of factors that contribute to 
individual delinquency. Th ornberry concludes that 
“prior to joining the gang, gang members have some-
what higher rates of violent off ending than do non-
members, but the predominant change in behavior 
patterns occurs during periods of active gang mem-
bership. A similar pattern is observed for general de-
linquency and property crime.” 
Gang youth are far more likely to commit delinquent 
acts during periods of active gang membership than 
during other years. Th ornberry and his colleagues 
found that male gang members in the Rochester 
sample tended to report two times more person 
off enses in gang years than in nongang years. Th e 
Rochester team found a similar “gang facilitation ef-
fect” for general delinquency and drug sales, but not 
for property off enses.
Gang youth also reported committing more of-
fenses than other youth with delinquent peer groups. 
Th ornberry and his colleagues found that average 
levels of self-reported delinquency were two to four 
times higher among gang members than among non-
members with delinquent peers. Th e Seattle Social 
Development project data also show that gang youth 
committed three times more off enses than nongang 
youth whose best friends had been in trouble with the 
law (cited in Th ornberry 2001b). 
Crime
One estimate of gang crime amounts to less than 6 per-
cent of all crime in the United States.
Reliable data on the extent of gang crime do not ex-
ist. David Curry, Richard Ball, and Scott Decker pro-
duced estimates of total gang membership and gang 
crime for 1993—a peak moment for juvenile crime 
in the United States—by tabulating data from law en-
forcement surveys and using statistical estimates for 
jurisdictions that failed to provide information in the 
surveys (1996). Th eir method produced a “conserva-
tive” estimate of roughly 380,000 gang members and 
440,000 gang crimes, and a “reasonable” estimate of 
560,000 members and 580,000 crimes. 
Th ese gang crime numbers must be taken with fi st-
fuls of salt. Even if all of the assumptions guiding the 
statistical estimates were accurate, Weisel and Shel-
ley (2004) argue persuasively that there are serious 
problems with the reliability of the underlying data. 
Nevertheless, the numbers provide a point of depar-
ture for examining gang members’ contribution to 
the total incidence of crime. 
Th e Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting (UCR) program recorded more than 14 
million serious (Part I) violent and property crimes in 
1993.3 If a range of 440,000 to 560,000 accurately cap-
tured the number of serious property and violent crimes 
committed by gang members in 1993, then gang mem-
bers would have been responsible for 3.1 percent to 4.1 
percent of serious crime in the United States. 
Th is estimate could be low if police departments 
recorded in their gang statistics only the most seri-
ous and violent off enses—crimes that receive more 
attention and resources. But the estimate could be 
high if law enforcement agencies’ gang crime reports 
counted less serious off enses (simple assault, disor-
derly conduct) or drug off enses that are not included 
in the overall index crime total. 
Th e gulf between the estimate of gang delinquency 
obtained from youth survey data (20 to 25 percent) 
and the estimate of gang crime obtained from law 
enforcement surveys (3 to 4 percent) demands some 
explanation. One explanation is that law enforce-
3  Th e Uniform Crime Reporting program collects crime report 
data from local law enforcement agencies. Criminal off enses are 
classifi ed according to a uniform system to facilitate compilation 
of national statistics and comparison of jurisdictions. Part I 
off enses include the most common serious person and property 
off enses and make up the UCR crime index. 
Figure 6.3. U.S. index crime and gang crime 
estimates: 1993
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ment agencies may underreport gang crime because 
many jurisdictions lack the capacity—or the political 
will—to carefully track the extent of gang involve-
ment in criminal activity. Law enforcement under-
reporting may account for some of the gap, but the 
most compelling explanation is that gang activity 
peaks during early adolescence and drops sharply as 
youths approach adulthood. 
The Rochester research team reports that the preva-
lence of active gang membership among male sur-
vey respondents dropped from 18 percent in the 
first year (average age 14) to 7 percent in the fourth 
year (average age 17) (Hall, Thornberry, and Lizotte 
2006). Other surveys have found a more gradual 
drop-off in gang membership. Fagan (1990) reports 
gang prevalence rates that decline from 26 percent 
at age 15 to 22 percent at ages 17 and 18 (cited 
in Klein and Maxson 2006). Data from the Seat-
tle Social Development Project show rates of gang 
membership that fall from 6 percent at age 15 to 
5 percent at age 18 (Hill, Lui, and Hawkins 2001 
cited in Klein and Maxson 2006). Nonetheless, it is 
clear that adults—who commit the vast majority of 
crimes—participate in gangs at substantially lower 
rates than adolescents.
It should not be surprising, given the small contri-
bution of gang members to the crime problem, that 
there is little or no correlation between law enforce-
ment gang population estimates and overall crime 
trends. An analysis of gang membership and crime 
data from North Carolina found that most jurisdic-
tions reporting growth in gang membership also re-
ported falling crime rates. Large, urban counties that 
apparently experienced the greatest growth in gang 
membership achieved some of the largest reductions 
in crime. The full results of this comparison can be 
found at the end of this chapter.
Homicide
Public concerns about gang crime often focus on 
well-publicized incidents of lethal violence. Many 
lives have been lost to gang violence over the past 
decades. African American and Latino parents in 
high-crime neighborhoods have good reason to fear 
for the well-being of their sons. Fifteen years ago, for 
example, the homicide rate for black males between 
the ages of 20 and 24 in St. Louis—one of the most 
violent cities in America—reached a shocking 626 
per 100,000 residents (Decker and Curry 2003). 
Nevertheless, gang members are responsible for a 
relatively small share of the nation’s homicides.
Author and activist Tom Hayden cites a 2001 figure 
of 1,335 gang-related homicides in 132 cities with 
populations over 100,000 provided by the staff at 
the National Youth Gang Center (2005).4 The gang 
homicide total amounts to 8.4 percent of the 15,980 
homicides reported to the FBI and is a little more 
than half the 2,387 people known to have been killed 
by family members or intimates in 2001.5 Malcolm 
Klein and Cheryl Maxson cite a slightly smaller 2002 
figure of 1,119 gang homicides—less than 7 percent 
of all homicides that year—based on the FBI’s Sup-
plemental Homicide Reports, which use criteria that 
“approximate a gang motive approach to defining 
gang homicides” (2006).
The reported prevalence of gang-related homicides 
varies widely by jurisdiction. In California, George 
Tita and Allan Abrahamse found that “gang killings 
accounted for 16 percent of all homicides between 
1981 and 1991” (cited in Klein and Maxson 2006). 
Tita and Abrahamse also reported that three of ev-
ery four California gang homicides took place in Los 
Angeles County. The most recent available National 
Youth Gang Survey data indicated that gang mem-
bers were responsible for more than half of all ho-
micides in Chicago and Los Angeles, and a quarter 
of homicides in 173 other large cities that reported 
gang problems and provided gang homicide infor-
mation (Egley and Ritz 2006).
Gang-related homicides are a serious problem in a num-
ber of cities, but nationally just one gang homicide occurs 
annually for every 18 gangs and 570 gang members.
The National Youth Gang Center estimates that there 
are roughly 24,000 youth gangs with 760,000 mem-
bers in the United States. If just one member of each 
youth gang committed a single homicide each year, 
the annual number of gang homicides would reach 
24,000—nearly 10,000 more homicides than the na-
tion experienced in 2005 under any circumstances. 
The most recent available figure for gang-related ho-
micides is 1,335 killings in 2001—one homicide for 
every 18 gangs and 570 gang members. At that rate, 
it would take 18 years for each gang to be respon-
sible for a single killing, assuming that the homicides 
were divided evenly (they are not) and that the gangs 
4  The total does not include smaller cities or rural areas, but the 
impact of the omission is small because gang-related homicides 
are rare in less-populous jurisdictions. A large majority of rural 
counties and small cities reported no gang problems at the turn of 
the century, and among those reporting gang problems, 80 percent 
reported no gang-related homicides (Egley and Ritz 2006).
5  The FBI does not include victims of the attacks of September 
11, 2001, in the annual homicide count.
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survived that long (many do not). Since a handful of 
cities and gangs account for a disproportionate share 
of killings, we can infer that most gangs will never 
have a murderer in their midst.
Most law enforcement agencies reported zero youth gang 
homicides between 2002 and 2004.
Most law enforcement agencies reported zero youth 
gang homicides between 2002 and 2004. Jurisdic-
tions that experienced no gang homicides over the 
three-year period included two in five larger cities 
(50,000 or more residents), a majority of suburban 
counties, and four in five smaller cities and rural 
counties. Just one in 10 larger cities—and one in 
37 suburban counties—reported 10 or more gang-
related homicides in at least one of the three survey 
years. Gang-related homicides happen occasionally in 
a large number of jurisdictions and are a major prob-
lem in a handful of cities, according to the surveys. 
Murders committed by family members and partners 
are a more serious issue in most jurisdictions. 
Policy makers and the public at large generally believe 
that gang killings are fueled by struggles for control 
of the illegal drug trade. Yet researchers have consis-
tently found that drug motives are present in a very 
small proportion of gang homicides. Carolyn and 
Richard Block conducted a comprehensive analysis 
of gang homicides in Chicago at the height of the 
crack epidemic and concluded that guns, not drugs, 
were behind a spike in gang killings (2001). 
Fewer than 3 percent of gang-motivated murders 
that took place between 1987 and 1990 were drug-
related, according to Chicago homicide data, and 
just five of 288 cases (1.7 percent) were connected to 
drug business. There was also a much stronger cor-
relation at the neighborhood level between gang-mo-
tivated homicides and nonlethal violence than was 
found between gang homicides and gang-motivated 
drug crimes. 
A spatial analysis of violent incidents showed that 
gang-related homicides and nonlethal violence were 
much more likely to occur at the border of gang ter-
ritories than in places with high levels of gang-re-
lated drug activity. The researchers found that “street 
gang–motivated homicides tended to occur within 
or close to the boundaries of turf hot spot areas, and 
only rarely in drug hot spot areas except when a drug 
hot spot area intersected with a turf hot spot area.” 
The number of gang-motivated homicides rose 
sharply in Chicago at the end of the 1980s, from 50 
in 1987 to a record 101 gang-motivated homicides in 
1990. The spike in homicides did not correlate to an 
increase in levels of nonlethal gang violence, which 
actually declined slightly over the period. Instead, the 
researchers report that “virtually the entire increase 
in the number of street gang–motivated homicides 
seems attributable to an increase in the use of high-
caliber, automatic, or semiautomatic weapons.” 
Research teams in Boston and Los Angeles conducted 
extensive analyses of homicide patterns and came to 
the same conclusion. They found that youth and 
young adult gang members were killing each other 
in a cycle of violence that had no motive other than 
the perceived need to defend symbolic turf and re-
taliate for past violence. The Boston researchers who 
designed Operation Ceasefire (discussed in chapter 
7) determined that most incidents “were not in any 
proximate way about drug trafficking or other ‘busi-
ness’ interests” (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). 
Further, youth known to be associated with homi-
cides were more likely to have been arraigned in the 
past for violent, property, and disorder offenses than 
for drug offenses.
The RAND Corporation researchers who assisted in 
the replication of Operation Ceasefire in Los An-
geles report that their findings “drew incredulous 
responses from members of the working group, in-
cluding one law enforcement member who insisted 
‘these kids are . . . being killed because of [dope]’ ” 
(Tita et al. 2003). A review of the case files with the 
detective who assembled them confirmed the team’s 
initial assessment: the kids were not being killed 
over dope. The findings from Chicago, Boston, and 
Los Angeles are supported by research studies that 
produced similar results in Miami, Pittsburgh, and 
St. Louis (cited in Howell and Decker 1999 and 
Tita et al. 2003).
In a recent summary of gang research literature, 
Short observes that both intergang and intragang 
homicides are associated with external challenges 
to group solidarity and internal challenges to group 
norms (2006). The perceived need to uphold a code 
of honor drives violence among gang members more 
than the interests of the gang or its members: 
Donald Black (1993) and Mark Cooney (1998) 
note that the violence associated with such con-
cerns appears to be overwhelmingly “moralis-
tic” rather than “predatory.” That is, it occurs in 
response to “a violation of standards of accept-
able behavior” rather than as a means of achiev-
ing personal gratification. (Cooney, p. 4)
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Th e intention here is not to minimize the toll gang wars 
have taken on youth, especially youth of color, over the 
past two decades, but instead to place it in context. Le-
thal violence remains a serious problem in the United 
States, and it requires a thoughtful response. Blaming 
the problem on “gangs” may be politically expedient, 
but it does little to advance a solution.
Violence
Research results in three gang problem cities show that 
gang members were responsible for less than 10 percent 
of violent crime.
Researchers working at the local level have also re-
ported that known gang members account for a small 
fraction of violent criminal activity, even in cities and 
neighborhoods that report serious gang problems. Las 
Vegas law enforcement offi  cials talked up the extent 
of gang violence prior to the passage of a law estab-
lishing enhanced sentences for gang-related crimes. 
But when researchers went back to examine police 
data, they determined that the prevalence of gang 
violence had been greatly exaggerated. Defendants 
identifi ed by police as gang members accounted for 
just 6 percent of violent crime charges and 5 percent 
of drug charges fi led in Las Vegas between 1989 and 
1995 (Miethe and McCorkle 2002). 
Data published by a team of researchers that evalu-
ated a gang suppression eff ort in Dallas show that 
gang-related off enses accounted for less than 10 
percent of serious violent crime in the year preced-
ing the intervention, even in target areas that expe-
rienced “large amounts of gang violence” (Fritsch, 
Caeti, and Taylor 2003). Th e same conclusions can 
be drawn from data collected by investigators evalu-
ating the eff orts of a gang task force in Westminster, 
California (Kent et al. 2000). Gang-related off enses 
in Westminster peaked at roughly 7 or 8 percent 
of all crime during the preintervention period, and 
the researchers concluded that “violent gang crime 
is a relatively small proportion of violent crime” in 
the jurisdiction.
Th e data from Las Vegas, Dallas, and Westminster 
roughly correspond to previously reported fi ndings 
from the National Crime Victimization Survey that 
gang members are responsible for a small share of 
violent crime (ziedenberg 2005). Th e proportion of 
violent crimes in which the victim believed the per-
petrator to be a gang member peaked at 10 percent 
of all victimizations in 1996 before declining 6 per-
cent in 1998 and remaining stable thereafter. 
One study of highly organized gangs in New York’s Chi-
natown found that most violence was motivated by gang 
rivalries or personal disputes, and that it was initiated 
by rank-and-fi le members rather than gang leaders.
It is often assumed that gang leaders orchestrate vio-
lence in order to secure control of drug markets and 
other criminal enterprises. Th is notion has been chal-
lenged by fi ndings from ethnographic research that 
gang violence is often expressive in nature and initi-
ated from below. Ko-lin Chin interviewed 62 male 
members of Chinese gangs in New York’s Chinatown 
in 1992 and found that, while fi ghting was common 
among the gang members he interviewed, the vio-
lence originated in personal disputes and gang rival-
ries rather than in instrumental concerns (1996). He 
also reported that leaders of Chinatown’s youth gangs 
and adult criminal organizations were more likely to 
restrain than to encourage gang violence. 
Law enforcement authorities had identifi ed drug traf-
fi cking as a major gang activity and a leading cause 
of violence among Chinese gang members. But the 
gang members interviewed by Chin reported little in-
volvement in drug sales; just one in six indicated that 
he had ever sold drugs. Th e top two reasons supplied 
by the interviewees for violence between members 
of rival gangs were “staring” during chance encoun-
ters in public locations (mentioned by 45 percent of 
respondents) and fi ghts over turf (32 percent). Dis-
putes over money (25 percent) and girls (21 percent) 
were the most commonly cited reasons for confl ict 
between members of the same gang. 
Chinatown gang leaders were more likely to intervene 
to restrain, rather than to promote, conﬂ ict between 
gang members.
Most gang members reported that gang leaders, 
sometimes joined by representatives of adult criminal 
PART II    Chapter 6:  Public Enemy #1?
Figure 6.4. Proportion of violent crime committed by people 
believed to be gang members
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 (1998–2003)  (1996) (1991–1992)
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organizations, would intervene to resolve intergang 
and intragang conflicts. Chin concludes that “(a) 
violence between gang members is freelance and 
erupts rather spontaneously over personal matters, 
and (b) gang leaders strive to control and contain 
violence for purely pragmatic purposes…. Drug use, 
drug trafficking, tong [organized crime] affiliations, 
protection rackets, and community politics appear to 
have little influence on gang violence in New York 
City’s Chinatown.”
Drug distribution
National and local law enforcement officials have long 
argued that gangs are heavily involved in drug traf-
ficking and distribution, but the evidence behind the 
contention is thin. The National Drug Intelligence 
Center (NDIC) reported in the October 4, 2005, is-
sue of Narcotics Digest Weekly that gangs (including 
street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle 
gangs) are “the primary retail distributors of drugs in 
the country.” The National Alliance of Gang Investi-
gators Associations (NAGIA) makes a similar claim 
in its most recent National Gang Threat Assessment, 
which is based on a survey of gang investigators at 
455 law enforcement agencies (2005).
The NAGIA survey is not, as the authors readily ad-
mit, “representative of the nation as a whole, nor is it 
based on a statistically valid sample.” Beyond prob-
lems with the representativeness of the sample, how-
ever, the NAGIA report clearly overstates the survey 
findings. Three in five law enforcement respondents 
(60.2 percent) reported “moderate” or “high” gang 
involvement in total street-level drug sales in their 
areas. But when the responses are broken down by 
substance, it becomes clear that the figures are driven 
primarily by marijuana distribution. 
Marijuana is the only drug for which a majority of law 
enforcement respondents reported “moderate” or “high” 
gang involvement in distribution.
Marijuana is the only drug for which a majority of 
law enforcement respondents reported “moderate” or 
“high” gang involvement in distribution (64.8 per-
cent). Close to half reported moderate to high lev-
els of gang involvement in the distribution of crack 
cocaine (47.3 percent), while fewer than 40 percent 
of respondents identified a significant role for gangs 
in the distribution of methamphetamine (39.1 per-
cent), powdered cocaine (38.2 percent), or heroin 
(27.9 percent). Just a quarter of law enforcement 
agencies in Southern states indicated moderate or 
high gang involvement in the distribution of meth-
amphetamine (24.9 percent), despite local media re-
ports that have suggested much closer ties between 
gangs and meth trafficking. 
Researchers found that law enforcement officials overes-
timate gang member involvement in drug distribution.
Further, researchers Malcolm Klein and Cheryl 
Maxson found that law enforcement officials have 
an exaggerated perception of gang member involve-
ment in drug distribution. In the mid-1980s the two 
conducted research on cocaine sales in South Central 
Los Angeles, where they were told that “upward of 
90 percent” or “almost all” sales were gang-related 
(Maxson 1995). 
A review of police records, however, showed that the 
share of arrests attributable to gang members ranged 
from 9 percent in 1983 to 25 percent in 1985. De-
spite stereotypes that gang drug activity is associated 
with “high levels of violence” (NDIC 2005), the re-
searchers found that gang members were no more 
likely to carry firearms than nonmembers (Maxson 
1995). 
Maxson replicated these findings six years later when 
she used police records to examine 1,563 cocaine 
sale incidents and 471 other drug sale incidents in 
Pasadena and Pomona, California. Gang members 
accounted for just over a quarter of cocaine sale ar-
rests (26.7 percent) and one in nine non–cocaine sale 
arrests (11.5 percent). The proportions of cocaine 
sales attributable to gang members—21 percent in 
Pomona and 30 percent in Pasadena—were consis-
tent with the last year of the Los Angeles data (25 
percent) and well below law enforcement estimates, 
which ranged from 30 to 50 percent. 
The proportion of non–cocaine sale arrests attributed 
to gang members (one in nine) also failed to meet 
the expectations of law enforcement officials who 
reported that “gangs were prominent in the distribu-
tion of marijuana, heroin, and PCP, although less so 
than in the distribution of cocaine.” Maxson further 
notes that these proportions may overstate the role of 
gangs in the drug trade since many gang members sell 
drugs independent of their gangs: “It should also be 
noted that these gang member arrestees might have 
been entrepreneurs. Involvement of the gang might 
have been minimal.”
Gang members arrested for drug sales were no more 
likely than nonmembers to carry weapons or engage in 
violence associated with the sale.
Maxson’s findings also belied the stereotype of heav-
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ily armed gang members who use violence to control 
local drug markets. Gang members arrested for co-
caine sales were no more likely than nonmembers to 
carry a firearm (10 percent) or to engage in violence 
in conjunction with the sale or arrest (5 percent). 
Cocaine sales by gang members were somewhat more 
likely to involve the rock form of cocaine. But the 
average amount of cocaine sold by nonmembers was 
twice that sold by gang members (6.95 grams and 
3.55 grams, respectively). The only other significant 
differences between cocaine sale incidents involving 
gang members and those involving nonmembers 
were that gang members were disproportionately 
black, male, and young (a mean age of 22.5). 
Youth survey and interview data suggest that a sig-
nificant proportion of gang members participate in 
drug sales during their time in the gang. Members 
of gangs that were considered by law enforcement 
to be the most highly organized in Chicago and San 
Diego all reported drug sale activity to interviewers 
(Decker, Bynum, and Weisel 2001). A large major-
ity of St. Louis gang members said that more than 
half of their gang peers sold drugs (Decker and Van 
Winkle 1996). Several other studies conducted dur-
ing the early 1990s found rates of self-reported par-
ticipation in drug sales that ranged from a low of 30 
percent to a high of 95 percent (Maxson 1995).
One study found that just one Los Angeles gang member 
in seven sold drugs as often as once a month.
The character of gang-member-involvement drug 
sales is poorly understood. Drug selling is not typi-
cally a full-time occupation for gang members. A 
study conducted by the Los Angeles County district 
attorney’s office in 1992 found that just one gang 
member in seven sold drugs on a monthly basis (How-
ell and Decker 1999). Scott Decker and Barry Van 
Winkle describe the drug sale activity of St. Louis 
gang members as “sporadic,” observing that they sold 
drugs “when they wanted to make money, not at any 
fixed time” (1996). “It is probable,” the authors con-
clude, “that the majority of the drug sellers in the St. 
Louis area are not gang members.”
Instead, drug sales represent an occasional source of 
income that allows gang youth to obtain the con-
sumer goods and services that are readily available 
to more affluent teens. Nearly two-thirds of St. 
Louis gang members said that most of their drug 
revenues were spent on clothing. San Diego gang 
members told interviewers that their drug profits 
were spent on fast food and parties (Decker, By-
num, and Weisel 2001).
Gang members are clearly not the primary retail dis-
tributors of drugs in the country. In Southern Cali-
fornia cities with recognized gang problems, gang 
members accounted for roughly a quarter of drug 
sale arrests. It is safe to assume that gang members 
account for a much smaller share of drug sale arrests 
in jurisdictions with smaller gang problems. It is also 
likely that gang members are heavily underrepre-
sented in the many drug transactions that take place 
in more affluent neighborhoods where police make 
fewer drug arrests. 
Gang members do not even account for a majority 
among youth who have sold drugs. Sixteen percent 
of 17-year-olds report selling drugs at some point 
in their lives, while just 8 percent report past or 
current gang membership (Snyder and Sickmund 
2006). The prevalence of drug sale activity was even 
higher among white youth (17 percent) despite the 
fact that white youth had a lower rate of gang in-
volvement (7 percent). 
Several researchers have described gang member involve-
ment in drug sales as sporadic and poorly organized.
Law enforcement officials generally perceive the in-
volvement of gang members in drug sales as a crimi-
nal conspiracy on the part of the gang to traffic in 
drugs. Most of the ethnographic and survey litera-
ture paints a very different picture of the relation-
ship between gangs and the drug trade. They describe 
gang member drug activity as sporadic and disorga-
nized—less Drug Traffickers Inc. than a fraternal as-
sociation whose members network and occasionally 
do deals with one another.
Scott Decker, Tim Bynum, and Deborah Weisel inter-
viewed 85 active members of the four most organized 
gangs in Chicago and San Diego (2001). All of the 
interviewees reported selling drugs, and most said that 
their gangs were involved in organizing drug sales. But 
their responses generally suggested low levels of orga-
nization with few defined roles or rules. According to 
one San Diego gang member:
The gang don’t organize nothing. It’s like ev-
erybody is on they own. You are not trying to 
do nothing with nobody unless it’s with your 
friend. You don’t put your money with gangs.
Drug profits were not primarily used to finance gang 
activities but instead were retained by individual drug 
sellers. Even members of Chicago’s Gangster Dis-
ciples—arguably one of the most highly organized 
street gangs in the United States—overwhelmingly 
reported that drug profits went into their own pock-
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ets and not back to the gang. San Diego gang mem-
bers were even more emphatic, with one responding, 
“A percentage of the drug money [to the gang]? Hell, 
no. You keep it to yourself.” 
Decker and Van Winkle found similar results in their 
investigation of St. Louis gangs: “Although every gang 
in our sample had some members who sold drugs 
(crack cocaine, in the main), gang involvement was 
generally poorly organized, episodic, nonmonopo-
listic, carried out by individuals or cliques on their 
own, and was not a rationale for the gang’s existence 
and continuance” (1996). Gangs did not dominate 
the drug trade in St. Louis, nor did they attempt to 
do so. Gang members who were interviewed often 
referred to nonmembers who sold drugs, and to drug 
houses within gang neighborhoods that were not 
controlled by the gang. 
The drug economy plays a significant role in the lives 
of many gang members, a fact that has been well 
documented by Hagedorn (2005) and others. But the 
drug trade is not responsible for the existence of gangs 
or the activities of their members. And gangs are not 
responsible for the flow of drugs and drug dollars into 
low-income communities. 
Perception and reality
All of the available evidence indicates that gang mem-
bers play a relatively small role in the crime problem 
despite their propensity toward criminal activity. 
Gang members appear to be responsible for fewer 
than one in four drug sales; fewer than one in 10 ho-
micides; fewer than one in 16 violent offenses; and 
fewer than one in 20 index crimes. Gangs themselves 
play an even smaller role, since much of the crime 
committed by gang members is self-directed and not 
committed for the gang’s benefit. The question, then, 
is why the problem of gang crime is so commonly 
overstated by law enforcement and media reports.
There are several possible explanations for why law 
enforcement and media reports consistently overes-
timate the role of gangs and gang members in crime 
and violence. First, gang members often make them-
selves highly visible, while others who commit crimes 
try to keep a lower profile in order to avoid arrest. 
Graffiti, colors, hand signs, and dramatic rivalries en-
sure that gang activity will be more memorable and 
more newsworthy than the less spectacular offenses 
that drive crime statistics. 
Second, law enforcement and media depictions of 
gangs fuel gang crime myths by equating all gang ac-
tivity with criminal activity and by tarring all gangs 
and members with the worst crimes committed by 
any gang member. Klein succinctly illustrates the 
tendency of law enforcement agencies to cram all 
drug crime in a gang box when he quotes the deputy 
chief of a large police department on the subject of 
crack sales:
Look, this narcotics stuff is all a matter of 
gangs and conspiracy. To me, a gang is any 
two or more guys working on crime together. 
In a drug sale, you got at least the seller and 
the distributor involved. Now that means it’s 
a conspiracy. And there’s two guys, right. So 
all these crack sales are gang crimes . . . . Two 
or more guys conspiring to make crack sales 
means it’s a gang affair . . . that’s how we define 
gang around here. (1995)
Law enforcement and media accounts also tend to 
attribute to the gang any crime for which an alleged 
gang member stands convicted, charged, or even sus-
pected. This practice implies that every member of 
a gang has committed, or is at least capable of com-
mitting, a laundry list of heinous offenses. Some 
agencies such as North Carolina’s State Bureau of 
Investigations (SBI) go even further by lumping to-
gether the alleged activities of many gangs. The gangs 
of Charlotte/Mecklenburg County, for example, are 
said to engage in:
homicides, threats against law enforcement, 
firearm possession, drug possession, assaults, 
fighting, kidnapping, carjacking, armed rob-
bery, home invasions, vandalism (graffiti), auto 
theft, breaking into vehicles, restaurant rob-
beries, gun trafficking, extortion, prostitution 
and gambling. 
The list of alleged gang activities creates the impres-
sion that every Charlotte gang member is a sociopath 
with a long criminal record, or, at a minimum, that 
every gang contains murderers, drug traffickers, car-
jackers, armed robbers, and their ilk. A quick review 
of the national gang data dispels any such idea.
The typical gang is not an army of killers or even po-
tential killers. It is a group of youth and young adults 
who are alienated from mainstream society and caught 
up in a mythical world of excitement and danger. The 
damage that these young people do to themselves, to 
each other, and to more than a few bystanders is very 
real. But as Klein and many other researchers have ob-
served, most gang members are more talk than action. 
A more realistic assessment of the gang contribution 
to the crime problem is needed if policy makers are 
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to avoid playing into the gang myth by inflating the 
dangers to public safety posed by gangs.
North Carolina: More gangs, less crime
Mercer Sullivan contends that the focus on gangs 
distracts researchers and policy makers from the real 
problem of youth violence (2006). He points to the 
lack of a correlation between youth violence and the 
most solid measure of gang prevalence, the National 
Youth Gang Center gang population estimates:
During the 1990s, youth gangs were widely re-
ported to be increasing in numbers and mem-
bership throughout the United States (Miller 
2001). Yet, during the latter part of the decade, 
youth violence decreased sharply (Butts and Tra-
vis 2002), while gang membership underwent 
but a slight decline and remained at historically 
unprecedented levels. . . . Given the choice, who 
would not prefer more gangs and less youth vio-
lence to the opposite combination.
A comparison of North Carolina crime data and gang 
membership estimates provides further evidence for 
Sullivan’s argument, as well as an example of how 
gang hysteria can elicit counterproductive policy re-
sponses. Legislation introduced by Representatives 
Henry Michaux, a Democrat from Durham, and 
Phillip Frye, a Republican from Spruce Pine, in Feb-
ruary 2005 declared that gang activity had brought 
North Carolina to a “state of crisis”: 
The General Assembly, however, further finds 
that the State of North Carolina is in a state 
of crisis that has been caused by violent street 
gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and 
commit a multitude of crimes against the peace-
ful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activ-
ities, both individually and collectively, present 
a clear and present danger to public order and 
safety and are not constitutionally protected.
H.B. 50 would have made participation in a street 
gang a separate criminal offense; added 10 years to 
the sentence of anyone found to be an “organizer, su-
pervisor or manager” of gang activity; required judges 
to make a determination on the record as to whether 
an offense was committed to benefit a street gang; 
allowed the state to seize property used for gang ac-
tivity; added at least five years to the sentence of any 
defendant convicted of a serious felony committed to 
benefit gang activity if he or she was in possession of 
a firearm; and established a grant program for gang 
prevention and intervention efforts.
The legislature’s Fiscal Research Division estimated that 
the proposed changes would cost the state nearly $80 
million to implement over the first four years if just 1 
percent of eligible offenses resulted in convictions. The 
monies would have gone largely to the construction 
and operation of nearly 400 new adult and juvenile 
corrections beds. The estimate did not include any costs 
associated with the penalty enhancement provisions of 
the bill. The legislation would also have exposed chil-
dren as young as 12 to stiff penalties, prompting con-
cern that troubled youth could suffer lasting damage at 
the hands of the criminal justice system.
The public often assumes that such harsh and costly 
measures would be proposed only in the face of a 
true public safety crisis. A review of the gang litera-
ture, however, shows that some jurisdictions have 
adopted tough gang control measures only to dis-
cover that the gang threat was greatly exaggerated. 
Nevada state lawmakers enacted strict gang sentenc-
ing enhancements based on law enforcement claims 
that arrest data did not support. A review of crime 
trends suggests that North Carolina risks repeating 
Nevada’s mistake.
Families Against Mandatory Minimums organizer 
LaFonda Jones says that the gang panic was pre-
cipitated by several killings in Durham. Jones agrees 
that Durham has a youth violence problem. But she 
argues that youth violence is a long-standing local 
problem with roots in youth unemployment and the 
“severe gap between haves and have-nots” rather than 
a statewide crime epidemic. 
Uniform Crime Report data support Jones’s conten-
tion: statewide index crime rates fell by 12 percent 
during the five-year period that preceded the intro-
duction of H.B. 50, dropping from 5,267 crimes 
per 100,000 residents in 1999 to 4,642 crimes per 
100,000 residents in 2004. Violent crime rates saw an 
even greater 16 percent decline, dropping from 551 
to 461 crimes per 100,000 residents over the period. 
Even juvenile violent crime arrests declined slightly, 
from 2,749 per year in 1999 to 2,574 in 2004. 
Despite falling crime rates, two reports issued by 
state law enforcement agencies fueled fear of gangs 
by appearing to show rapid growth in gang activity. 
The North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations 
produced a report summarizing gang activity in 15 
alleged “hot spots” for the General Assembly’s Fiscal 
Research Division. 
The language of the SBI report is alarming: Durham’s 
PART II    Chapter 6:  Public Enemy #1?
	 	 Justice	Policy	Institute	 
    Table 6.1. North Carolina local gang membership and crime trends: 1999 to 2004 
Members Members Members Members Index crime Violent crime
County 1999 2004 change (#) change change change
Cumberland 2547 259 -2288      -89.8%      7.3%    17.6%
Burke 154 12 -142     -92.2%   -12.8%   -51.3%
Guilford 144 68 -76     -52.8%   -17.0%   -22.9%
Stanly 58 18 -40     -69.0%   -37.0%     -6.4%
Avery 22 10 -12     -54.5%   -21.1%   -52.6%
Brunswick 9 7 -2     -22.2%     -0.5%   -21.0%
Lenoir 20 21 1        5.0%    16.4%      3.1%
Rowan 32 34 2        6.3%      8.6%     -4.8%
Duplin 23 30 7      30.4%   -13.4%   -16.0%
Northampton 15 22 7      46.7%    36.2%    11.0%
Franklin 16 27 11      68.8%   -19.4%   -23.3%
Rockingham 15 30 15    100.0%     -6.8%   -42.9%
Catawba 8 60 52    650.0%     -0.6%      5.1%
Davidson 187 263 76      40.6%      1.8%    22.2%
New Hanover 20 105 85    425.0%     -5.7%      1.0%
Nash 7 300 293  4185.7% 0.0%     -0.3%
Pitt 40 835 795  1987.5%   -13.8%   -11.3%
Mecklenburg 168 1739 1571    935.1%   -14.4%   -24.7%
Wake 30 1753 1723  5743.3%   -32.4%   -21.3%
   Source: Governor’s Crime Commission 2005; FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1999 & 2004
Hispanic gangs were “becoming more visible”; Char-
lotte/Mecklenburg County had a “growing number 
of Hispanic gangs” as well as Asian gangs that were 
“becoming more active”; Wake County had seen “a 
large influx of gang activity”; Hispanic gang activity 
had “increased significantly in the town of Angier” 
and “recently emerged in the Fayetteville area”; “gang 
members from Charlotte” were committing crime in 
Catawba/Iredell County, which was also witnessing 
the “development of MS-13 [Mara Salvatrucha gang] 
activity in the area”; gang activity had “erupted in the 
Kinston area . . . in the last three or four years”; His-
panic gangs were “emerging” in Wilmington/New 
Hanover County; and Henderson County had “seen 
Hispanic gangs move into the area.” The report con-
tains no references to gang membership decreasing, 
nor does it mention gangs becoming less active in 
any of the 15 hot spots. 
The Governor’s Crime Commission also released a 
report that compared local law enforcement esti-
mates of gang activity in 2004 and 1999. Author 
Richard Hayes notes that apparent changes in gang 
activity over the period might in fact be changes in 
law enforcement acknowledgment of gang problems. 
Nevertheless, a more than 3,000-person jump in the 
estimated gang population—from 5,068 in 1999 to 
8,517 in 2004—led the News and Observer to print a 
story headlined “Gangs on the Rise in N.C.” (Man-
ware and Wootson 2005). The article quoted Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg gang detective Joel McNelly, who 
told the paper that “the spike in gang numbers is as 
much about gang members who’ve moved to the city 
as about officers better documenting them.” 
Yet the pattern of rising gang activity and falling 
crime was evident at the local level. Most North Car-
olina counties either failed to report any gang activity 
or reported an “unknown” number of gang members 
in one or both of the surveys. But 22 counties did 
provide estimates of local gang membership in both 
1999 and 2004. Nineteen counties, including some 
of the state’s largest, submitted uniform crime reports 
for the same years, permitting comparison between 
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gang membership and crime trends.
The results are striking. Of the four counties report-
ing the greatest increase in gang membership, three 
(Wake, Mecklenburg, and Pitt) saw substantial drops 
in violent and overall crime rates, while the fourth 
(Nash) saw no change in its overall and violent crime 
rates. The county with the greatest reported decrease 
in gang membership—Cumberland County, where 
the number of reported gang members dropped by 
90 percent—saw growth in overall and violent crime 
rates and a 62 percent spike in its murder rate. Other 
counties that reported declining gang membership 
also experienced falling crime rates. But only one 
(Stanly County) saw a greater reduction in over-
all crime than Wake County, where reported gang 
membership increased by nearly 6,000 percent as the 
index crime rate dropped by 32 percent.
Five of North Carolina’s six largest counties were pro-
filed by the SBI report. Gang membership and crime 
trends moved in opposite directions in four of the 
five counties. 
Charlotte/Mecklenburg County
The SBI report indicated that the 
Charlotte area was plagued by a 
“growing number of Hispanic gangs,” 
that MS-13 had become “the most vi-
olent gang” in the city, and that Asian 
gangs were “becoming more active.” 
A comparison of law enforcement survey data from 
1999 and 2004 shows that the number of alleged 
gang members grew tenfold, from 168 to 1,739, 
while the number of gangs shot from 15 to 65. Yet 
crime trends went in the opposite direction over the 
five-year period. The overall index crime rate de-
creased by 14.4 percent, and the violent crime rate 
fell by an even larger 24.7 percent.
Wake County
The SBI report notes that Wake 
County municipalities had seen a 
“large influx of gang activity,” includ-
ing United Blood Nation and Crips, 
as well as Hispanic gangs, which posed 
the “largest threat” to the county. Law 
enforcement survey data also indicate a tremendous 
proliferation of gang activity, with the number of 
gangs jumping from one to 39 between 1999 and 
2004, while the population of gang members shot 
from 30 to 1,753. But crime trends moved in the op-
posite direction. Wake County’s overall index crime 
rate was down by a third (32.4 percent) and violent 
crime fell by a fifth (21.3 percent) over the period.
Greensboro/Guilford County
The SBI report indicates that 
a number of gangs are in-
volved in criminal activities 
in the Greensboro/Guilford 
County area, but it provides 
no information on recent 
trends. Law enforcement survey data show that gang 
membership actually dropped sharply between 1999 
and 2004, falling from 144 to 68 known members (a 
52.8 percent decrease). Crime rates also declined in 
Guilford County, although the overall reduction was 
smaller than that achieved in Wake County. Total in-
dex crime was down by 17 percent, and violent crime 
was down by 22.9 percent.
Fayetteville/Cumberland County
The SBI report notes that 
Fayetteville gangs have 
strong ties to other parts 
of the country and states 
that “Hispanic gangs have 
recently emerged” in the 
area. But law enforcement officials in Cumberland 
County actually reported a 90 percent reduction in 
youth gang membership—from 2,547 members in 
1999 to 259 members in 2004—along with a drop 
in the number of gangs from 23 to 14. Crime trends 
moved in the opposite direction of reported gang 
membership; the index crime rate climbed by 7.3 
percent and the violent crime rate jumped by 17.6 
percent over the period.
Durham
The SBI reported that Dur-
ham’s largest gang, United 
Blood Nation, had “ties to 
New York” and was engaged 
in “numerous” shootouts 
with rival Crips. Hispanic 
gangs were becoming “more visible” and had docu-
mented ties to the largest population of MS-13 mem-
bers on the East Coast, located in Fairfax County, 
Virginia. The city of Durham was said to have “over 
20 organized gangs” that were “constantly attracting 
new members from all ethnic backgrounds.” The same 
year, the Governor’s Crime Commission reported 
the existence of 10 “criminal youth gangs” in Dur-
ham based on law enforcement surveys, a threefold 
Gang members
935.1%
Violent crime
-24.7%
Gang members
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Violent crime
-21.3%
Gang members
-52.8%
Violent crime
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Gang members
-89.8%
Violent crime
17.6%
Gang members
333.3%
Violent crime
-34.6%
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increase over 1999. Yet again, crime trends moved 
in the opposite direction. Between 1999 and 2004, 
Durham’s overall and violent crime rates dropped by 
a third—33.6 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively.
There are several possible explanations for the lack of 
correspondence between law enforcement reports of 
crime activity and crime trends. The apparent rise in 
gang membership may reflect a change in law enforce-
ment priorities rather than new gang activity. A recent 
influx of Latino immigrants may have led officers to 
misidentify young Latino men as gang members. On 
the other hand, it is conceivable that gang activity could 
be growing even as crime falls, since gang members ac-
count for a very small share of the crime problem. In 
any case, the data provide no support for the notion that 
North Carolina is experiencing a gang crime crisis. 
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When the existence of a gang problem has been 
announced or acknowledged by public officials, the 
conversation generally turns to how law enforcement 
should solve it. The following are fairly typical policy 
responses to the emergence of a gang problem: 
1.   Form a specialized gang unit within the police 
department if one does not already exist.
2.   Launch a crackdown in high-crime neighborhoods 
by adding police patrols, aggressively enforcing 
public ordinances, and using every available op-
portunity to stop and question local residents.
3.   Target alleged gang “leaders” and “hard-core” 
gang members for heightened surveillance and 
stiff criminal justice sanctions.
Other policy makers may propose adoption of a 
fourth option—a “balanced” approach that combines 
the gang enforcement tactics described here with pro-
vision of services and supports to gang members and 
gang-afflicted communities. The choice of a gang en-
forcement strategy is frequently based on political and 
institutional considerations. Officials seek strategies 
that let the public know they are “doing something” 
about the problem without requiring fundamental 
changes in the police department’s operations. 
The official response to an emerging gang problem is 
rarely based on a solid understanding of gang issues 
or a coherent theory of what an intervention should 
accomplish. The hysteria that greets the sudden emer-
gence of a gang problem creates a poor atmosphere 
for considering the questions that will determine the 
success or failure of a gang control strategy: What 
are its objectives? Whom will it target? And what ef-
fect will the initiative have on the targets in order to 
achieve the objectives?
The objectives of a gang control effort depend on 
whether the problem is defined as gang violence, 
gang crime, or the gangs’ very existence. Law en-
forcement officials often take the public position that 
gangs must be eradicated. In the words of Captain 
Ray Peavy, who heads the Los Angeles sheriff’s homi-
cide bureau, “Everyone says: ‘What are we going to 
do about the gang problem?’ It’s the same thing you 
do about cockroaches or insects; you get someone in 
there to do whatever they can do to get rid of those 
creatures” (Garvey and McGreevy 2007).
Others take a different perspective on what gang con-
trol efforts can, or should, set out to accomplish. As a 
representative of one urban community development 
corporation told a researcher, “The problem is not to 
get kids out of gangs but the behavior. If crime goes 
down, if young people are doing well, that’s success-
ful” (Villaruel, personal communication). Some law 
enforcement officers also acknowledge—usually in 
private—that their goal is not to eliminate gang mem-
bership but to reduce levels of gang crime and violence 
(Villaruel, personal communication).
The second important question for gang control ef-
forts is whom to target. On one hand, an initiative 
may elect to target “leaders” or “hard-core” members 
who are believed to be the driving force behind gang 
crime. On the other hand, the initiative may target 
“fringe” members or even nonmembers whom policy 
makers believe can more easily be enticed or deterred 
from gang activity. 
The most appropriate target depends on one’s the-
ory about how gangs operate. Some law enforce-
ment officials subscribe to the view that gangs can 
be eliminated or at least neutralized by removing 
their leadership (“cutting the head off the snake”). 
Others argue that gang leadership is fluid, and that 
gangs—like the mythical hydra—are capable of 
growing new heads faster than law enforcement can 
decapitate them. Some contend that so-called “hard-
core” members should be targeted because they do 
(and suffer) the most damage. But others believe that 
a focus on newer and more marginal members will 
not only save more youth but also limit gangs’ ability 
to reproduce themselves over time.
If drive-by shootings and other spectacular acts of 
gang violence are committed by younger members 
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at the behest of leaders, then it is possible—although 
not certain—that removing the leaders from the 
community might reduce violence. If, on the other 
hand, drive-bys and other acts of violence are ini-
tiated by younger and more volatile members with 
poor impulse control and a desire to “prove” them-
selves, then removing leaders will do nothing to quell 
the violence.
The third critical question for gang control efforts is 
what effects they are intended to have on the targets. 
A gang control initiative may set out to incapacitate 
gang members who are deemed too dangerous to re-
main on the street due to their role in the gang or 
their personal involvement in crime and violence. An 
initiative may also seek to use “carrots” or “sticks” 
to persuade individuals to change behaviors ranging 
from gang membership to gun violence. Finally, a 
gang control initiative may try to disrupt gang ac-
tivities by making it impossible for individuals or the 
group as a whole to function normally. 
Boston’s Operation Ceasefire is an example of a gang 
control effort with clear objectives, targets, and in-
tended effects. The architects of Operation Ceasefire 
set reducing gun violence as the principal objective 
and stuck with that objective throughout the life of 
the project. They developed a strategy that was de-
signed to persuade both hard-core and fringe youth 
gang members to stop engaging in acts of retaliatory 
violence. 
Targeted youth were told that further acts of violence 
would place them and their gangs under heightened 
law enforcement scrutiny; they were offered supports 
and services designed to facilitate the transition from 
gang activities to other activities. Police also con-
ducted saturation patrols and prosecuted targeted 
gang leaders, but these actions were considered com-
ponents of the main “lever-pulling” strategy rather 
than competing strategies. 
The conceptual clarity that characterized Operation 
Ceasefire is rare among gang control efforts. Few 
initiatives have proved capable of orienting their 
activities around realistic, measurable public safety 
objectives. And most are unable to articulate a vi-
able theory of how gang control activities will have 
the intended effect on their targets. Gang enforce-
ment efforts mounted in response to public concerns 
about gang and gun violence have driven up arrests 
for nonviolent offenses with no reduction in violence. 
Gang intervention programs that were intended to 
target active members wind up serving nonmembers 
because the staff is unwilling to work with “that kind 
of kid.” Conceptual clarity is no guarantee of success. 
The failure of efforts to replicate the Ceasefire model 
in Los Angeles and Indianapolis cast doubt on the 
underlying theory of “lever pulling” and deterrence 
“retailing.” But such clarity does make it easier to 
evaluate and debate competing proposals.
Further, the thrust of most gang enforcement ef-
forts runs counter to what is known about gangs and 
gang members, rendering the efforts ineffectual if not 
counterproductive. Police officials make much of tar-
geting reputed “leaders” while ignoring the fact that 
most gangs do not need leaders to function (not to 
mention the risk that removal of leaders will increase 
violence by destabilizing the gang and removing con-
straints on internal conflict). Research on the dynam-
ics of gang membership indicates that suppression 
tactics intended to make youth “think twice” about 
gang involvement may instead reinforce gang cohe-
sion, elevating the gang’s importance and reinforcing 
an “us versus them” mentality. Finally, the incarcera-
tion of gang members is often considered a measure 
of success, even though prison tends to solidify gang 
involvement and weaken an individual’s capacity to 
live a gang- and crime-free life. 
It is easy to provide anecdotal evidence for the effec-
tiveness of any one of these strategies: media reports 
are full of stories about cities where crime goes up, a 
crackdown is launched, and crime goes down. But 
a review of research on the implementation of gang 
enforcement strategies—ranging from neighbor-
hood-based suppression to the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention’s Comprehensive Gang Program Model—
provides little reason for optimism. Findings from 
investigations of gang enforcement efforts in 17 juris-
dictions over the past two decades yield few examples 
of success, and many examples of failure. 
The problems highlighted in the research include:
•   Lack of correspondence between the problem, typ-
ically lethal and/or serious violence, and a law en-
forcement response that targets low-level, nonviolent 
misbehavior.
•   Resistance on the part of key agency personnel to 
collaboration or implementation of the strategy as 
designed.
•   Evidence that the intervention had no effect or a 
negative effect on crime and violence.
•   A tendency for any reductions in crime or violence 
to evaporate quickly, often before the end of the 
intervention period.
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•   Poorly designed evaluations that make it impos-
sible to draw any conclusions about the effect of 
an intervention.
•   Failure of replication efforts to achieve results com-
parable to those of pilot programs.
•   Severe power and resources imbalances between 
law enforcement and community partners that 
hamper the implementation of “balanced” gang 
control initiatives.
The following sections describe common gang en-
forcement strategies and explore findings of program 
evaluations from 17 jurisdictions. 
Institutional responses: The rise of 
police gang units
Over the past decade and a half, we have witnessed 
a proliferation within law enforcement agencies of 
specialized units that focus on gang enforcement. 
The formation of a gang unit is often viewed as a 
rational response to an emerging gang threat. But re-
searchers have concluded that gang units are more 
often formed in response to pressure on police to “do 
something,” or as a way to secure additional resources 
for the agency. Once gang units are launched, the ex-
perts find they often become isolated from the rest of 
the department, a development that can render them 
ineffective or even facilitate corruption.
Roughly half of local law enforcement agencies with 
100 or more sworn officers maintain special gang 
units, according to a 1999 survey, including 56 per-
cent of municipal police department, 50 percent 
of sheriff’s departments, and 43 percent of county 
police agencies (Katz and Webb 2003a). In 2003 
Charles Katz and Vincent Webb estimated that the 
total number of police gang units (including state 
police agencies) stood at 360, most of which (85 
percent) were no more than 10 years old (2003b).
Why law enforcement agencies  
form gang units
The proliferation of specialized gang units has been 
justified as a natural response by police officials to the 
spread of gangs and growing public concerns over 
gang crime. The argument for such units is that they 
permit officers to develop the technical skills and ex-
pertise needed to diagnose local gang problems and 
to assist the rest of the agency and the community to 
address them. But the idea that the formation of a 
gang unit is “a result of rational considerations on the 
part of police agencies” that face “real gang problems” 
has been challenged by several researchers (Katz and 
Webb 2003a). Marjorie zatz examined the establish-
ment of a gang unit in Phoenix and determined that 
police officials had invented a serious gang problem 
in order to secure federal resources (cited in Katz and 
Webb 2003a). 
Richard McCorkle and Terance Miethe found that 
the formation of a gang unit in the Las Vegas Po-
lice Department was driven by a search for resources 
and scandals within the department rather than an 
emerging gang crime problem (cited in Katz and 
Webb 2003a). Law enforcement officials fomented a 
“moral panic” by linking “national reports of a grow-
ing problem to local concerns of increasing crime in 
order to divert public attention away from problems 
within the police department and to justify an infu-
sion of additional resources into the department.” 
Gang panics are not always generated by law enforce-
ment. Carol Archbold and Michael Meyer document 
a particularly disturbing example of how a handful 
of troubling incidents can snowball into a full-scale 
moral panic (cited in Katz and Webb 2003b).
The researchers found that the public fear generated 
by a series of youth homicides in a small Midwestern 
city led police to begin designating local minority 
youth as gang members. Fear continued to rise as the 
number of documented “gang members” grew. The 
situation eventually “spun out of control, resulting in 
community panic, even though there was no actual 
evidence of any gang-related activity in the city.” 
Charles Katz, Edward Maguire, and Dennis Roncek 
examined factors that influenced the establishment 
of police gang units in about 300 large U.S. cities 
(Katz and Webb 2003b). The researchers found no 
relationship between the formation of a gang unit 
and “the size of a community gang or crime prob-
lem.” Instead, they found that gang units were most 
likely to be formed in cities with larger Hispanic 
populations, and among police departments that re-
ceived funding for gang control efforts. The authors 
“reasoned that police organizations might be creating 
units when the community feels threatened by a mi-
nority group.” They also concluded that at least some 
of the gang units “might have been created prior to 
receiving external funding for the purposes of justify-
ing the need for more resources.” 
Other investigations have emphasized the role of in-
stitutional factors in the formation and persistence 
of gang units. Katz conducted research into a police 
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gang unit in a Midwestern city and found that the 
unit “was created under pressure from influential 
community stakeholders” (Katz and Webb 2003b). 
Katz’s finding fits previous research that demonstrates 
that the creation of specialized police units is “offered 
as a symbolic act to show the community, potential 
offenders, and police officers that the police depart-
ment is taking a particular problem seriously (Meyer 
1979; Scott 1995).”
This finding was strengthened in subsequent research 
by Katz and Webb examining police responses to 
gangs in four Southwestern cities: Albuquerque, New 
Mexico; Inglewood, California; Las Vegas; and Phoe-
nix (2003b). The authors concluded that the creation 
of gang units was largely a reaction to “political, pub-
lic, and media pressure” rather than a response to 
an objective problem or a strategy for securing addi-
tional resources or controlling marginalized popula-
tions. Katz and Webb report that “much of the data 
suggested that minority communities played a major 
role in shaping the nature of the police organizations’ 
responses to gangs.” 
Their conclusion that public pressure influenced 
the formation of gang units fit with the findings of 
Weisel and Painter, who conducted interviews with 
police gang specialists in five cities and determined 
that “most police agencies had responded to gang 
problems because of well-publicized gang homicides 
and fights. They reported that the police departments 
in their study typically had responded by establishing 
specialized units that emphasized suppression” (cited 
in Katz and Webb 2003b).
What gang units do
It should be no surprise that gang units whose for-
mation was precipitated by external pressures or op-
portunities rather than a coherent law enforcement 
strategy would have difficulty establishing a role 
within the agency. Katz found that “once the gang 
unit was created it was often required to incorporate 
competing ideas and beliefs into its organizational 
structure and operational strategy to communicate 
an image of operational effectiveness when it oth-
erwise was unable to demonstrate success” (cited in 
Katz and Webb 2003b). 
Katz and Webb found that most gang units gravitated 
toward intelligence-gathering and enforcement/sup-
pression activities while devoting less attention to 
investigations and very little to prevention (2003a). 
The authors’ conclusions on the operation of gang 
units are not encouraging. The majority of the po-
lice departments they studied lacked formal mecha-
nisms to monitor gang unit officers and hold them 
accountable for job performance. 
The gang units tended to engage in “buffet-style 
policing,” accepting only cases that involved high-
profile crimes such as homicides, drive-by shoot-
ings, and aggravated assaults. Priorities were not set 
by a well-articulated vision of the unit’s mission but 
instead were determined by a “unique workgroup 
subculture…that reflected internally shared beliefs 
about the nature of the local gang problem and the 
appropriate response to that problem” (2003b). The 
chief of one police department admitted to the re-
searchers that he had “little understanding of what 
the gang unit did or how it operated” (2003a).
The absence of strong departmental oversight and the 
physical separation of gang units from the rest of the 
police force—three of four units operated from “se-
cret” off-site facilities that were known only to gang 
unit officers—contributed to a “decoupling [that] led 
gang unit officers to isolate themselves from the rest 
of the police organization and from the community 
and its citizens.” Although gang units are supposed 
to afford an opportunity for officers to develop spe-
cialized expertise, the authors found that the officers 
were poorly trained and had little direct exposure to 
gang members: an average of just one to three con-
tacts per eight hours worked. 
Gang unit officers “rarely sought citizen input” or 
partnerships with community organizations, ac-
cording to the researchers: “None of the gang unit 
officers in any of the study sites appeared to value in-
formation that non–criminal justice agencies might 
provide, nor did they recognize potential value in 
sharing their own information and knowledge with 
non–criminal justice personnel.” Gang units ap-
peared instead to have adopted a Spy vs. Spy world-
view that extended to their own departments. Some 
gang officers professed that “regular precinct stations 
or police headquarters were subject to penetration by 
gangs, purportedly rendering intelligence files vul-
nerable to destruction and manipulation.”
Given the isolation of gang units from their depart-
ments and their communities, it is not surprising 
that interview participants “were hard-pressed to of-
fer specific evidence of the units’ effectiveness” and 
“rarely commented on the gang units’ impact on the 
amelioration of local gang problems.” Lack of confi-
dence in the gang units’ effectiveness was most pro-
nounced on the topic of suppression. The researchers 
found that “almost no one other than the gang unit 
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officers themselves seemed to believe that gang unit 
suppression efforts were effective at reducing the 
communities’ gang problems.” 
The isolation of gang units from host agencies and 
their tendency to form tight-knit subcultures—not 
entirely unlike those of gangs—also contributes to a 
disturbingly high incidence of corruption and other 
misconduct. The Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Rampart scandal is only the most famous example 
of a gang unit gone bad. Katz and Webb cite sev-
eral other places where police gang units have drawn 
attention for aggressive tactics and misconduct, 
including Las Vegas, where two gang unit officers 
participated in a drive-by shooting of alleged gang 
members; Chicago, where gang unit officers worked 
with local gangs to import cocaine from Miami; and 
Houston, where gang task force officers were found 
to routinely engage in unauthorized use of confi-
dential informants, warrantless searches, and firing 
weapons at unarmed citizens. 
Katz and Webb conclude by recommending that po-
lice departments with gang units take steps to make 
them more effective, including better integrating 
gang units into the department’s patrol and investi-
gative functions; strengthening managerial controls 
and accountability; and incorporating commu-
nity policing strategies. But their research findings 
also suggest that police officials should reconsider 
whether gang units are an effective law enforcement 
tool or a potentially dangerous distraction from the 
real work at hand.
Neighborhood gang suppression
The 1980s and 1990s saw a significant shift away 
from prevention and treatment responses to gang ac-
tivity in favor of suppression (Katz and Webb 2003a). 
The specific aims of suppression programs differ: 
some aim to halt potentially lethal behaviors such as 
gun carrying, while others seek to drive youth out of 
gangs entirely. But suppression efforts generally share 
a focus on specific geographies or gangs, and they 
require the investment of law enforcement resources 
in stepped-up efforts to monitor gang members. 
The purpose of suppression is to reduce gang-related 
activity by current gang members, and to reduce the 
number of people who choose to participate in gangs, 
by providing for swifter, severer, and more certain 
punishment. The guiding assumption is that, in the 
words of Malcolm Klein, “the targets of suppression, 
the gang members and potential gang members, will 
respond ‘rationally’ to suppression efforts [and] will 
weigh the consequences of gang activity, redress the 
balance between cost and benefit, and withdraw from 
gang activity” (Katz and Webb 2003a). 
The reality of gang suppression is more complicated. 
Father Greg Boyle, founder of Homeboy Industries, 
argues that gang membership is not a rational choice 
but rather a desperate response to profound misery 
(2005). He believes that police attempts to deter 
gang activity by making life more difficult for gang 
members miss the fact that youth join gangs because 
they are already miserable. The research literature on 
gangs also indicates that suppression efforts can be 
counterproductive. Such tactics can increase gang 
cohesion by reinforcing an “us versus them” men-
tality, and by providing external validation of the 
gang’s importance: 
Gang researchers have noted the potential 
for gang suppression programs to backfire in 
the face of group processes that undermine 
deterrence messages through status enhance-
ment, building cohesion within the gang, 
and invoking an oppositional culture, all of 
which lead to increased gang activity (Klein, 
1995). A member of the 18th Street gang in 
Los Angeles makes the same point succinctly:  
“ ‘We’re not taking it seriously.’…He said that 
the official attention on the gang—which the 
police say has up to 20,000 members in South-
ern California—united members and helped 
attract recruits. ‘Other gangs are getting . . . into 
18th Street,’ he said. ‘It’s growing’ ” (Lopez 
and Connell, 1997). (Maxson, Hennigan, and 
Sloane 2003)
Suppression efforts face other challenges as well. Sup-
pression campaigns tend to cast a wide net that catches 
gang members and nonmembers alike. Stepped-up 
enforcement of public ordinances and the use of ag-
gressive stop-and-search tactics can increase tensions 
between law enforcement and community members 
who feel that police are targeting the wrong people 
or engaging in racial profiling. Community members 
may feel less inclined to cooperate with police, mak-
ing the task of law enforcement even more difficult.
Suppression efforts also require the investment of sig-
nificant law enforcement resources in activities, like 
saturation patrolling, that are designed to prevent 
crime. Such investments may strain the capacity of 
police to solve crimes elsewhere, or limit the ability of 
local officials to provide other services that could have 
a greater long-term impact on crime and violence. 
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The combination of police-community tensions 
and high cost can make suppression efforts difficult 
to sustain. Unless the community has been trans-
formed during the period of active suppression, 
gang activity is likely to resurface—if it ever went 
away in the first place—as soon as the police pres-
ence diminishes. Finally, suppression efforts may 
simply displace gang activity from target neighbor-
hoods to surrounding areas.
Suppression is a popular response to perceived gang 
problems, despite the challenges outlined here and 
the lack of evidence of either short- or long-term re-
ductions in crime. Suppression-oriented activities can 
provide a feeling of efficacy to law enforcement of-
ficers frustrated by their inability to rein in crime and 
violence, and they create the public impression that 
policy makers are “doing something” about crime.
 The public discourse on gang enforcement is full 
of anecdotal accounts that credit suppression efforts 
with reducing gang crime. The typical scenario be-
gins with a spike in violence or high-profile crime 
that triggers a “crackdown” on gang activity. If crime 
begins to fall, officials credit the suppression effort. 
If crime does not fall, new enforcement efforts are 
mounted until it does.
As long as suppression campaigns are launched dur-
ing crime surges, success is virtually assured. The 
odds of crime falling back toward normal levels af-
ter a sharp increase would be good even if the police 
took no unusual steps. And as long as officials con-
tinue to announce new gang initiatives, it is all but 
certain that one of them will eventually correspond 
with a drop in crime.
When suppression efforts are subject to more rigorous 
evaluation, however, researchers often find that cele-
brated drops in crime are attributable to larger trends, 
seasonal fluctuations, or chance. Studies of gang sup-
pression programs in three jurisdictions highlight the 
limitations of suppression tactics as well as weaknesses 
in the research literature on suppression. 
The Anti-Gang Initiative: St. Louis,  
Dallas, and Detroit
St. Louis, Dallas, and Detroit were among 15 cities 
that received federal funds for gang suppression un-
der the Anti-Gang Initiative of the U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services. All three efforts centered on targeted patrol 
operations in limited geographic areas with identified 
gang crime problems. 
St. Louis
Violent crime has long been a problem in St. Louis. 
During the 1990s, the city’s homicide, robbery, and 
aggravated assault rates were consistently among the 
top five in the nation (Decker and Curry 2003). 
Young black men were disproportionately represented 
among homicide suspects and victims. In 1995 the St. 
Louis police recorded 52 gang homicides and 1,573 
gang-related assaults. 
St. Louis police used a $500,000 grant from the De-
partment of Justice to implement a “zero-tolerance” 
gang suppression program in the College Hill and Fair-
ground Park neighborhoods during 1996 and 1997. 
The neighborhoods were reported to be the home of 
five active gangs and 200 gang members. The strategy 
developed by the police combined aggressive curfew 
enforcement; the use of consent-to-search tactics to 
reduce the availability of guns; and the targeting of 
known gang members by the Gang Intelligence Unit. 
The activities actually undertaken by officers differed 
from the plan, however, due to resistance on the part 
of some police units to assigned tasks.
Scott Decker and David Curry gathered data on Anti-
Gang Initiative activities and crime outcomes in St. 
Louis. The researchers found that the initiative gener-
ated a considerable amount of police activity within 
the target neighborhoods, resulting in 301 pedes-
trian and traffic stops conducted under the curfew 
enforcement program and 63 arrests of known gang 
members conducted under the zero-tolerance pro-
gram. But many of the activities did not fit within 
the stated goals of the initiative. 
The conflict between the priorities set forth in the 
initiative and the priorities of the enforcing officers is 
evident in the curfew enforcement program. Officers 
were assigned to curfew enforcement and directed to 
send juveniles they encountered to a “curfew center,” 
but no juveniles were referred to the center on 24 of 
31 nights of operation. Police officers were reluctant 
to enforce the curfew because they “didn’t regard cur-
few enforcement as ‘real police work,’ and [believed] 
that it was unlikely to address ‘real’ gang problems.” 
A memo generated by the lieutenant in charge of the 
initiative shows similar resistance to the notion that 
police should enforce curfews. The lieutenant pro-
poses that officers find ways to use curfew enforce-
ment as an opportunity to do “real” police work: 
“Once the car is stopped…only time will tell what 
may be found .…While our roll [sic] is curfew en-
forcement, the manner in which we carry out our 
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roll [sic] is strictly up to us. As you can see…the 
above-mentioned activities plus the ones you and 
your offi  cers think up can all be conducted from the 
Anti-Gang Initiative Curfew Car.” 
Problems also plagued the gun enforcement com-
ponent of the Anti-Gang Initiative. Th e researchers 
found that the unit charged with gun enforcement 
“served a record number of warrants in the second 
half of 1996” and “actively implemented its mandate 
to sweep target neighborhoods for suspected gang 
members.” But the unit failed to use consent searches 
and “subverted” the goals of the program, according 
to the researchers, by using the process as an oppor-
tunity to make arrests. During 1996 the Mobile Re-
serve Unit conducted just 39 consent searches and 
made arrests in more than half of cases. Further, on 
two occasions, researchers conducting “ride-alongs” 
noted that Mobile Reserve Unit offi  cers were “unable 
to identify the target neighborhoods.”
Th e activities of the Gang Intelligence Unit offi  cers 
conformed more closely to the “zero-tolerance” strat-
egies set forth under the initiative, perhaps because 
the offi  cers saw the arrest of known gang members 
as “real” police work. Th e unit was responsible for 77 
arrests over a 14-month period. Nearly all (91 per-
cent) of the arrestees were African American males, 
and most (71 percent) of the resulting charges were 
for drug off enses. Weapons off enses accounted for 
16 percent of arrest charges, and violent off enses ac-
counted for just 2 percent. Probation violations (8 
percent) and property off enses (3 percent) accounted 
for the remainder of the arrest charges. Th e arrests 
resulted in the seizure of 37 weapons.
Th e researchers compared the incidence of crime 
during the 12 months leading up to implementation 
of the Anti-Gang Initiative to the incidence of crime 
during the 15 months of program operations. Th ey 
found no statistically signifi cant changes across nine 
crime categories in College Hill, and just one statisti-
cally signifi cant change in Fairground Park—a drop 
in unarmed robberies from three per month in the 
preintervention period to just under two per month 
during the suppression program. Th e researchers also 
examined crime trends in two comparison neigh-
borhoods with similar results. Th e comparison areas 
each saw a statistically signifi cant change in just one 
of nine crime categories—an increase in assaults and 
an increase in unarmed robberies, respectively.
Decker and Curry conclude that the results were 
“somewhat discouraging given the targeted suppres-
sion focus and high levels of activity in small geo-
graphic areas with modest populations.” Th ey suggest 
that the participation of the St. Louis Metropolitan 
Police Department in a federally funded initiative put 
Table 7.1. Change in crime (gang and nongang) associated with St. louis Anti-Gang Initiative
Crime category
Target neighborhoods Control neighborhoods
College hill Fairground Park O’Fallon Park hyde Park
Murder NS NS NS NS
Robbery NS NS NS NS
Robbery—weapon NS NS NS NS
Robbery—no weapon NS -35.7% NS +52.6%
Assault NS NS +64.0% NS
Gun assault NS NS NS NS
Person crime NS NS NS NS
Property crime NS NS NS NS
Index crime NS NS NS NS
NS Statistically nonsignifi cant
Source: Decker and Curry 2003
Auto Theft 3%
Assault 2%
Probation Violation 
8%
Weapons 
Violation 
16%
Drug
(heroin/crack) 
44%
Drug
(marijuana) 
27%
Source: Decker and Curry 2003
Figure 7.1. Charges resulting from the St. louis 
Anti-Gang Initiative Zero Tolerance Program
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the agency on the map as “an important and capable 
institution,” but that it also “continue[d] the depart-
ment’s isolation from social intervention strategies.” 
Th e St. Louis case study starkly illustrates the poten-
tial downside of suppression eff orts. Offi  cers failed to 
follow strategies set forth under the initiative because 
they did not consider the prescribed activities “real” 
police work. Dozens of targeted arrests and hundreds 
of police stops failed to yield meaningful crime re-
ductions in the targeted neighborhoods, even during 
the period of intense police activity. Finally, a half-mil-
lion-dollar federal grant—not to mention untold 
resources expended by local and state authorities to 
process and punish individuals targeted under the 
initiative—failed to generate much more than a few 
dozen drug arrests. 
Dallas
Eric Fritsch, Tory Caeti, and Robert Taylor report 
contradictory results from their evaluation of a par-
allel antigang initiative that was mounted in Dallas 
during 1996 and 1997 (2003). Gang-related violence 
fell in target areas, but violent crime levels remained 
stable and the incidence of robbery increased. Tar-
get areas achieved larger reductions in gang-related 
violence than control areas but underperformed the 
control areas on broader violent crime measures.
Th e Dallas Police Department reported 79 gangs 
and 1,332 gang-related crime incidents in 1996. Th e 
Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative set out to reduce violent 
activity in fi ve target areas by funding aggressive cur-
few and truancy enforcement, along with saturation 
patrols. Th e gangs targeted under the initiative were 
believed to account for 18 percent of the city’s known 
gang members and for 35 percent of all gang-related 
violent crime. 
Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor matched the fi ve target 
areas with four control areas not covered by the ini-
tiative and compared changes in monthly reports of 
gang-related violence. Th e results were mixed: three 
of fi ve target areas saw statistically signifi cant reduc-
tions in gang-related violence, but so did two of four 
control areas. Th e overall incidence of gang-related 
violence dropped signifi cantly in both target and 
control areas, although the decline was greater in the 
target areas (57 percent versus 37 percent). Because 
reports of gang-related violence were relatively infre-
quent even before the intervention, the total gang 
crime reduction in the target areas amounted to 12 
fewer incidents per month, compared to a reduction 
of eight incidents per month in control areas.
Th e researchers sought to explain the diff erence in tar-
get area outcomes by analyzing the specifi c activities 
of police patrols. Th ey found that police patrolling 
the target areas where gang violence fell signifi cantly 
had devoted 80 to 90 percent of their overtime hours 
to curfew or truancy enforcement. Police units in 
target areas that did not see statistically signifi cant 
reductions in gang violence, by contrast, had en-
gaged primarily in saturation patrols. Th e researchers 
concluded that “saturation patrol to increase police 
presence only was not eff ective in decreasing the level 
of gang violence in these areas.” 
Fritsch and his colleagues also compared overall crime 
trends in target and control areas, expecting to fi nd both 
a drop in reports of violent and property crime and an 
increase in the number arrests for weapons and drug 
off enses generated by offi  cers freed from respond-
ing to calls for service. Th e data showed the opposite 
result: the only statistically signifi cant violent crime 
trend in the target areas was a 23.8 percent increase
in the number of reported robberies. Th e target areas 
actually underperformed the control areas, which saw 
no signifi cant change in violent crime reports. 
Target and control areas performed equally, and 
poorly, in the area of property crime. Target areas 
experienced a statistically signifi cant 15.4 percent 
increase in auto thefts. And control areas saw a sta-
tistically signifi cant 11.4 percent rise in other thefts. 
Figure 7.2. Statistically signifi cant changes in crime (gang and 
nongang) associated with Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative
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Source: Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor 2003
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The only statistically significant crime reduction in 
the target areas was for criminal mischief. This trend 
was evident in the control areas as well, which sug-
gests either a citywide drop in “criminal mischief” or 
a change in charging policies. 
Finally, arrests for weapons offenses actually fell by 
a statistically significant 29 percent in the target ar-
eas while remaining stable in the control areas—an 
indication that the initiative may have been less ef-
fective than policing-as-usual at catching weapons-
related activity. The target areas did see a 24 percent 
jump in drug arrests while control areas saw a much 
smaller 8.3 percent increase. The changes in drug ar-
rests were not statistically significant and therefore 
may not be meaningful. But the results fit the pattern 
seen in St. Louis, where drug charges accounted for 
the overwhelming majority of arrests made under the 
“zero-tolerance” gang policing initiative. 
There are several potential explanations for the appar-
ently contradictory outcomes of the Dallas Anti-Gang 
Initiative. First, it is possible that apparent reductions 
in gang violence were a consequence of changes in the 
way offenses were reported by the police department 
rather than a drop in violence. The classification of an 
offense as “gang-related” can be highly subjective, and 
the integrity of the classification process can easily be 
compromised by changes in staffing or reporting pro-
cedures. Such problems have led some researchers to 
warn against the use of law enforcement gang data to 
track trends or make comparisons between jurisdic-
tions, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Second, the apparent contrast between sharp drops 
in reports of gang violence and the lack of change in 
overall crime rates could be explained by the fact that 
gang-related incidents accounted for a small share of 
violence, even in the target areas. The five areas targeted 
under the initiative were selected, in part, because they 
“experienced a large amount of gang violence in the 
preceding year” (Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor 2003). But 
even before the initiative began, reported incidents of 
gang-related violence represented less than 10 percent 
of all violent incidents in the target areas. 
On a monthly basis, target area residents reported 
an average of 61 robberies, 92.3 aggravated assaults, 
and 181.6 simple assaults. Yet the police department 
recorded an average of just 20.9 incidents of gang-re-
lated violence per month. It is possible that the target 
neighborhoods became less safe despite a real decline 
in gang-related violence, with the monthly increase 
in robberies (up 14.5 per month) exceeding the drop 
in gang-related violence (down 12 per month). 
Regardless of whether the results are an artifact of 
reporting problems or evidence that police in Dallas 
won the battle with gangs while losing the war on 
crime, they do not speak well for the effectiveness of 
gang suppression. Residents of the target neighbor-
hoods experienced higher levels of violent crime, in-
cluding a statistically significant increase in robberies, 
during the intervention period than during the previ-
ous year, while police made significantly fewer arrests 
for weapon offenses. The outcomes suggest that the 
Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative was, at best, a distraction 
from the real problem and, at worst, a counterpro-
ductive exercise that increased levels of violent crime.
Detroit
Timothy Bynum and Sean Varano examined a third 
federally funded antigang initiative in Detroit and 
concluded that the effort contributed to a substantial 
reduction in violence (2003). But this conclusion ap-
pears to have been biased by the selection of the evalu-
ation time frame. A comparison of crime trends over 
a longer period suggests that violent gun crime trends 
in the target precincts may have matched or underper-
formed a comparison district.
Detroit launched its Anti-Gang Initiative in 1997. 
Police estimates of gang membership were some-
what inconsistent at the time (ranging from a high 
of 3,500 in 1997 to a low of 800 in 1998), and the 
department did not track the incidence of gang-re-
lated crime. The research team used gun crime as 
their primary measure of the problem, based on a 
finding that self-reported gang members were more 
likely than other arrestees to report carrying guns 
most or all of the time (13 percent versus 4 per-
cent).1 More than 12,000 gun-related crimes were 
1  The data on gang membership and gun carrying was collected 
through Detroit’s Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Figure 7.3. Incidence of gun-related crimes in Detroit target  
and control precincts before, during, and after Anti-Gang  
Initiative intervention
Source: Bynum and Varano 2003
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reported to Detroit police in 1996, including 5,293 
aggravated assaults, 4,877 robberies, 1,801 weapon 
offenses, and 346 murders. 
Federal funds provided to Detroit’s Anti-Gang Ini-
tiative were used to establish the Gang Specialist 
Unit within the Detroit Police Department’s Special 
Crime Section (SCS). The new unit was staffed by 
both SCS gang specialists and patrol officers from the 
targeted precincts. The main activities undertaken by 
the Gang Specialist Unit were: 
•   “aggressive enforcement of city ordinances, includ-
ing curfew and truancy sweeps” in target geographic 
areas; 
•   joint police-probation operations targeting gang 
members for possible violations of probation con-
ditions; and 
•   regular visits to local schools to speak with school ad-
ministrators and question people “hanging around” 
the school perimeter during the school day. 
The Wayne County prosecutor’s office also assigned a 
staff person to serve as a liaison to the unit and over-
see the prosecution of gang-related crimes. 
The research team sought to assess the impact of the 
initiative by examining arrest patterns in the two tar-
get precincts and by comparing gun-related crime 
trends in the target precincts and a third “control” 
precinct. Most of the arrests that took place in the 
target precincts were for disorderly conduct or viola-
tions of local ordinances. Drug offenses accounted 
for 17 percent of arrests, while person and weapon 
arrests were 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of 
the total.
The research team also compared the monthly inci-
dence of violent crime during the quarter preceding 
the launch of the operation to the incidence of vio-
lent crime a year later. They found that the number 
of assaults, robberies, burglaries, and gun assaults 
had fallen drastically, led by a drop in gun assaults 
of more than two-thirds. The control precinct, by 
contrast, saw growth in the incidence of assaults and 
burglaries, along with a more modest drop in rob-
bery reports. 
In order to control for the effects of seasonal fluc-
tuations and external variables, Bynum and Varano 
conducted a time-series analysis of gun-related 
crime trends. They found that the initiative was as-
sociated with a statistically significant reduction 
in gun-related crime in the Ninth Precinct. Gun 
crime also fell in the Fourth Precinct, but the de-
cline was nonsignificant—a result that the researchers 
attributed to the low incidence of gun crime in the 
area. The researchers concluded that the Detroit Anti-
Gang Initiative had reduced the number of gun-re-
lated offenses in the Ninth Precinct by 112 crimes per 
month, and that it may also have reduced the level 
of gun-related crime in the Fourth Precinct by eight 
crimes per month.
These results may say more about the researchers’ se-
lection of a time frame for comparison than about 
the effectiveness of gang suppression efforts in De-
troit. The three-month period the researchers selected 
to measure levels of crime “before” the intervention 
included a dramatic spike in gun crime in one of the 
target precincts. Monthly gun-crime reports reached 
roughly 300 per month in the Ninth Precinct at the 
end of 1996 before dropping back to a more typical 
150 per month at the beginning of 1997.2 The selec-
tion of a time period that includes such a dramatic 
crime spike inflates estimates of preintervention 
crime and all but guarantees that the intervention 
will “succeed” when crime returns to historic levels.
The three-month period selected to measure postint-
ervention crime levels is similarly problematic. The 
authors explain that they picked the last quarter of 
1997, rather than the end of the intervention period, 
in order to control for seasonal variations, and because 
“most of the components had been implemented” by 
that point. The choice is fortuitous for proponents of 
the Anti-Gang Initiative since both the Fourth and 
Ninth Precincts saw gun-related crime hit four-year 
lows during the last quarter of 1997 before beginning 
to climb back toward preintervention levels. The num-
ber of gun-related crime in the “control” precinct, by 
contrast, hit a four-year high at the end of 1997. 
The time frame selection problems could be solved 
by comparing the incidence of crime during the sec-
ond and third quarters of 1996—a time period that 
immediately preceded the spike in gun crime—with 
the incidence of crime during the second and third 
quarters of 1998, when the intervention ended. The 
results would look quite different, as is evident from 
Figure 7.3, depicting gun crimes in the target and 
control precincts. 
Figure 7.3 shows that the incidence of gun-related 
crime was higher in the Ninth Precinct at the end 
of the intervention period than during mid-1996. 
By the time the intervention ended, the Ninth 
Precinct was receiving more than 200 reports of 
2  Gun-related crime information is derived from Figure 9.2 
Comparisons of Pre- and Postintervention Effects for Target 
and Control Precincts in Bynum and Varano 2003.
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gun-related crimes per month—well above typical 
preintervention levels. 
The incidence of gun-related crime in the Fourth 
Precinct at the end of the intervention period was a 
bit below mid-1996 levels. But within three months 
of the program’s end, the number of monthly gun-
related crime reports in the Fourth Precinct hit a 
four-year record high. Large investments of money 
and time in gang suppression clearly did not achieve 
substantial and lasting reductions in levels of gun 
crime in Detroit’s Fourth and Ninth Precincts—a 
result that casts further doubt on the notion that ag-
gressive “public order” policing (use of traffic laws 
and city ordinances to stop and question residents, 
for example) can deliver community safety.
Suppression remains a popular response to gang vi-
olence, despite the failure of such tactics to reduce 
crime. A recent spike in gun violence led Boston po-
lice to launch a series of neighborhood sweeps. Of ap-
proximately 1,250 people taken into custody during 
an eight-month period, only 16 percent were arrested 
on violent crime charges and just over 4 percent were 
arrested on gun charges (Smalley 2006). The opera-
tions angered community leaders, who alleged that 
police were targeting the wrong youth. Police offi-
cials eventually acknowledged that “the sweeps were 
not as effective as they had hoped and led primarily 
to arrests for trespassing, drug possession, and other 
misdemeanors…. [Some suspects] were taken into 
custody just on motor vehicle violations.” 
Gang injunctions
Civil gang injunctions are legal tools that are de-
signed to enhance targeted suppression efforts. The 
injunctions treat gangs as unincorporated associa-
tions whose members can be held responsible by civil 
courts for creating a public nuisance and enjoined 
from otherwise lawful behaviors. Enforcement of 
gang injunctions requires a heavy and sustained po-
lice presence, much like other suppression tactics. 
But injunctions apply only to named (alleged) gang 
members rather than to all youth who hang out on 
the street, skip school, or violate city ordinances. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued 
unsuccessfully to block enforcement of a gang in-
junction in San Jose, California, in the mid-1990s 
(Siegel 2003). Individuals named in the original San 
Jose injunction, or subsequently added to it, were 
prohibited from “standing, sitting, walking, driving, 
gathering, or appearing anywhere in public view” 
with a suspected gang member. Alleged gang mem-
bers were also prohibited from “approaching vehicles, 
engaging in conversation or otherwise communicat-
ing with the occupants of any vehicle.” Violation of 
the injunction could result in arrest, a six-month jail 
sentence, and a fine of $1,000. 
Gang membership is often established based on very 
loose criteria. In the San Jose case, police admitted 
that “a person could be labeled a gang member if he 
or she were seen on just one occasion wearing cloth-
ing indicative of gang membership, such as a blue jean 
jacket, cut-off sweat pants, any clothing associated 
with the Los Angeles Raiders, or white, blue, gray, 
black, khaki, or any other ‘neutral’ colored item.” 
The use of gang injunctions is most widespread in 
Southern California, where, Cheryl Maxson, Karen 
Hennigan, and David Sloane report, “at least 30 gang 
injunctions were issued” between 1993 and 2000 
(2003). More than two-thirds of the injunctions were 
issued in Los Angeles County. Maxson and her col-
leagues conducted a survey of Southern California 
gang officers to gather information on their use of 
injunctions. Most considered gang injunctions a “last 
resort” when “a gang is entrenched in a small area 
or …gang-related violence is so far out of authorities’ 
control that it is worth the resources that are required 
to obtain and maintain an injunction.” One officer 
described injunctions as a measure that “severely re-
stricts [the] movement of citizens—like martial law.” 
The restrictions to civil liberties that accompany a 
gang injunction are justified by a perceived need to 
save communities from a gang-imposed “state of 
siege.” But community residents often play little 
or no role in the process. Two-thirds of Southern 
California law enforcement respondents told the 
researchers that they “did not feel that community 
support was crucial” to the success of an injunc-
tion. Roughly half “did not suggest that the com-
munity played any role at all in the development of 
injunctions.” 
Law enforcement and the media report impressive 
reductions in crime and fear through the use of gang 
injunctions. Maxson and her colleagues observe that 
these stories “are often compelling, but are never but-
tressed with supporting evidence that meets minimal 
scientific standards of evaluation.” A typical gang in-
junction implemented in Inglewood, California, is 
“cited as a success in the practitioner literature.” But 
Maxson and Theresa Allen found “little support for 
a positive effect” when they examined crime patterns 
before and after the injunction (Maxson, Hennigan, 
and Sloane 2003).
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The ACLU Foundation of Southern California ex-
amined trends in San Fernando Valley police re-
porting districts covered by the Blythe Street gang 
injunction and came to an even more disturbing 
conclusion. The organization reported that imple-
mentation of the injunction was associated with an 
increase in violent crime: “The Blythe Street gang 
injunction was preceded, and has been followed, by 
elaborate claims for its effectiveness in cutting crime 
and making communities safer. According to statis-
tical materials provided by the LAPD, the truth is 
precisely the opposite” (cited in Maxson, Hennigan, 
and Sloane 2003).
An analysis by Jeffrey Grogger of 14 Los Angeles 
County injunctions, on the other hand, provides 
evidence that the injunctions were associated with 
modest 5 to 10 percent reductions in violent crime. 
The impact of the injunctions appeared to be “con-
centrated in reductions in assault, rather than rob-
bery” and did not extend to property crimes (cited 
in Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane 2003). 
Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane also found that a gang 
injunction in San Bernardino had reduced “the visibil-
ity of gang members, gang intimidation, fear of gang 
confrontation, and fear of crime.” But the research-
ers determined that the injunction had not led to im-
provements in indicators of “neighborhood efficacy, 
social cohesion, or informal social control” (Klein and 
Maxson 2006). The positive effects were limited to 
areas that were described as “most disordered.” Less 
disordered areas experienced “more gang visibility and 
property victimization and less belief that the neigh-
borhood could solve its own problems.” 
Klein and Maxson conclude that changes in resi-
dents’ experiences and perceptions of their com-
munities brought about through gang injunctions 
could “evolve into increased collective efficacy and 
the buttressing of social control via expanded social 
linkages.” In other words, gang injunctions could 
empower community members and provide breath-
ing room to rebuild community institutions that 
have been weakened by neglect. But they caution not 
only that such an outcome would require time and 
“vigilant attention to ongoing implementation,” but 
also that it “appears unlikely in the face of a lack of 
investment in the social fabric of communities”: 
[The San Bernardino] injunction was largely a 
one-man show, and that man was the police, 
employing the new injunction penalties in a 
suppression operation. To do otherwise would 
have required law enforcement to engage com-
munity members in a process that promoted 
social ties, provided a forum for the develop-
ment of mutual trust or social cohesion among 
neighbors, and reactivated the mechanisms of 
informal social control. Admittedly, this is a 
lot to ask of law enforcement, but community 
engagement is the sole parameter that distin-
guishes injunctions as an innovative strategy 
for improving gang neighborhoods from a 
run-of-the-mill gang suppression strategy.
Targeting “hard-core” gang members
The “targeting” of selected gang members by the 
criminal justice system is a second popular response 
to gang problems. Proponents argue that focusing at-
tention and resources on “hard-core” gang members 
will deter them from criminal behavior by increasing 
the certainty and severity of punishment, or prevent 
them from committing new crimes in the commu-
nity through incarceration. 
The tactics employed to target gang members can in-
clude sentencing enhancements, special prosecution 
units, and stepped-up surveillance by law enforcement 
and corrections officials. Some jurisdictions focus on 
a single targeting tactic, while others set up compre-
hensive programs. A task force initiative launched in 
Westminster, California, under the acronym TAR-
GET (Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team) 
is a good example of a comprehensive program. The 
primary components of TARGET were:
(1)   Vigorous arrests of identified target sub-
jects;
(2)   Effective prosecution and conviction of 
target subjects;
(3)   Vigilant supervision of target subject pro-
bationers;
(4)   Expanded intelligence and information-
sharing between cooperating agencies;
(5)   Development and implementation of in-
novative crime reduction tools.
(Kent and Smith 2001)
Targeting, like suppression, faces a number of chal-
lenges. The first and foremost is the difficulty of 
identifying the right targets. One common approach 
is to target alleged gang “leaders,” but gang research-
ers largely report that leadership functions are fluid 
in youth gangs. Many have also found that gang vio-
lence is more likely to be initiated by rank-and-file 
members than by leaders.
PART II    Chapter 7:  Getting Less for More
	 	 Justice	Policy	Institute	 
A second approach targets so-called “hard-core” 
gang members who are believed to be responsible for 
the bulk of gang crime. This task is easier said than 
done. The majority of youth who join gangs remain 
involved for periods of a year or less. Their delinquent 
behavior rises sharply during periods of gang activity 
and falls thereafter. There is no way to predict how 
long an individual will remain in a gang, which makes 
it difficult to distinguish those who continue to pose a 
risk to public safety from others whose days of serious 
offending are behind them. 
Further, research findings indicate that young gang 
members with limited criminal records may be re-
sponsible for a disproportionate share of serious gang 
violence. A RAND Corporation research team found 
that “new baldies”—new gang members intent on 
proving themselves to older members—were com-
mitting much of the violence in the Hollenbeck area 
of Los Angeles (Tita, Riley, and Greenwood 2003). 
These individuals are difficult to target successfully 
because much of the damage is done before they are 
identified by law enforcement.
The second challenge is to intervene with targeted 
gang members in ways that do not exacerbate the 
problem over the long run. The most likely outcome 
of targeting is the incarceration of gang members in 
youth detention facilities, jails, or prisons. And there 
is evidence that these institutions not only weaken 
the capacity of incarcerated individuals to lead law-
abiding lives upon release but also strengthen gang 
ties. Jeremy Travis has documented the many obsta-
cles to success that face former prisoners when they 
return to their communities, ranging from difficulty 
securing housing to a paucity of medical, mental 
health, and addiction treatment services (2006). A 
report recently released by the Justice Policy Insti-
tute found that the detention of juveniles is associ-
ated with a number of negative outcomes, including 
higher rates of future offending (Holman and zie-
denberg 2006). 
Nor does incarceration necessarily suspend gang in-
volvement. Some incarcerated gang members remain 
active participants in the life of their old gangs, some 
develop new gang affiliations behind bars, and some 
do both. Incarcerating the “right” gang members of-
ten does little more than postpone the community’s 
day of reckoning until the incarcerated individual 
returns. And incarcerating the “wrong” individuals 
risks trapping youth who would otherwise have out-
grown gang activity in a life of crime. Decker notes 
that the “latent consequence [of incarceration] is to 
get them together in prison. [Gang members] get out 
largely unchanged, maybe worse, with more contacts 
and older” (personal communication).
The research literature on targeting is much weaker 
than the literature on neighborhood-based suppres-
sion efforts. Just three studies were found in the cur-
rent literature survey, and two of them suffer from 
serious methodological problems. Neither study of 
gang task force initiatives could show that the pro-
grams examined had actually changed the treatment 
of targeted individuals in the criminal justice system, 
much less that the programs had reduced crime.
Gang task forces in San Diego and 
Westminster, California
San Diego
Jurisdictions United for Drug Gang Enforcement 
(JUDGE) was formed in California in 1998 as a multi-
jurisdictional task force to combat drug trafficking 
by gang members in San Diego County. Researchers 
with the San Diego Association of Governments at-
tempted to conduct a process and impact evaluation 
of the program in the early 1990s and published their 
results in 1996 (Pennell and Melton 2002). 
When the JUDGE program began, San Diego County 
reported 27 active street gangs with an estimated 2,300 
members in an initial grant application. The document 
described the county’s gang problem as follows: “The 
current situation of gang related narcotics control has 
created a wave of violence involving several drive-by 
shootings and homicides. Street gangs have begun 
to resemble modern organized crime operations in 
terms of sophistication and tactics.” It is worth not-
ing that this diagnosis is at odds with the results of 
in-depth studies of gang violence in several jurisdic-
tions (including nearby Los Angeles), which found 
that the role of the drug trade in gang violence has 
been vastly overstated by law enforcement (see Ken-
nedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001, and Tita, Riley, and 
Greenwood 2003).
Task force members responded by targeting juvenile 
gang members who were either on probation for nar-
cotics offenses or known to be involved in drug dis-
tribution. Youth were considered to be documented 
gang members if they met one of five criteria, which 
ranged from admitted gang membership to having a 
close association with known gang members. Targeted 
individuals were subject to:
•   intensive supervision by the probation depart-
ment’s Narcotics Task Force; 
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•   special enforcement operations by law enforce-
ment; and 
•   stepped-up prosecution by the district attorney’s 
offi  ce, which committed to “vertical” prosecution, 
opposing pretrial release, and seeking the most se-
vere possible sentence.
During the fi rst two years of the program, nearly all 
of the JUDGE targets were black (45 percent) or 
Hispanic (52 percent); and male (98 percent). Th e 
overwhelming majority were between the ages of 14 
and 17 when they were targeted, with 16- and 17-
year-olds constituting the largest group (56 percent 
of JUDGE targets). All were identifi ed as gang mem-
bers, and 96 percent had been convicted or arrested 
for a drug off ense. Just one in fi ve (22 percent) had 
been arrested for a violent off ense.
Th e research team initially sought to compare recidi-
vism outcomes for JUDGE targets with outcomes 
for gang members who were not targeted by the pro-
gram. Th is approach proved impracticable because 
too many control group members were eventually 
targeted. Instead, the researchers compared the crim-
inal records of JUDGE targets before and after they 
were targeted. 
A large majority (83 percent) of JUDGE targets were 
rearrested in the two years after targeting. Felonies 
accounted for just 30 percent of new arrests, down 
from 58 percent in the two years before targeting. 
Probation violations accounted for 37 percent of new 
arrests, up from 10 percent in the earlier period.
Th e researchers determined that under the program, 
JUDGE targets were assigned a greater number of 
probation conditions, ranging from drug-testing re-
quirements to prohibitions on riding in vehicles with 
other juveniles. Th e average number of probation 
violation arrests per youth jumped more than three-
fold, from 0.3 to 1.0, while the average number of 
felony and misdemeanor arrests fell from 3.7 to 2.0. 
Th e research team also found that JUDGE targets 
“spent a considerable amount of time behind bars 
during their JUDGE tenure.” Two in fi ve spent a 
year or more in a juvenile hall or other local institu-
tion, while another 25 percent spent six months to a 
year in custody. But the absence of a suitable control 
group made it impossible for the team to determine 
whether the JUDGE targets spent more time behind 
bars as a result of the program than they would have 
without the program. Th e researchers note that the 
harsher treatment youth received after being targeted 
could have been the result of longer exposure to the 
criminal justice system and the advancing age of the 
targets rather than an eff ect of the program.
Concerns about youth gang violence were put for-
ward as part of the initial rationale for the program. 
But the arrest data do not indicate that the program 
reduced violent behavior. Th e number of JUDGE 
targets arrested for violent felonies was identical be-
fore and after targeting (62 in each period). 
In 1995, four years after the initial evaluation period, 
the research team reviewed updated fi les on the 279 
JUDGE targets. Th ey found that new court cases had 
been fi led against two in three (64 percent) targets, 
with an average of three cases per person. Th is fi nding 
suggested to the researchers that “many JUDGE tar-
gets remained involved in criminal activity and that 
the task force had appropriately focused on isolating 
a small segment of off enders who appear particularly 
crime-prone, monitoring their behavior closely, and 
applying sanctions swiftly and with certainty.”
Yet swift and certain application of sanctions appar-
ently failed to deter the large majority of JUDGE 
targets from committing further crimes. Th e re-
searchers acknowledge that the program might have 
done more harm than good: “[Th e long-term recidi-
vism] fi nding is diffi  cult to interpret because not 
enough is known about this group of off enders to 
determine whether they are particularly crime-prone 
or the extent to which an enforcement approach ac-
tually contributes to reoff ending because it does not 
address other issues such as drug treatment, educa-
tion, and employment.” 
Th e notion that JUDGE may have increased recidi-
vism among targeted youth is supported by research 
fi ndings on the dangers of juvenile detention. If the 
program did meet goals to “resist the release of defen-
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dants from custody before the trial or hearing” and 
“ensure that the most severe possible sentenced is im-
posed,” it may have increased the likelihood that tar-
geted youth would be detained and made them more, 
rather than less, prone to crime.
A recent literature survey on the impact of incar-
cerating youth in detention and other secure facili-
ties found that first incarceration experiences make 
youth more likely to commit new crimes. Research 
on youth committed to state facilities in Arkansas 
found that prior incarceration was a stronger pre-
dictor of future recidivism than gang membership, 
carrying a weapon, or a poor parental relationship 
(Benda and Tollett 1999).
Such targeting efforts also run the risk of devoting 
a greater and greater share of resources to detect-
ing and imposing sanctions on less and less serious 
criminal conduct. This is a particular risk with ju-
venile gang members, who may go through periods 
of heightened offending followed by sharp drops in 
delinquent behavior that are associated with matura-
tion and the weakening of gang ties. 
The majority of youth targeted by JUDGE had already 
passed the age of peak gang participation (15 years 
old) by the time they were identified by the program, 
and most became adults during the two-year follow-up 
period. It is possible that many who came to the at-
tention of San Diego law enforcement during periods 
of heightened offending continue to be targeted and 
punished for minor delinquent behavior despite pos-
ing little risk to public safety. There is some evidence 
to support this view: before targeting, half of arrests 
involved felony charges and just over half (52 percent) 
of youth were held in custody at arrest. After targeting, 
the proportion of felony arrests fell to just 30 percent 
while the proportion of youth held in custody at arrest 
rose to more than two in three (68 percent). 
Westminster
Criminal justice officials in Westminster, California, 
adopted a similar approach to reducing gang crime. 
The Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team 
(TARGET) was launched in 1992 as a collaborative 
effort of the Westminster Police Department, the Or-
ange County district attorney’s office, and the county 
probation department to identify “repeat gang of-
fenders” and remove them from the community. 
A team of researchers examined program results and 
declared TARGET a successful model that should 
be considered for replication (Kent et al. 2000). 
But a closer analysis reveals that the researchers 
failed to gather enough information to determine 
whether the program had any impact at all on the 
target population.
 On its face, TARGET appears to have achieved 
remarkable results. The number of reported gang 
crimes dropped sharply in the first year of the pro-
gram—from nearly 30 per month at the beginning 
of 1992 to fewer than 15 per month at the end of the 
year—and remained below preintervention levels for 
the entire evaluation period. By the end of 1997, the 
researchers found a 47 percent cumulative reduction 
in gang crime.
The drop in gang crime that took place during the 
first year of the program coincided with a nearly 
fivefold jump in the number of target subjects in 
custody, appearing to confirm the hypothesis that 
removing “repeat gang offenders” from the com-
munity was an effective crime-control strategy. The 
researchers also examined overall crime trends and 
determined that gang crime had fallen more rapidly 
than nongang crime during the first year of the pro-
gram, lending support to the notion that the drop in 
gang crime was due to the intervention rather than 
part of a larger decline in crime. 
Finally, the research team found that violent crime 
rates fell further in Westminster than in two com-
parison communities during the intervention period. 
The researchers conclude based on these findings that 
the program was successful in reducing gang violence 
and that it should be considered for replication. 
There are serious flaws, however, in the TARGET 
evaluation design that undermine the research 
findings. The researchers argue that an experimen-
tal research design, which compares outcomes for 
a “treatment” group and a nontreatment control 
group, is neither practical nor desirable in the con-
text of gang enforcement. 
They instead employ a “logic model” research design 
that tracks variables related to the program’s ultimate 
goals and intermediate variables related to how the 
program proposes to achieve its goal. If both sets of 
variables move in the expected direction, and if the 
evaluation can demonstrate a positive relationship be-
tween them, then the program is deemed a success.
The TARGET evaluators selected the number of 
targeted “repeat gang offenders” in custody as their 
intermediate variable and the number of monthly 
gang-related crimes as their final outcome variable. 
Their logic model proposes that the TARGET pro-
gram will increase the likelihood that “repeat gang 
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offenders” will end up in custody and that incapaci-
tating more “repeat gang offenders” will reduce levels 
of gang crime. 
But the research team never provides evidence that 
the intervention increased the time targeted indi-
viduals spent behind bars. Gang members with 
prior criminal convictions would have been strong 
candidates for detention and incarceration under 
any circumstances. The relevant measure of the pro-
gram’s effect is not how many of the targets end up 
in custody, but how many more are placed into cus-
tody as a result of the intervention. Unfortunately, 
without a control group or a baseline, it is impos-
sible to assess the program’s impact on the disposi-
tion of target cases.
Nor can the research team demonstrate that more 
people who met the “repeat gang offender” profile 
were in custody during the intervention period than 
before the intervention because they track only the 
custody status of the targets and not the larger pool 
of “repeat gang offenders.” Their data show that 
roughly 40 targets were added to custody at the end 
of the first program year. 
But the researchers fail to examine how many previ-
ously detained or incarcerated “repeat gang offend-
ers” were released back to Westminster during the 
same year.3 In order to prove the logic model, the 
researchers would have to change their measure from 
the number of targets in custody to the total num-
ber of “repeat gang offenders” in custody including 
those who were detained or incarcerated before the 
program began. 
There are also problems with the researchers’ use of 
gang crime as a primary measure of the project’s suc-
cess, since the police department did not track gang 
crime before the program began. The researchers 
produced a retrospective count of gang crime during 
the preintervention period using 12 months of police 
data. These data show a sharp spike in gang-related 
crime immediately preceding the intervention. 
Without more than a year’s worth of data, it is im-
possible to know whether the change that took place 
during the intervention period represented a real 
change or merely a return to normal levels of gang 
crime following a temporary surge. As the research-
ers note, “because baseline observations are limited 
3  The researchers can no more determine whether the total 
population of “repeat gang offenders” in custody has increased 
or decreased than a new clerk can tell whether the number of 
hotel guests has increased or decreased based solely on how 
many people he or she checked in and how long they stay. 
to 12 months, and because the baseline trend is not 
stable, interpretation of the gang crime pattern is sub-
ject to plausible alternative explanation.”
Gang prosecution units in Las Vegas and 
Reno, Nevada
An evaluation of the use of gang prosecution units in 
Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada, bolsters the suspicion 
that programs setting out to “target gang offend-
ers” may have little concrete effect. Terance Miethe 
and Richard McCorkle found that gang members 
prosecuted by specialized gang units were no more 
likely to be convicted or imprisoned than defendants 
whose cases were handled by prosecutors in tradi-
tional “track” units (2002).
The Clark County district attorney’s office, which 
serves the Las Vegas metropolitan area, established 
a gang prosecution unit in 1991. State lawmakers 
had recently enacted a series of penalty enhance-
ments for crimes that were considered gang-re-
lated, including a statute that doubled penalties 
for felonies committed to further gang activity. 
Three full-time deputy district attorneys screened 
and prosecuted felony complaints involving gang 
members. The unit worked closely with the Special 
Enforcement Detail of the Las Vegas Police Depart-
ment and attempted to enhance communication 
between law enforcement and other agencies con-
cerned with gang activity.
Three years later, the Washoe County district attor-
ney’s office, which serves Reno, launched a Danger-
ous Youth Offender prosecution team to handle gang 
and nongang cases involving youth who were “con-
sidered a threat to the community.” The team “rap-
idly became a specialized gang unit after the number 
of gang-related offenses in Reno rose from 77 to 193 
in the last 6 months of 1994.” The unit’s goals were 
to “rigorously prosecute the minority of gang mem-
bers who commit serious crimes” and to provide 
“community alternatives for at-risk youths who are 
just marginally involved in gang activity.”
Both the Clark and Washoe County gang prosecu-
tion units employed vertical prosecution “whereby 
the same attorney follows a case through successive 
stages of criminal processing.” Vertical prosecu-
tion is often promoted as a more effective means 
for handling gang cases than horizontal pros-
ecutions because it permits prosecutors to become 
more familiar with the details of a case and address 
gang-specific concerns (the possibility of witness in-
timidation, for example). 
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Miethe and McCorkle found no evidence that con-
solidating gang-related cases in the gang unit resulted 
in more successful prosecutions or tougher penalties 
than the traditional process. Defendants prosecuted 
by gang units were more likely to be imprisoned than 
defendants whose cases went to track units, and they 
also received longer prison terms. But these differ-
ences were entirely attributable to factors such as 
prior record, age, and the number of charges. There 
were “no statistically significant differences between 
gang units and track units in the likelihood of con-
viction and imprisonment upon conviction” after 
controlling for relevant variables. 
The establishment of Clark County’s gang prosecu-
tion unit also failed to increase the conviction rate 
for gang members, which remained stable before 
and after the change. The researchers concluded that 
“gang prosecution units do not enhance the success 
of criminal processing beyond that provided by other 
nongang prosecution units.” These results reinforce 
a point that should be obvious: gang members who 
commit serious crimes and have extensive criminal 
records are likely to receive harsh penalties whether 
or not they have been “targeted” by a task force or 
special prosecution unit.
Gang sentencing enhancements in 
California and Nevada
California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and  
Prevention (STEP) Act
In 1993 California enacted a far-reaching piece of 
legislation designed to heighten penalties for gang 
crime. The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Pre-
vention Act has two relevant provisions. One makes 
“knowing participation and willful furtherance of 
felonious conduct by members of a criminal street 
gang” a separate crime. The other creates a sentenc-
ing enhancement that applies to “any felony or mis-
demeanor committed for the benefit of a criminal 
street gang” (Jackson 2004). The penalties under 
the second provision are severe: an extra two to four 
years of imprisonment for “garden-variety” felonies, 
five years for “serious” felonies, 10 years for violent 
felonies, and life terms for crimes such as carjacking 
and committing drive-by shootings.
Proving the elements of the second enhancement 
provision is simple. The prosecutor must show that 
the defendant is a member of—or that his or her ac-
tions benefit—a group of three or more people with 
a common sign or symbol, and that two or more of 
the group’s members have been convicted of or adju-
dicated for one of 25 designated crimes.4 And as Los 
Angeles County deputy district attorney Alan Jackson 
notes, “the prosecutor does not even have to prove that the 
defendant is a member of the gang, as long as his conduct 
promotes or benefits the gang” (emphasis added). 
State policy makers have never evaluated the effec-
tiveness of the STEP Act, but a glance at the daily 
news from Los Angeles indicates that the statute 
has done little or nothing to resolve the city’s gang 
problems.
Nevada’s gang sentencing enhancements
Several years before STEP took effect, Nevada’s legis-
lature enacted an even tougher set of gang penalties 
and sentencing enhancements. The lawmakers were 
spurred on by a series of high-profile gang crimes and 
dire statements by law enforcement officials about 
the growing gang menace. A subsequent analysis de-
termined that gang members were responsible for a 
small share of the crime problem: just 6 percent of 
violent crime charges and 5 percent of drug traffick-
ing charges were filed against known gang members 
(Miethe and McCorkle 2002).
Miethe and McCorkle examined the use of Nevada’s 
antigang statutes and found that the charges were 
comparatively rare (2002). An enhancement dou-
bling the length of confinement for crimes commit-
ted to promote the activities of a criminal gang was 
charged 263 times in Clark County and 24 times 
in Washoe County over a four-year period, result-
ing in just 41 convictions. A statute prohibiting the 
discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle (i.e., a 
drive-by shooting) was charged 199 times in Clark 
County and 26 times in Washoe County over a six-
year period, resulting in a total of 23 convictions. 
The authors note that many of the drive-by shooting 
charges were multiple counts filed against the same 
defendant for a single criminal incident. 
Prosecutors and judges argued that the enhancements 
played an important role in plea bargaining, but the 
researchers could find no evidence of such an effect. 
Conviction rates did not change in gang cases after 
enactment of the enhancement statute. Nor did the 
enhancements appear to affect the use of other felony 
charges in cases involving gang members.
4  The three offenses required to prove the STEP enhancement—
the current offense and the two predicate offenses committed by 
members of the gang that “benefits” from the current offense—
must have taken place within three years of one another, which 
means that neither the time between the first and second 
predicate offense nor the time between the second predicate 
offense and the current offense can exceed three years.
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“ Balanced” approaches to gang 
enforcement 
Public officials who recognize the failure of traditional 
suppression and targeting efforts to reduce gang vio-
lence have sought to develop more “balanced” mod-
els of gang enforcement. The two best-known models 
for balanced gang enforcement are Operation Cease-
fire, an initiative launched in Boston to reduce youth 
gun violence, and the U.S. Justice Department’s Of-
fice of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model, which was 
developed by researcher Irving Spergel in Chicago. 
Both models require law enforcement and other key 
institutions to change how they work with one an-
other, and how they respond to gang problems. Each 
aims to: 
•   “Balance” suppression and other enforcement ac-
tivities with efforts to provide services, supports, 
and opportunities to both gang-involved youth 
and gang problem communities.
•   Specify the role of law enforcement by delineat-
ing which tactics support the overall initiative and 
which should be avoided because they could be 
counterproductive.
•   Engage a broader group of stakeholders—includ-
ing schools, social service providers, and grassroots 
community groups—in the development of gang 
policy.
•   Collaborate with researchers on the design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of the initiative.
•   Keep the focus on reducing gang violence rather 
than mounting a fruitless effort to eliminate gangs 
or gang crime. 
The Ceasefire and Spergel models appear to have 
achieved notable successes in their pilot phase, but 
the results of replication efforts have been much less 
promising. Replications of the Ceasefire model in 
Los Angeles and Indianapolis produced no evidence 
that efforts to “retail” a deterrence message—com-
municating the message directly to targeted individ-
uals—had changed the behavior of gang members, 
casting doubt on a central premise of the Ceasefire 
model. Meanwhile, replications of the Spergel model 
in five cities produced mixed results, with just two 
sites reporting reductions in participants’ violent be-
havior that approached statistical significance.
There are several possible explanations for the failure 
of the replication efforts to achieve the desired re-
sults. The results of the Ceasefire replication efforts 
strongly suggest flaws in the theory behind “retailing 
deterrence.” It is equally possible, however, that the 
models work, but only under a narrow set of circum-
stances. The Ceasefire and Spergel model replication 
efforts both attempted to transplant successful initia-
tives to cities with very different demographics, geog-
raphies, and gang problems. 
Finally, the fundamental problem may be that the 
models require unrealistic changes in the behavior 
of the institutions charged with implementation. 
Results from several of the replication efforts sug-
gest that law enforcement agencies may be unwilling 
to abandon “real” police work in favor of activities 
that produce fewer arrests, or to share power with 
community groups. On the other hand, the replica-
tion efforts demonstrate that most of the community 
stakeholders lack the resources necessary to become 
real partners in collaborative gang control efforts.
The Ceasefire model: “Pulling levers”  
and “retailing deterrence” 
Boston
Killings rose dramatically in Boston at the end of the 
1980s, peaking at 152 homicides in 1990. Roughly 
half of homicide victims that year were under the 
age of 25. The incidence of such youth homicides 
fell sharply between 1990 and 1991 but remained 
substantially above 1980s levels throughout the early 
1990s (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001).
City officials, law enforcement, and community al-
lies launched a number of initiatives in response to 
the surge in violence committed both by and against 
youth. Police and probation officers conducted joint 
patrols as part of the well-publicized Operation 
Night Light. The police department began to collab-
orate with the Ten Point Coalition, a group of black 
clergy formed after a gang attack on mourners at a 
funeral. But none of the measures implemented prior 
to Operation Ceasefire appeared to significantly af-
fect youth violence.
In 1994 Boston police commissioner Paul Evans in-
vited Harvard University researchers Anthony Braga, 
David Kennedy, and Anne Piehl to examine the prob-
lem of youth homicide and design an intervention. 
The research team conducted a review of homicides 
involving youth offenders and victims. They found 
that a majority of cases (60 percent or more) were 
gang-related, but that the cases did not fit the stereo-
type of gang violence motivated by “drug trafficking 
or other ‘business’ interests.” Instead, the researchers 
concluded that youth homicides had been driven up 
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by chronic “beefs” between gangs, as well as spiraling 
fear of violence that led more youth to carry and use 
handguns.
The research results were presented to a working 
group made up of researchers and frontline staff from 
key law enforcement and social service agencies. The 
working group concluded that the best way to reduce 
the number of youth homicides was to begin per-
suading gang members to break the cycle of retalia-
tory violence. The group believed that this aim could 
be accomplished through an exercise in focused de-
terrence that provided strong incentives for aggrieved 
gang members not to retaliate. They proposed:
•   Targeting gangs engaged in violent behavior.
•   Reaching out directly to members of the tar-
geted gangs.
•   Delivering an explicit message that violence 
would not be tolerated.
•   Backing up that message by “pulling every 
lever” legally available (i.e., applying appro-
priate sanctions from a varied menu of pos-
sible law enforcement actions) when violence 
occurred. (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001)
At the same time, social service agencies, probation 
and parole officers, and community groups (includ-
ing churches) were to offer gang members services 
and opportunities that might provide a viable alter-
native to gang life. The hope was that a combination 
of “sticks,” “carrots,” and efforts to get the word out 
about the new initiative could create a “firebreak” 
that would allow fear and violence to reach a new, 
lower equilibrium point. The strategy was dubbed 
Operation Ceasefire.
The Operation Ceasefire approach was inspired by 
a 1994 police effort to reduce gun violence among 
members of the Wendover Street gang. The street 
was quiet by the time the operations ended, and gang 
members were reportedly “walking up to [the Youth 
Violence Strike Force’s] Warren Street headquarters 
with paper bags full of guns and dropping them off.” 
Officers credited the success of the operation to a 
combination of focused attention and “honesty.” They 
pulled every legal lever at their disposal to disrupt the 
gang and make its members uncomfortable. But they 
also told the gang members how to make it stop: end 
the violence and hand over the illegal guns. “ ‘We’re 
here because of the shooting,’ the authorities had said. 
‘We’re not going to leave until it stops. And until it 
does, nobody is going to so much as jaywalk, nor make 
any money, nor have any fun.’ ” 
The tactics employed in the Wendover Street action 
and adopted by Operation Ceasefire are largely fa-
miliar: saturation patrols, home visits by police and 
probation officers, enforcement of local ordinances, 
and so on. But the strategy of trading zero-tolerance 
fantasies of eradicating gangs, drugs, and low-level 
criminality for leverage over youth violence was a 
radical departure from law enforcement orthodoxy: 
Operation Ceasefire’s Working Group under-
stood that law enforcement agencies do not 
have the capacity to “eliminate” all gangs or 
powerfully respond to all gang offending in 
gang-troubled jurisdictions. Pledges to do so, 
although common, are simply not credible. 
(Braga et al. 2001)
The researchers argue that the strategy entailed not a 
“deal …[to] win gangs the freedom to deal drugs or 
commit other crimes” if they refrained from violence 
but rather a “promise” to bring the weight of the jus-
tice system down on gangs whose members engaged 
in gun violence (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). 
Yet the strategy was premised on the belief that youth 
gang members would rather “make money” (read 
“sell drugs”) and “have fun” (read “engage in low-
level delinquency”) than spend all of their time fight-
ing with the police. 
Most gang enforcement initiatives view the exis-
tence of gangs and the persistence of gang crime as 
the problem. The architects of Boston’s Operation 
Ceasefire saw an opportunity to use the gang struc-
ture as a means for transmitting their message, and 
they saw nonviolent delinquency as a source of le-
verage for addressing the real problem of youth vio-
lence. Their strategy aimed to turn “gang offenders’ 
behaviors against themselves, taking advantage of the 
vulnerabilities created by their chronic misbehavior 
and turning them into a violence prevention tool.” 
And it sought to use the same group dynamics that 
contributed to the rise in violence to constrain gang 
members, if not for themselves then for the sake of 
the gang.
The research team conducted a time-series analysis 
of crime trends before and after the first lever-pull-
ing meeting and concluded that the intervention was 
associated with statistically significant reductions in 
youth and gun violence (Braga et al. 2001). These re-
ductions included a 63 percent decrease in youth ho-
micides; a 32 percent reduction in shots-fired calls; 
and a 25 percent drop in gun assaults. A compari-
son of violent crime patterns in 39 major U.S. cities 
and 29 major New England cities showed that the 
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crime reduction could not be explained by national 
or regional trends, although a large number of cities 
also experienced a “sudden, significant reduction in 
youth homicides” during the 1990s.5
These results should be interpreted with caution be-
cause they are based on a relatively small number of 
incidents and occurred during a time when violence 
was trending down. Richard Rosenfeld, Robert For-
nango, and Eric Baumer conducted their own analy-
sis of the numbers, comparing Boston’s reduction 
in youth homicides to trends in other cities (2005). 
Rosenfeld and his colleagues integrated homicide 
data for the nation’s 95 largest cities into a statistical 
model that incorporated other explanatory variables, 
including measures of economic disadvantage, popu-
lation density, policing levels, and incarceration rates. 
They report that Boston appeared to outperform the 
average, but that the difference did not reach the 
level of statistical significance: 
After adjusting the changes for the effects of 
the covariates, Boston’s youth firearm homicide 
rate fell an estimated 30% per year during the 
intervention period [while] the [95-city] aver-
age rate fell by 16%. Although the estimated 
decline in Boston’s rate was nearly double 
that of the sample average in the conditional 
model, the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant.…The lack of statistical significance 
reflects Boston’s low youth firearm homicide 
counts during the intervention period (rang-
ing from 21 in 1996 to 10 in 1999). 
The failure of replications of the Ceasefire model in 
Los Angeles and Indianapolis to achieve comparable 
results provides further cause for caution. Evalua-
tions of these efforts cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of retailing deterrence and suggest that the model 
may work under a very narrow set of circumstances, 
if it works at all.
Los Angeles
The RAND Corporation led an effort to determine 
whether elements of the Boston model could be used 
to address gang violence in Los Angeles (Tita, Riley, 
and Greenwood 2003). A team of researchers began 
collaborating with law enforcement and community 
groups in early 1999, with support from the National 
Institute of Justice, to identify places in Los Angeles 
County where an intervention might have the great-
5  The authors report that Dallas, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, New 
York, Philadelphia, and Tucson all reported sharp drops in 
youth homicides during the period.
est impact. The working group eventually settled on 
Hollenbeck, an area with entrenched gangs and high 
levels of youth violence despite relatively low overall 
crime rates. 
Law enforcement and community sources attributed 
the violence to the narcotics trade, which was said to 
be “the underlying cause of nearly every violent act 
involving a gang member.” The research team’s analy-
sis of homicide data found, however, that the killings 
had very little to do with drug activity. A drug motive 
was present in just one in five homicides committed 
by gang members and fewer than one in ten homi-
cides defined by investigators as “gang-motivated.” 
Further, the motives in drug-related gang homicides 
typically related to disputes between business part-
ners, or the attempted robbery of drug sellers, rather 
than to struggles to control drug markets. 
Gang homicides in Hollenbeck were being driven in-
stead by gang rivalries. The researchers described the 
typical killing as one in which a gang member “drives 
up or walks up to a youth from a rival neighborhood 
and asks the question, ‘Where are you from?’ ” The 
research team mapped the social networks of 37 Hol-
lenbeck street gangs and identified the Boyle Heights 
community as a place where a coordinated interven-
tion might break a relatively self-contained cycle of 
retaliatory violence.
The working group found it difficult to identify le-
vers for changing the behavior of targeted members 
of the four most active gangs. Few of those identified 
by law enforcement as “shot-callers” or “shooters” 
had probation or parole conditions that could serve 
as a source of leverage. More than 70 gang members 
had outstanding warrants—many for nonviolent 
offenses—but personnel were not available to serve 
them in a coordinated fashion. Finally, a dispropor-
tionate number of violent crimes were committed 
by “new baldies”—a term for recently initiated gang 
members who “act brazenly or outside the control 
of the more established gang members in an effort 
to gain the respect of their older peers.” The “new 
baldies” were less likely not only to consider the con-
sequences of their actions, but also to be subject to 
probation conditions or outstanding warrants. 
The limited capacity of Operation Ceasefire to gener-
ate individualized responses to outbreaks of gang vio-
lence forced the initiative to rely heavily on the use of 
police patrols in the territory of gangs whose mem-
bers were responsible for violent incidents. The Boyle 
Heights community was concerned by the possibility 
that Operation Ceasefire would be another heavy-
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handed exercise in gang suppression. Community 
leaders insisted that pulling levers should be paired 
with violence prevention programming and other ser-
vices designed to support the eff orts of gang members 
and their families to break the cycle of gang violence. 
But events overtook the development of the commu-
nity’s capacity to provide gang prevention and inter-
vention services. An escalation in violence between 
the Mob Crew and Cuatro Flats gangs culminated 
in a walk-by shooting that left a gang member and 
a 10-year-old girl dead. Th e police increased patrols 
in the fi ve reporting districts that encompassed the 
two gangs’ territory and the site of the homicide, and 
placed two offi  cers on mounted patrol. Additional 
offi  cers were deployed from specialized units includ-
ing Metro Unit (home of the SWAT team) and the 
Special Enforcement Unit and Traffi  c Bureau work-
ing out of the Operations Central Bureau.
Police and probation offi  cers visited the residences 
of more than 30 members of both gangs over the 
next three months, making eight arrests. Th e city 
deployed health and child welfare agency staff  to in-
spect the properties where gang members gathered. 
Speed bumps were installed in the area of the ho-
micide, and a nearby alley was fenced off . A $5,000 
reward was posted for information related to recent 
violent incidents between the two gangs. Operation 
Ceasefi re was up and running without the ability to 
off er carrots alongside the enforcement sticks.
Before the intervention, police and community groups 
collaborated in eff orts to retail the message that vio-
lence would no longer be tolerated in Boyle Heights. 
Th ey promised to meet each incident of gang violence 
in the neighborhood by pulling levers on members of 
the off ending groups, while off ering services to those 
who were willing to refrain from violence. Once 
the operation was launched, however, “the working 
group members did not constantly reprioritize and 
reallocate resources after each violent incident, but 
rather focused almost exclusively on the two gangs 
involved in the triggering incident.” Other shootings 
took place in the week following the walk-by killings, 
for example, but the incidents did not produce a sim-
ilar response from Operation Ceasefi re.
Th e RAND research team conducted an extensive 
analysis of crime patterns to determine whether the in-
tervention had reduced violent, gang, or gun crime in 
the six months following the triggering incident. Th e 
researchers set up three comparisons to test whether 
the intervention had generated greater reductions in 
crime than would have taken place in its absence: 
•   Boyle Heights versus the remainder of Hollen-
beck; 
•   the fi ve police reporting districts where the bulk 
of the enforcement actions were taken versus the 
remainder of Boyle Heights; and 
•   the target census blocks versus a matched set of 
census blocks in Boyle Heights. 
Th e fi rst comparison was designed to test the eff ec-
tiveness of eff orts to retail the message throughout 
Boyle Heights. Th e second and third were designed 
to measure the eff ect of the police suppression and 
follow-up deterrence eff orts. Th e results of the analy-
sis are mixed at best. Violence declined in Boyle 
Heights and the rest of Hollenbeck at exactly the 
same rate—a 28 percent reduction between the six 
months that preceded the intervention and the six 
months that followed—indicating that the interven-
tion had no eff ect on the neighborhood as a whole. 
Th e target areas saw modest reductions in violence 
compared to the rest of Boyle Heights and large gains 
compared to the matched comparison blocks, which 
suggests a localized impact. 
Gang and gun crime reports dropped much more 
Figure 7.5. hollenbeck Area Crimes involving TMC or Cuatro Flats 
Gang Members Before and After Operation Ceasefi re
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Table 7.2. Findings of RAND analysis of los Angeles Operation 
Ceasefi re intervention effects
Crime type
Boyle heights 
vs. rest of 
hollenbeck
Target districts 
vs. rest of Boyle 
heights
Target blocks 
vs. matched 
blocks
Violent None Positive Positive
Gang Positive Mixed None
Gun Positive None None
Source: Tita et al. 2003
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quickly in Boyle Heights than in the rest of Hollen-
beck during both the four-month “suppression” period 
and the two-month “deterrence” period of the inter-
vention. The apparent effect vanishes, however, in the 
target areas, where patterns of gang and gun crime did 
not differ significantly from those of either the rest of 
Boyle Heights or the matched comparison blocks. 
The researchers reported that the target districts out-
performed the rest of the neighborhood in reducing 
gang crime during the suppression period of the inter-
vention. Yet the net drop in gang crime between the 
pre- and post-intervention periods was smaller in the 
target reporting districts (19 percent) than in the rest 
of Boyle Heights (45 percent).
A comparison of violent, gang, and gun crime trends 
during the suppression and deterrence phases of the 
project also produced inconsistent results, particu-
larly with regard to gang crime. The researchers found 
statistically significant reductions in gang crime only 
during the deterrence phase in the interneighborhood 
comparison; only during the suppression phase in the 
first intraneighborhood comparison; and not at all in 
the second intraneighborhood comparison. 
There are several ways to interpret such varied results, 
but the most compelling interpretation is that the in-
tervention simply did not work. An analysis of crimes 
involving the Mob Crew and Cuatro Flats gang mem-
bers in the pre- and postintervention period provides 
a clearer picture. The number of incidents spiked 
immediately before the intervention began, dropped 
sharply in the first month of suppression activities, 
and climbed steadily thereafter. By the fifth and sixth 
months of the operation (the deterrence period), 
crime committed by members of the targeted gangs 
exceeded preintervention levels. If the intervention 
worked at all, it did not work for long.
The RAND report authors conclude that efforts to 
retail the message had “no discernible effect on crime 
in the immediate aftermath of implementation or 
during the suppression period.” They have a more 
positive evaluation of law enforcement activities in 
the target areas, noting that four of six violent and 
gang crime comparisons showed “reductions of crime 
in these areas during the suppression period to be sig-
nificantly greater than in the comparison areas.” 
There are several reasons to question the meaning and 
significance of these conclusions. First, it is possible 
that the drop in violence following the trigger inci-
dent was nothing more than an example of regres-
sion to the mean—a built-in tendency of numbers to 
trend from high and low points back toward average 
levels. Sudden drops in gang violence are common 
and may have no more to do with law enforcement 
activity than the surges that preceded them. Second, 
there are methodological problems with the use of 
gang crime as a measure, since gang crime statistics 
are sensitive to changes in law enforcement practice. 
Third, the findings are based on a small number of 
incidents: an average of just 25 violent crimes, nine 
gun crimes, and five to six gang crimes per month in 
the targeted areas during the preintervention period. 
The targeted areas saw a drop in violence that was 
13 percent greater than the drop in the rest of Boyle 
Heights (37 percent versus 24 percent), and 31 per-
cent greater than the matched comparison blocks (34 
percent versus 3 percent). This means that the inter-
vention might have averted between three and eight 
violent crimes per month. A larger number of violent 
incidents were averted in the nontargeted sections of 
Boyle Heights, where the monthly average fell from 
67 in the preintervention period to 51 in the postint-
ervention period. 
At best, Operation Ceasefire can lay claim to a mod-
est, localized, and temporary reduction in gang vio-
lence, a program effect that was too small to affect 
violent crime rates in Boyle Heights and too insub-
stantial to persist after police scaled back suppression 
activities. At worst, Operation Ceasefire did noth-
ing more than dump law enforcement resources on 
a neighborhood after violence had peaked and then 
claim credit for an inevitable return to normal—if 
unacceptable—levels of violence. In either case, the 
fears of local residents were realized: the initiative 
became yet another suppression-heavy, “Band-Aid” 
response to entrenched gang violence.
The latter point is particularly important. Despite 
the best intentions of the plan’s architects, Los An-
geles’ Operation Ceasefire was unable to balance law 
enforcement suppression with opportunities for gang 
members seeking a new life or supports for residents 
who wanted to rebuild their community. The RAND 
research team concluded that a resource imbalance 
between law enforcement and community groups 
made this outcome all but inevitable:
Thus the stick side of the intervention, when it 
finally developed, had a lot of power and force 
behind it. This is not the case with our com-
munity partners. Although equally committed 
to the goals of the project, they have far less 
flexibility in terms of resources committed to 
the project, and less experience in mounting a 
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coordinated ongoing eff ort with other agencies. 
We suspect that the carrot side of these interven-
tions will always lag far behind the stick side in 
spite of the best intentions that it not do so, unless 
some extraordinary eff orts are made to provide the 
community-based organizations with additional 
resources and the kinds of training that can help 
them become much more eff ective partners. (Tita, 
Riley, and Greenwood 2003, emphasis added)
Indianapolis
Indianapolis experienced a rise in homicides during 
the late 1990s. Th e number of murders, which had 
fl uctuated from 60 to 90 per year during most of 
the 1980s, rose steadily and peaked at 157 in 1997 
(McGarrell and Chermak 2003). Conventional wis-
dom held that the violence was produced by the late 
arrival of crack cocaine to Indianapolis, although re-
searchers Edmund McGarrell and Steven Chermak 
note that the proportion of arrestees testing positive 
for cocaine peaked three years earlier. 
City leaders began to search for possible solutions to 
the homicide epidemic and quickly seized on Bos-
ton’s Operation Ceasefi re. A multiagency working 
group, the Indiana Violence Reduction Partnership 
(IVRP), was formed with the participation of cor-
rections; the courts; and local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies. 
Th e group began its investigation with a review of 
1997 homicide cases and determined that a major-
ity of cases involved drugs (52.7 percent); that many 
suspects were young (median age 23); and that most 
suspects belonged to groups of “known, chronic of-
fenders” (58.9 percent). Use of the term “known, 
chronic off enders” refl ected “the lack of a consensual 
defi nition of a gang and the reality that much gang 
activity in Indianapolis is of relatively loose struc-
ture.” McGarrell and Chermak observe that many 
groups of known, chronic off enders “have names and 
colors, but their membership is fl uid and many are 
not territorial.” 
Th e working group’s conclusion that drugs were in-
volved in half of homicides is at odds with the fi nd-
ings from Boston and elsewhere that drug motives 
and eff orts to control drug markets play a minor 
role in gang-related killings. Th e diff erence may re-
fl ect particular local circumstances. It may also result 
from the use of an extraordinarily broad defi nition of 
“drug-involved,” which included not only homicides 
with drug motives but also any homicide involving a 
known drug user or drug seller.
Th e working group settled on two strategies for re-
ducing homicide levels: fi rst, to increase “the arrest, 
prosecution, and incarceration of the most violent of-
fenders” through a program with the ominous name 
of VIPER (Violence Impact Enhanced Response); 
and second, to engage in “lever pulling” with high-
risk individuals by persuading them that they faced 
serious criminal sanctions and off ering them “legiti-
mate opportunities and services.” Th e latter strategy, 
inspired by Boston’s Operation Ceasefi re, generated 
a series of meetings launched in late 1998 in which 
220 probationers and parolees received presenta-
tions from law enforcement offi  cials about the legal 
consequences for violent crime and presentations 
from community representatives to express their 
concerns about elevated levels of violence. 
Th e plan called for “regular responses to homicides 
involving groups or gangs, chronic hot-spot loca-
tions, and/or drug markets” in the form of “directed 
police patrol, narcotics enforcement, warrant ser-
vice, and similar enforcement eff orts.” McGarrell 
and Chermak report that these responses took place 
“fairly regularly” in 1999 and “much less frequently” 
during 2000. Th e meetings and responses were or-
ganized by neighborhood but not, as in Boston, by 
gang. IVRP also launched a public ad campaign in 
2000 that was “designed to communicate the dan-
gers of violent crime as well as advertise the punish-
ments available to the criminal justice system when 
off enders commit violent crimes” (McGarrell and 
Chermak 2004).
Th e research team used several measures to gauge 
the eff ectiveness of the IVRP and VIPER initiatives. 
First, the researchers tracked homicide and other vio-
Figure 7.6. Proportion of Indianapolis arrestees who perceived the 
chances of being sanctioned for a crime as “good” or “very good”
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lent crime trends to determine whether the interven-
tion was associated with a reduction in killings. They 
report that homicide levels remained high in India-
napolis “from the beginning of the project in 1998 
through early 1999.” The pattern changed around 
the time of a crackdown on a major drug-dealing or-
ganization. The April 1999 bust was the result of a 
separate long-term investigation and not the efforts 
of IVRP, but the working group nonetheless used the 
publicity surrounding the operation in their efforts 
to retail the deterrence message. 
The arrests of 16 alleged Brightwood Gang members 
were associated with a decline in homicides from 149 
in the prior 12 months to 101 in the following 12 
months. The researchers conducted time-series analy-
ses of violent crime trends and concluded that the tim-
ing of the Brightwood arrests correlated to statistically 
significant reductions in both citywide homicides and 
incidents of serious violence in Brightwood. 
The research team’s statistical models explained 22 
percent of the variation in monthly citywide homi-
cide totals and show an estimated 42 percent drop in 
homicide levels at the time of the intervention. The 
models also explained between 5 and 17 percent of the 
variance in armed robbery and gun assaults within the 
Brightwood neighborhood, producing an estimated 
reduction in serious violence of two to three offenses 
per month. The models showed no statistically signifi-
cant effect of the Brightwood arrests on the citywide 
incidence of armed robbery and gun assaults.
Second, McGarrell and Chermak measured arrest-
ees’ perceptions of law enforcement efforts by add-
ing questions about various program components to 
the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) sur-
vey, which is given quarterly to a random sample of 
arrestees. Arrestees reported low awareness of both 
initiatives: between 3 and 10 percent had heard of 
IVRP and 8 to 17 percent knew of VIPER. One in 
five was familiar with the lever-pulling meetings in 
the first wave of interviews, although the ratio fell 
to one in 11 by the end of 2001. More arrestees re-
ported knowledge of probation contacts and sweeps 
(roughly a third) and police stops (over half ). 
Awareness of program components did not increase 
with successive waves of interviews, although it did 
spike during the second quarter of 1999, when the 
Brightwood arrests took place. Lever-pulling meet-
ing attendees demonstrated greater familiarity with 
the initiatives and probation activities than other ar-
restees but were slightly less likely than their coun-
terparts to report knowledge of police stops. One in 
five meeting attendees was familiar with IVRP (20.5 
percent), and just over a third knew of VIPER (35.9 
percent). Surprisingly, just three in four lever-pulling 
meeting attendees (74.4 percent) reported that they 
had heard of the lever-pulling meetings. 
A large majority of arrestees reported having seen 
television commercials (77.1 percent), billboards 
(63.7 percent), or bus signs (62.9 percent) sponsored 
by the initiative after the ad campaign was launched 
in January 2001. But the significance of this find-
ing is undermined by the fact that most arrestees 
from the previous wave of interviews thought that 
they had seen IVRP television commercials (56.9 
percent), billboards (51.4 percent), or bus signs 
(41.1 percent) before the campaign was launched. 
The false-positive responses to questions about a 
media campaign that did not yet exist indicate that 
the popular culture may already be so saturated with 
tough-on-crime messages that the impact of new 
messages is marginal.
Meeting attendees were more likely than other ar-
restees to report that their chances of being arrested, 
charged, convicted, or imprisoned for a robbery or 
drug sale were “good” or “very good.” The research-
ers considered this finding “evidence that the direct 
communication of the lever-pulling message to 
probationers and parolees had some effect” (2003). 
The fact that the respondents had just been arrested, 
however, suggests that the effect was not the in-
tended one. The meeting attendees appear to have 
continued to engage in criminal conduct even after 
“getting the message”—an indication that there may 
be serious flaws in the theory of retailing deterrence 
or its application in Indianapolis. 
Meeting attendees also appear to have received the 
wrong message. The Boston Operation Ceasefire and 
IVRP initiatives were purportedly designed to deliver 
the message that homicides would trigger a robust law 
enforcement response. Yet the IVRP meeting partici-
pants were slightly less likely than other arrestees to be-
lieve that the chances of being sanctioned for homicide 
were “good” or “very good.” 
Meeting participants rated their chances of being 
sanctioned for a homicide (80 to 85 percent “good” 
or “very good”) the same as their chances of being 
sanctioned for a robbery (80 to 87 percent “good” or 
“very good”), and not much higher than their chances 
of being sanctioned for a drug sale (69 to 74 percent 
“good” or “very good”). Other arrestees, by contrast, 
had a more accurate picture of the response of the 
justice system to various crimes. They perceived the 
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chances of being sanctioned as “good” or “very good” 
85 to 87 percent of the time for a homicide; 75 to 
80 percent of the time for a robbery; and 60 to 66 
percent of the time for a drug sale. 
Perhaps meeting attendees were simply more likely 
than other arrestees to have been arrested for a rob-
bery or a drug sale, raising their perceptions of the 
likelihood of sanctions for those crimes. But it is also 
possible that the intended message, “We’re coming 
after you if the killings don’t stop,” was heard sim-
ply as “We’re coming after you.” The latter message 
may be music to the ears of police, but it violates 
a core principle of the Ceasefire model that law en-
forcement responses focus on—and be directly tied 
to—lethal and potentially lethal violence. In place of 
a laser focus on homicide, IVRP communicated a de-
terrence message about everything but homicide. 
Third, the research team attempted to assess the 
impact of the lever-pulling meetings by comparing 
attendees’ behavior to that of other probationers 
convicted of similar offenses. This effort was ham-
pered by difficulty in finding a suitable comparison 
sample and reaching the target probationers, many 
of whom failed to show up for appointments or had 
moved without providing a forwarding address. But 
the researchers were ultimately able to collect surveys 
from 69 meeting participants and criminal record in-
formation for the whole group. And they were able 
to identify a control group that matched the attendee 
group in terms of gender, age, marital status, and ed-
ucation (but not race or income).
The researchers found that the meeting attendees 
surveyed were not only more likely than control 
group members to have heard of the IVRP program 
elements, but also “more likely in every case to believe 
more strongly in the effectiveness of the strategies 
for deterring crime” (emphasis in original). But the 
meeting participants were just as likely as their coun-
terparts to commit new offenses. 
Close to half (44.6 percent) of meeting participants 
were arrested while they were on probation for the 
current offense, and nearly a third (31.3 percent) were 
arrested after attending a lever-pulling meeting. Con-
trol group members were rearrested on probation at 
a slightly lower rate (36 percent). None of the differ-
ences between meeting participants and control group 
members on measures of criminality (arrests, convic-
tions, sentences to probation or incarceration) were 
statistically significant. As the researchers observe:
It seems that the offenders who attended the 
meetings were slightly more likely to be aware 
of the initiatives of the Indianapolis Violence 
Reduction Partnership and to believe in their 
effectiveness. Unfortunately, their correspond-
ing behavior does not reflect a change in their 
willingness to change their offending habits. 
Similarly, most attendees understood and re-
membered at least one of the lever-pulling 
messages though, again, their behavior did not 
correspond to the lever-pulling message. 
A comparison of attendees’ and control group mem-
bers’ perceptions of the likelihood of criminal justice 
sanctions produced results that were nearly identical 
to those generated by the ADAM surveys. Lever-pull-
ing meeting participants were more likely than control 
group members to rate their chances of being sanc-
tioned for a robbery or drug sale as “good” or “very 
good,” but there were no meaningful differences when 
it came to homicide—further evidence that IVRP tar-
gets got the reverse of the intended message.
Finally, IVRP appears to have failed miserably in its 
efforts to link meeting participants with services and 
opportunities that could draw them away from a life 
of crime. Less than a third (29 percent) of meeting 
participants reported getting a job or employment 
training. Less than a quarter (23.2 percent) said 
that they were “hanging out with different friends.” 
And fewer than 15 percent of attendees had started 
school, entered substance abuse treatment, or begun 
going to church regularly. Worse, these figures may 
exaggerate the successes of meeting attendees be-
cause they include only those who could be located 
and persuaded to complete a survey. 
Control group members were far more likely to re-
port positive changes in their lives over the previous 
six months. Close to half (44.9 percent) got jobs or 
training; two in five (40.4 percent) had begun treat-
ment and/or were hanging out with a different crowd 
(42.9 percent); and a quarter had enrolled in an edu-
cation program (29.6 percent) and/or started going to 
church (24.4 percent). The only area in which control 
group members reported worse results than meeting 
attendees was missed meetings with probation of-
ficers: one in five control group members reported 
missing a meeting compared to one in 10 attendees. 
Limitations in the research design make it impos-
sible to draw strong conclusions from the differences 
between outcomes for attendees and control group 
members. But the results do suggest that the meet-
ings did little or nothing to connect at-risk individu-
als with opportunities and services.
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Th e murder rate fell sharply in Indianapolis during 
the time when an initiative based on the Boston 
model was active. McGarrell and Chermak provide 
some evidence that an operation unrelated to the 
Ceasefi re replication could have contributed to the 
reduction in violence. Th e arrest of 16 Brightwood 
Gang members may have helped to facilitate a re-
turn to more normal levels of serious violence in the 
Brightwood neighborhood, and more normal levels 
of homicide throughout Indianapolis. 
But the evidence collected by the research team 
strongly indicates that the drop had nothing to do 
with activities undertaken by IVRP. Probationers 
who participated in lever-pulling meetings were as 
likely as their counterparts to commit new crimes. 
Th ey were no more likely to anticipate that com-
mitting a homicide would result in criminal justice 
sanctions. And they were much less likely than con-
trol group members to report recent positive life 
changes. Finally, there is no reason to believe that the 
Brightwood arrests had an impact on other forms 
of serious or gun violence outside the Brightwood 
neighborhood, or that IVRP had any impact on 
crime whatsoever.
Th ere are two likely explanations for the failure of 
lever-pulling and deterrence-“retailing” strategies to 
change the behavior of probationers in Indianapolis. 
Th e fi rst is that the strategies simply do not work, 
and that the sharp reduction of homicides in Boston 
is attributable to other law enforcement activities or 
unrelated factors. 
Th e second possibility is that the lever pulling and 
message retailing worked in Boston due to a unique 
set of circumstances that were not present in India-
napolis. Th e Boston working group built its strategy 
around youth and young adults in small, highly ter-
ritorial gangs that were involved in long-standing 
disputes with local rivals. Th e strategy gave the gang 
members an incentive to constrain lethal violence in 
order to avoid law enforcement interference with ac-
tivities that were more pleasurable (“hanging out”) 
or lucrative (drug sales). Indianapolis authorities had 
to contend with youth gangs and groups that were 
more fl uid and less territorial, making it more dif-
fi cult to exert leverage over any one group.
Two important lessons can be drawn from the India-
napolis and Los Angeles Ceasefi re replication eff orts. 
Th e fi rst is that there is no such thing as a “balanced” 
approach to gang enforcement. Th e structural imbal-
ance in power and resources between law enforcement 
and community groups ensures that suppression tac-
tics will never be matched with an adequate level of 
services and supports. Th e continuing imbalance also 
ensures that community stakeholders will have little 
role in decision making. At the end of the day, the 
police will do what they think best, and residents will 
have no choice but to hope that it works.
Th e scale of the imbalance is evident from the evalu-
ations of the Indianapolis and Los Angeles initia-
tives. Providing services and building community 
were clearly afterthoughts in Indianapolis, where the 
researchers failed to present an adequate measure of 
the supports provided to targeted probationers. Th e 
RAND research team made a much more concerted 
eff ort to engage community stakeholders and sup-
port their eff orts. But Tita and his colleagues provided 
no concrete evidence of changes in the availability of 
critical services to gang members and their families. 
Further, the researchers concluded that such changes 
were unlikely to take place without a major infusion 
of resources. 
Th e failure of Ceasefi re replication eff orts to demon-
strate any gains in the provision of services to gang 
members or gang communities should not come as a 
complete surprise. Th e architects of Ceasefi re incor-
porated carrots in their model but failed to report on 
how availability of services changed as a result of the 
program. Nor did Kennedy and his colleagues dem-
onstrate a relationship between provision of services 
and the reduction in violence. Th e Ceasefi re model 
pays lip service to a balance between sticks and car-
rots, but the program is really about using sticks to 
enforce compliance—and not about growing carrots. 
Th e imbalance between law enforcement and social 
service responses to gang problems is not unique to 
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Figure 7.7. Changes in lives of Indianapolis “lever-pulling” 
meeting attendees and control group members
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Ceasefire but is structural. As Decker observes:
Give police money and they are ready to go 
tomorrow. But it takes six months to get an 
after-school program. Go to agencies that do 
intervention with active gang members, and 
those take six to nine months to roll out. We 
can get suppression out on the street tomor-
row but other resources take longer to pull to-
gether. (Personal communication)
The second lesson is that lever pulling and deterrence 
retailing work under narrow and specific circum-
stances, if they work at all. Efforts to sell the deter-
rence message had no impact on violence in Boyle 
Heights, nor did they affect the behavior of proba-
tioners in Indianapolis. The Indianapolis lever-pull-
ing meetings did leave an impression on participants, 
but it was not the intended one. These results may 
indicate that lever pulling and deterrence retailing 
never worked. Or the results may show that the strat-
egies work only with small, territorial youth gangs 
whose members would rather sell drugs with mini-
mal interference than fight with the police. 
This is not to say that a coordinated law enforcement 
and community effort to target youth violence could 
not establish a “firebreak” that would allow violence 
to reach a new and lower equilibrium point. It is also 
conceivable that a single police operation against a 
criminal group (the Brightwood bust, for example) 
could facilitate a return to more normal levels of vio-
lence by changing the dynamic of conflict in a city. 
Instead, we would argue that such successes are im-
possible to replicate because they depend on too 
many factors that are not only unknown but also 
beyond the control of policy makers. Criminologists 
know little about what produces drastic changes in 
murder and violent crime rates. They can produce 
models that attempt to measure the effect of an in-
tervention after the fact but have been unable to de-
velop a model that successfully predicts future spikes 
in violence. 
The Comprehensive Gang Program Model 
The Comprehensive Gang Program Model (also 
known as the “Spergel model” for its architect, 
Irving Spergel) is designed to provide both social 
controls and supports to gang members and youth 
at high risk of gang membership. The model was 
developed in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood 
during the early and mid-1990s and replicated in 
five cities with support from the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). It 
requires extensive collaboration between law en-
forcement, schools, social service agencies, and 
community organizations.
The Little Village pilot program provided direct ser-
vices to gang youth who were “active in carrying out 
or planning violent activity,” along with other youth 
considered at risk for gang involvement (Spergel, Wa, 
and Villareal Sosa 2006). Police and probation offi-
cers and youth workers were the frontline staff: 
The youth workers emphasized individual youth 
and family counseling, referrals for jobs, and so-
cial services. Police and probation officers car-
ried out their traditional law enforcement and 
supervision activities, targeting many of the 
same youth as the outreach youth workers and 
also referring target youth (and youth to be tar-
geted) back to the youth workers for services. 
Youth workers clarified information about seri-
ous gang assaults, aiding project police to deter-
mine who were, and were not, offenders. 
The research team tracked the behavior of program 
participants as well as the incidence of crime in the 
target neighborhood. Participation in the program 
was associated with a statistically significant reduc-
tion in serious violent crime arrests among older 
youth (ages 17 and up), although the differences 
were not significant among 14- to 16-year-old youth. 
The researchers also found a significant reduction in 
arrests for gang-motivated aggravated battery and 
assault at the neighborhood level. A higher rate of 
worker contacts was associated with reductions in 
violent behavior.
Drug arrests and gang involvement also declined 
among program youth, although the research team 
found no significant effect on the larger neighbor-
hood. Program youth experienced fewer drug arrests 
in the program period than in the preprogram pe-
riod, even though the number of gang-related drug 
arrests in the neighborhood rose by 1,000 percent. 
Program youth were more likely than their counter-
parts outside the program to reduce their gang activ-
ity; youth who received successful job placements or 
who were reenrolled in school showed the greatest 
reductions.
The organizers had difficulty institutionalizing the 
model in Chicago despite these accomplishments. 
The Chicago Police Department “chose not to in-
tegrate the project into its regular operations or its 
community policing program …[because according 
to police officials] the department’s primary mission 
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was suppression not community organization or 
social work.” But OJJDP picked up the model and 
funded replication efforts at five sites: Mesa, Arizona; 
Riverside, California; Bloomington-Normal, Illinois; 
San Antonio, Texas; and Tucson, Arizona.
The results of the replication efforts were mixed at 
best. No site fully implemented the model, and most 
of the projects did not reduce arrests at either the 
individual youth or the neighborhood level. None 
of the sites achieved statistically significant reduc-
tions in arrests for violent offenses among program 
youth compared to nonprogram youth, although 
Mesa and Riverside both reported decreases that 
were marginally significant.6 Program youth in-
creased their gang involvement at three sites (Mesa, 
Bloomington-Normal, and Tucson), while gang in-
volvement remained unchanged in the remaining 
two sites. The effect of the program on arrests did 
not vary by level of gang involvement: gang mem-
bers, gang “associates,” and nongang youth were 
equally likely to benefit (or not) from their partici-
pation in the program.
Target neighborhoods in Mesa and Riverside saw 
greater reductions in violent crime and drug crime 
arrests than comparison areas, but no significant 
changes in gang membership. Bloomington-Normal 
and San Antonio target neighborhoods experienced 
larger increases in overall and violent crime arrests 
than comparison areas, despite significant decreases 
in reported gang membership. 
The largest effect found by the researchers across all 
six sites was not a program effect but regression to 
the mean. Arrests of youth with the greatest number 
of arrests during the preprogram period were likely 
to decline to more typical levels during the program 
period. The converse was true of youth with the 
smallest number of arrests in the preprogram period, 
who tended to be arrested more often in the program 
period. Age also had a significant effect on arrests. 
The oldest group of youth (age 19 and up) saw arrests 
decline in the program period, while the youngest 
group (16 and under) saw arrests rise.
The researchers collected extensive information cov-
ering not only program outcomes but also the nature 
of the specific services provided. They concluded that 
6  The researchers define a “marginal decrease” as a difference 
between program and comparison group outcomes where the 
P value falls between .06 and .15 (i.e., a 6 to 15 percent chance 
that the program had no effect on the outcomes).
the comprehensive gang program model was poorly 
implemented in Bloomington-Normal, San Antonio, 
and Tucson. Implementation problems at these sites 
ranged from lack of commitment on the part of the 
lead agency to difficulty engaging the criminal justice 
system to an overemphasis on suppression. 
The research team found that implementing the 
model in San Antonio was a low priority for both 
the police department, which served as the lead 
agency, and neighborhood residents (Spergel, Wa, 
and Sosa 2005a). Bloomington-Normal law en-
forcement used the project as an opportunity to 
“mount an aggressive, no-nonsense campaign to 
repress African-American gangs” but solicited little 
input from grassroots groups (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 
2005b). Tucson’s program failed to involve a broad 
range of stakeholders and failed to develop educa-
tion and employment opportunities (Spergel, Wa, 
and Sosa 2005c).
The researchers’ evaluation of implementation efforts 
in Riverside and Mesa was more positive, but both 
projects rated poorly on scales of grassroots involve-
ment and received only “fair” marks for provision of 
educational, employment, and cultural opportuni-
ties (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2005d, e). Malcolm Klein 
and Cheryl Maxson argue that in its attempt to be 
comprehensive, the Spergel model may inadvertently 
have made implementation impossible: “The very 
complex process is both the source of the Spergel 
Model’s strength and a prescription for inadequate 
implementation. Every opportunity to bring about 
an effective component is at the same time an op-
portunity for things to go wrong” (2006). 
The results of the Comprehensive Gang Program 
replications broadly correspond to those of the Los 
Angeles and Indianapolis Ceasefire replication ef-
forts. In neither case could the replication site re-
produce the positive outcomes attained at the pilot 
site. Both cases highlight the difficulty (if not the im-
possibility) of achieving a balance between criminal 
justice agencies and suppression tactics on the one 
hand, and community stakeholders and services on 
the other. Finally, each case highlights the challenge 
of transplanting model programs to places with dif-
ferent gang problems and political cultures.
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First, we must address the personal, family, and com-
munity factors that cause young people to choose gangs 
over more productive alternatives. The more success 
we have in prevention, the fewer people we’ll have to 
prosecute for violent activity down the road.
—U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ALBERTO R. GONzALES, 2006
Although there is no clear solution for preventing 
youth from joining gangs and participating in gang-
sanctioned violence, there are evidence-based prac-
tices that work with at-risk and delinquent youth, 
the same youth who often join gangs. Whether these 
programs work with gang members depends more 
on the individual youth than on whether he or she 
belongs to a gang. 
Evidence-based practices are practices that have un-
dergone rigorous experimental design, have shown 
significant deterrent effects on violence and serious 
delinquency, have been replicated, and sustain their 
effects over a period of time. For example, an inter-
vention like multisystemic therapy (MST) provides 
intensive services, counseling, and training to young 
people, their families, and the larger network of people 
engaged in young people’s lives through schools and 
the community. MST has been shown to produce 
positive results for youth and their families, including 
improved mental health and substance use outcomes, 
reduced recidivism, and improved educational per-
formance. While the United States surgeon general 
has named only three “model” programs for treating 
violent or seriously delinquent youth—multisystemic 
therapy, functional family therapy, and multidimen-
sional treatment foster care (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services 2001)—policy makers 
continue to fund and use hundreds of programs that 
either have not been adequately evaluated or have been 
evaluated and found to be ineffective or even harmful 
(Greenwood 2006). Peter Greenwood, former director 
of the RAND Corporation’s Criminal Justice Program 
and author of Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention 
as Crime-Control Policy, warns that “delays in adopting 
proven programs will only cause additional victimiza-
tion of citizens and unnecessarily compromise the fu-
ture of additional youth” (Greenwood 2006).
Studies have shown that evidence-based practices that 
work with violent and seriously delinquent youth are 
more cost effective and produce more benefits than 
traditional punitive measures. A recent study by the 
Washington State Institute of Public Policy reported 
lower recidivism rates and higher monetary benefits 
to taxpayers and crime victims when these “model” 
programs were administered instead of detention or 
unproven alternatives (Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006). 
Furthermore, a meta-analysis of juvenile intervention 
practices found that these evidence-based programs 
were more effective when they were implemented 
in community settings than when they were used in 
custodial settings (Lipsey and Wilson 1998). A report 
by the surgeon general found that “the most effective 
programs, on average, reduce the rate of subsequent 
offending by nearly half (46 percent), compared to 
controls, whereas the least effective programs actu-
ally increase the rate of subsequent offending by 18 
percent, compared to controls” (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services 2001).
This reduction in recidivism leads to substantial 
monetary benefits to taxpayers (and emotional ben-
efits to those who avoid being crime victims) equal 
to thousands of dollars per participant (Aos, Miller, 
and Drake 2006). Spending just one dollar on evi-
dence-based programs can yield up to fifteen dol-
lars in benefits to society, whereas more punitive 
approaches like detention and juvenile boot camps 
yield less than two dollars in benefits. Utilizing these 
programs for at-risk and seriously delinquent youth, 
including gang members, can substantially increase 
public safety while saving money. 
Real Solutions to Youth Violence:  
Evidence-Based Practices 
ChAPTER 8
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Figure 8.1. For every dollar spent on Functional Family Therapy, 
there are almost $15 worth of benefi ts to taxpayers and victims 
of crime. In comparison, placing juveniles in county detention 
provides less than $2 in benefi ts.
 Juvenile County Multisystemic Multidimensional Functional 
 Boot Detention* Therapy Treatment Foster Family
 Camps*   Care (MTFC) Therapy on
     Probation
* County Detention and Juvenile Boot Camp numbers were calculated in 2002, the most 
recent year available.                      Sources: Aos, Miller, and Drake 2006, and Aos 2002
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Given the very high cost that citizens appear to as-
sociate with any victimization in their community, 
it would be foolish to put money into a crime-pre-
vention eﬀ ort that did not maximize the size of the 
crime-prevention eﬀ ect.
—PETER GREENWOOD
Public opinion on the issue of rehabilitation versus 
incarceration for youthful off enders is mixed, but 
recent polls indicate that people are more willing to 
pay for rehabilitation programs than for longer prison 
sentences when the programs are proven to reduce 
crime. A 2006 poll of 1,500 Pennsylvania residents 
found that, given the option of using tax dollars for 
either rehabilitation or incarceration of young people 
in confl ict with the law, the average person was will-
ing to pay 21 percent more of his or her tax money 
for rehabilitation programs for delinquent youth than 
for increasing a young person’s length of incarceration 
(Nagin et al. 2006). Another recent poll of 1,300 U.S. 
households found that the average household would 
be willing to spend between $100 and $150 per year 
“for crime prevention programs that reduced specifi c 
crimes by 10 percent in their communities, with the 
amount increasing with crime seriousness” (e.g., rob-
beries versus murders) (Cohen et al. 2004). 
Th e fi nding that taxpayers are willing to pay for pre-
vention and rehabilitation programs is in contrast to 
the belief popular among politicians that their con-
stituents are demanding more punitive responses 
to criminal activity. One reason this view persists 
is that much of society is still unaware of the eff ec-
tiveness of rehabilitation alternatives for delinquent 
youth (Greenwood 2006). Once the success of these 
programs is better publicized, lawmakers and politi-
cians may be more willing to give them a chance, as 
some have already done. For example, the Pennsyl-
vania Commission to Address Gun Violence recom-
mended in its 2005 report that the state continue 
to implement “evidence-based programs to address 
violence, which, in turn, impacts gun violence, and 
encourage the selection of those programs proven to 
be cost-eff ective.” 
In 1996 the Center for the Study and Prevention of 
Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder designed and launched a national violence 
prevention initiative to identify eff ective violence 
prevention programs. Th e project, called Blueprints 
for Violence Prevention, has identifi ed 11 prevention 
and intervention programs that meet a strict sci-
entifi c standard of program eff ectiveness and have 
been eff ective in reducing adolescent violent crime, 
aggression, delinquency, and substance abuse. Soon 
after Blueprints’ initiation, the Offi  ce of Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) became 
an active supporter of the project and provided fund-
ing to sponsor program replications in sites across the 
United States. When Blueprints was fi rst published 
in 1998, functional family therapy had been evalu-
ated 14 separate times and has since been replicated 
at hundreds of sites across the country; multisystemic 
therapy has been replicated in more than 80 sites and 
evaluated in four randomized trials; and multidi-
mensional treatment foster care has been evaluated 
in four trials and now has been replicated dozens of 
times across the country, with plans for more pro-
gram sites in the works (Greenwood 2006; TFC 
Consultants undated). 
Over the past decade, criminal-justice agencies were 
provided with ample opportunities and funding to 
develop prevention programs through the federal Of-
fi ce of Justice Programs and the COPS program estab-
lished by the 1994 crime bill. Very few of the programs 
attempted have been identifi ed as promising, and not 
one is considered proven. 
—PETER GREENWOOD (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Th e Bureau of Justice Assistance noted in its evalu-
ation of gang programs that traditional law enforce-
ment eff orts are in the long run not eff ective at 
addressing gang violence and that “most stand-alone 
gang prevention, intervention and suppression pro-
grams in the community that have generated posi-
tive results have generally produced modest and/or 
short-term impacts” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 
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website). Greenwood warns that one entity should 
not share the responsibility of both prevention and 
punitive activities, which blurs the boundaries be-
tween them; one may start to overrun the other, ren-
dering both ineffective. 
Primary responsibility for developing and operating 
delinquency-prevention programs should be assigned 
to an appropriate agency in HHS [health and human 
services] unless immediate public protection is an over-
riding concern. 
—PETER GREENWOOD
One of the reasons criminal justice programs are 
ineffective is the primary focus of law enforcement 
on immediate solutions to threats to public safety 
rather than long-term solutions to underlying 
problems. In contrast, health and human services 
(HHS) agencies focus on the long-term goals of 
educating and training individuals to learn how to 
deal with their own lives with their well-being in 
mind. Greenwood notes that “the primary capabili-
ties of [HHS] agencies lie in assessing and prioritiz-
ing individual risks and needs, and ensuring that 
those plans are carried out to the extent permitted 
by available resources.”
HHS staff members are better equipped to handle 
delinquency problems, as is evidenced by their track 
record of outperforming law enforcement staff at 
some of the same programs while also better moni-
toring the outcomes, despite chronic underfunding 
for these services. There are several prevention and 
intervention programs run in residential settings 
that are similar to those used in the community, but 
they have not been shown to render the same results. 
Treatment in residential settings may include milieu 
therapy, which utilizes the entire environment to be 
therapeutic, and programs such as individual coun-
seling and social casework. These programs have been 
found to be ineffective, for many reasons, when they 
are implemented in residential settings; one of the 
most prevalent reasons is that the programs are run 
in an artificial setting, making it hard for the young 
people to apply the skills they learned in the program 
when they return to the community (Greenwood 
2006). Community-based versions of these pro-
grams, such as multisystemic therapy and functional 
family therapy, which are run by HHS agencies, dig 
deeper into the social and everyday issues that young 
people face, and they work on problem-solving skills 
that are more applicable to life in the community. 
These programs have been critically evaluated and 
proven to work with at-risk and delinquent young 
people—in contrast to similar programs in residen-
tial settings that have not been evaluated.
 “Criminal justice agencies,” Greenwood writes, 
“rarely evaluate the effectiveness of their programs 
or activities, while HHS programs are more often 
evidence-based and subject to evaluation.” In other 
words, law enforcement programs have not been 
and cannot be evaluated in the same manner as evi-
dence-based programs provided through HHS, so 
there is no evidence in support of their effectiveness 
at preventing and deterring crime. Therefore, fund-
ing should be reallocated from the criminal justice 
system to proven programs through HHS, in order 
to get the maximum benefits.
Additionally, providing education and employment 
services has been shown to correlate with lower crime 
rates. According to the OJJDP, “If, as research has 
found, educational failure leads to unemployment 
(or underemployment), and if educational failure 
and unemployment are related to law-violating be-
havior, then patterns of educational failure over time 
and within specific groups may help to explain pat-
terns of delinquent behavior” (Snyder and Sickmund 
2006). Providing education and employment services 
for at-risk youth to increase graduation rates, as well 
as wages and employment rates, could greatly reduce 
crime, benefiting both young people and society as a 
whole (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001; Grogger 
1998; Lochner and Moretti 2004).
As the evidence that punitive responses to youth crime 
do not effectively increase public safety mounts, law-
makers and law enforcement should support imple-
mentation of evidence-based practices to treat young 
people who are in conflict with the law. Furthermore, 
policy makers must realize that funding for such pro-
grams should be routed through the health and hu-
man services system, where they have been proven to 
be more effective than in the criminal justice system, 
and implement such policies accordingly.
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